Questions & Answers on Naval History till the Bru Runs Out Take 2

Start with Friedman's and R. A. Burt's books on British battleships, John Roberts's work on British warships in the Second World War, and the naval architects' reports.

Fewer than might be assumed because active warships spent little time in harbor, though ships already under repair remained exposed.

Yes, when a wreck descends gently, avoids crushing pressure, and settles where chemistry and marine organisms do not rapidly consume it.

Much of the equipment could fit, but the proposed machinery power would risk driving the old hull beyond its structural limits.

The armor was substantial, but a close-range 16-inch hit could still overwhelm it.

No; Britain had a deep capital-ship and destroyer inventory, while Bismarck represented roughly a quarter of Germany's new capital ships.

Begin with Eyes of the Fleet for seaplane tenders and patrol aircraft, then use PBY Catalina unit histories for the Pacific and Atlantic.

Identify the rangefinder marks fitted to the ship's guns during the owner's service, then compare the lens with those instruments.

The gun itself might look familiar, but its breech and loading system would probably be automated.

She would have been easier for the second strike to hit and might have been sunk during the destroyers' night attacks.

The airframe, especially aft, would need strengthening for a tailhook, and folding surfaces might be required for carrier stowage.

No single simple cause explains it; armored, redundant battleship steering was a complicated system with many possible failure points.

It would likely have led to substantially larger Type 45 and Type 83 successors rather than the smaller Type 42 route.

Yes; French, Russian, Japanese, and British examples show that institutional rigidity and uncorrected design assumptions were widespread.

Ushant is the nearest plausible landmark, but so many earlier actions already carry that name that another Battle of Ushant would create confusion.

It would likely be larger, faster, more heavily armed, and better protected because a replacement had to justify itself over an existing modern generation.

The basic working uniform changed little, although flash gear and other protective clothing improved.

Its ability to leak and flow through a damaged, burning ship makes the apparent handling advantage dangerously unattractive.

Yes; supply vessels carried stores and some ammunition, but food was their most important recurring cargo.

They could support peacetime air surveillance, but a wartime site would be a fixed, known target requiring its own defenses.

Technically yes, but that degree of structural reconstruction would cost much like an entirely new ship.

A sealed ship might remain afloat, but shock would ruin shaft alignment, machinery, electronics, and turret systems.

Not lidar, but specialized side-looking or sub-bottom sonar mounted on a deep-sea vehicle might reveal buried damage.

Replacement components require less industrial infrastructure than an entire ship, while the setting's largest construction docks may have been lost or damaged.

They would probably have followed Japan's movement toward the fast battleship rather than resembling an older battlecruiser such as Hood.

Yes, but war forced navies to freeze and implement technologies already in development rather than continue a leisurely adoption process.

They would probably serve much like existing armoured cruisers but could be labelled dreadnought cruisers, leaving the faster Queen Mary generation to define the battlecruiser category.

Probably not by nationality alone; larger later destroyers from either navy might fare better, but every design would suffer in such conditions.

They were used when practical, but slow spotters were vulnerable wherever enemy fighters or carriers could contest the air.

Possibly, because a stronger carrier fleet could alter Norway, Mers-el-Kebir, and Taranto enough to reduce pressure on British battleships and create time for refits.

US 16-inch guns and high-pressure machinery combine with a British hull and armor scheme to produce something like a Lion-class design.

They were a significant French move toward high-temperature, high-pressure machinery, though the answer does not rank them above the American systems.

Yamato could use superior speed to influence range, but confined waters and British radar-controlled gunnery would make the fight dangerous, especially within a larger reinforced Force Z.

Large fleet carriers, G3 battlecruisers, and N3 battleships in numbers sufficient to form carrier-capital-ship task groups.

A third fleet carrier is unlikely, but several ski-jump LHDs could provide a secondary aviation role while replacing amphibious ships.

Long preparation and enabling developments can create a point at which many designers rapidly build on one another's work.

The principles overlap, but ammunition handling, mounting, and multi-gun turret interactions make naval artillery vastly more complex.

Henry VII, because he did more foundational work on naval infrastructure than the fame of Henry VIII usually suggests.

The small, crew-intensive hull would offer only an offshore-patrol-vessel level of modern capability.

Yes; crippling more Italian battleships could let R-class ships hold the Mediterranean while Queen Elizabeths reinforce the Home Fleet and Nelson or Rodney protect convoys.

The strongest explanation is that it visibly confirms the deck is clear before the launch signal, though traditions about luck or grounding are also reported.

