Queen Elizabeth Class: Brave 1st step/faltering leap/something else? & Patreon 73 Comment Response

Because a major power that always used its maximum capability could turn a controlled naval competition into an uncontrolled arms race.

Yes, further batches were a plausible option, but Agincourt's addition after the Revenge orders and her place as a sixth ship make the intended programme less straightforward.

No explicit archival record is identified here. The interpretation relies on personal references and inference from other discussions.

The combination remains plausible: three twin turrets would be a layout change, while geared turbines would be the additional technology paired with small-tube boilers.

Twin 18-inch mountings fit the proposed technological sequence, but the design remains an inference. A 16-inch step offered limited benefit, and the spare 15-inch turrets can be traced to other programmes.

Dropping battleship shells was conceivable, but accurate aiming would be very difficult. The torpedo suggestion receives no developed answer.

Not necessarily. The widely understood Anglo-German naval race gave Britain a clear explanation for its construction.

To answer congressional demands for an ultimate battleship and make its cost apparent.

Only with major prior investment and added risk: Britain lacked a dependable oil stockpile, small-tube machinery was not yet assured, and three turrets would make each turret loss more damaging.

Yes, if Royal Navy training and support built the local service gradually, while Simon's Town and the Cape route gave the deployment strategic value beyond colonial policing.

Those were possible roles, but an inferior dreadnought could send a weak deterrent signal, while overseas dispersal spread the fleet and reduced vulnerability to a surprise attack.

The point concerned tactical fire control: six guns had to be tested for ranging and effective fire, regardless of the separate armour comparison.

An ahistorical fire-control setting helped the German ship score repeated long-range hits in a simulated battle.

Because contemporary usage treated battlecruisers as dreadnought-type armored cruisers and battleships as dreadnought-type battleships, with both belonging to the new capital-ship category.

No. They bring more people into naval history and make ship forms easier to inspect, although their interpretations and details are not always correct.

The proposed transfers could strengthen imperial forces by keeping ships active, spreading costs, and training personnel, provided the ships remained available for wartime recall.

Local capital ships could justify dockyard spending and create infrastructure available to the wider Royal Navy.

Hypothetical Dominion deployments could place slower battleships across Goeben's route and limit her freedom to avoid combat.

A capable senior aide could argue the professional case while the senior officer listened and assumed an apparent umpire role between the aide and the civilian leader.

British development had followed roughly 1.5-inch steps, a 16.5-inch weapon had already received substantial research, and one inch over the 15-inch gun offered too little return by British calculations.

A 28-knot Queen Elizabeth would have been a true fast battleship, making 30-knot battlecruisers difficult to justify and pressuring other navies to raise battle-fleet speed.

No. The classification used here begins at roughly 28 knots, rather than rising with each new battlecruiser generation.

Germany needed cruisers, trade protection, Baltic strength, and some battle-fleet backing, but the fleet it built was poorly integrated with national strategy and was positioned as an unmistakable threat to Britain.

The alternative faces railway and mobility limits, costly fortifications, contrary army doctrine, and possible French countermeasures. Its Baltic assumptions also confuse shallow entry routes with the depth of the sea itself.

An 18-inch ship could answer American gun development, while triple 15-inch mountings should have been useful on Courageous if available. Renown's third turret supported a more effective ranging and firing sequence.

They could strengthen imperial defence, but Canada would need major port and industrial investment. Earlier Iron Duke and Tiger orders could not simply be replaced, and a larger Queen Elizabeth programme would alter later construction choices.

No. Their design pattern shows a shipboard requirement, although a naval gun could later be adapted for land service.

Oil became sensible once Britain funded the required stockpile and infrastructure. Agincourt appears to have been a later opportunity for small-tube boilers, while the Revenge class and Renowns retained older machinery.

Churchill's memorandum set out a minimum opening position, while four fast super-dreadnoughts supplied both battle-line power and the speed that reduced the need for a more expensive battlecruiser.

No. In Royal Navy practice it tended to operate within a squadron; the separate flagship arrangement is associated here with German practice.

Britain faced worldwide naval commitments. Older ships could serve abroad, remain available for recall, and still count within the wider imperial strength facing Germany.

The 900-ton figure concerns inefficient use of weight after the move from coal to oil. Conservative machinery and hull form constrained speed, while differing displacement figures did not establish a 5,000-ton design error.

An extra year offered no guarantee of suitable boilers and would sacrifice yard time while delaying ships that might be needed for war.

Ending a major source of Anglo-German tension could create space for rapprochement or greater British neutrality, although an invasion of Belgium would still matter.

Fighting preparation remained the work of the First and Second