They let Harriers and F-35Bs launch heavier loads quickly and efficiently when catapults are unavailable.

Furious had an earlier ramp-like experiment, but Hermes is the better answer for the modern ski jump, with the Invincible class first built around it.

They were excellent for their caliber but remained much less powerful than 16-inch guns; their real significance is how treaty limits suppressed true heavy-cruiser development.

Simon Elliott's books are the recommended starting point, although the exact title covering Pannonia is not identified in the answer.

Its speed requirement repeatedly destabilized the armor arrangement, making aircraft-carrier conversion a more useful employment of the large hulls.

No; yard capacity is committed to Type 26 and Type 31, and restarting an obsolete production line would yield few ships at very high cost.

Yes, but the US could assign them selectively, while Japan often had to use CVLs where it would have preferred fleet carriers.

The guns could fight effectively, but a capital ship also signaled national status, and 14-inch weapons looked inadequate beside foreign 15-, 16-, and 18-inch guns.

Speed lets Bismarck avoid the fight, but the escort need not chase; to reach the merchants, the raider must enter the battleship's effective range.

The United States might supply about six, Britain one with US aircraft support, China and Italy one each, while several other fleets lacked a ready fixed-wing carrier.

A solid nickel-iron asteroid could be hollowed into a protected dock, but construction would still require separate material-handling and manufacturing facilities.

Aircraft from several carriers could attack the same target, leaving historians to dispute which group delivered the decisive damage.

Speed chiefly supplied strategic utility for the next global war of maneuver after the German North Sea threat had been defeated.

A simpler weapon produced in larger numbers and available more often can overwhelm a technically superior but unreliable opponent.

Shipbuilding supported economic activity and displayed national power, allowing Britain to signal strength without first fighting a war.

Yes; its mission space already gives it substantial capacity to operate uncrewed systems.

Communications will always be a vulnerable part of uncrewed operations, and resilient control methods will depend on the opponent and mission.

Add roughly ten meters of length to create more room for later aircraft operations and equipment.

Chinese Type 052C, 052D, and Type 055 ships, the US Zumwalt class, and Britain's Type 45 dominate the field, while some claimed destroyers are better understood as frigates.

Yes, but much of it is concentrated in oil-industry support vessels, trawlers, lifeboats, and other specialist craft.

Major investment is unlikely until a visible threat overcomes elected governments' reluctance to fund infrastructure whose payoff lies beyond one election cycle.

It did not broadly stop; priorities shifted from capital ships and carriers toward other vessels, then shifted again as requirements changed.

A rough one-third split is a useful guide, with ships also conducting training whenever they were at sea.

Hit location, resulting damage, luck, and Roma receiving two weapons produced different outcomes.

A senior officer still had to present evidence, but a responsive Admiralty could standardize a proven weapon far faster than an obstructive bureau.

Conversion is harder than in earlier liners because much of a modern cruise ship's available deck space is high above the waterline, where added weight damages stability.

The layout was an efficient engineering compromise, though a completed development might have shifted the turret forward toward a Nelson-like arrangement.

They were not designed around that armament, but open deck positions could accept guns much as other liners did during wartime conversion.

It is extremely important in anti-submarine warfare but less decisive for an air-defense ship; the mission determines the design value.

A Franco-Italian concept reportedly explored an approximately 18,000-ton expanded global-presence ship, though it may never have advanced beyond discussion.

The 12-inch battery offers more guns, faster fire, easier maintenance and ammunition production, while preserving a clearer distinction from contemporary battleships.

It could drive off a cruiser armed with 6-inch guns and might also deter an 8-inch cruiser under favourable circumstances.

It would protect and interdict commerce, show the flag globally, lead task groups, and escort carriers with enough firepower to deter or damage a raiding battlecruiser.

The 6-inch calibre is the likeliest candidate, entering service in single mounts before designers cautiously consider twins.

No single definitive reason is offered, but the French appear to have selected the best weapon they believed could be ready in time.

Yes; the plans and engineering knowledge survive, though yards would need to relearn dormant production techniques.

Large cruisers could use yards and infrastructure separate from the capital-ship program, leaving the biggest facilities concentrated on Yamato-class and still larger battleships.

No; an interim Zumwalt variant replacing the failed gun system with additional Mark 41 cells could have provided a useful missile cruiser.

It may be forced toward cruiser-sized ships by vessels such as China's Type 055, but could call them destroyers despite cruiser roles and scale.

It might desire roughly a dozen, but the strategically meaningful number is how many are built and operational before war begins.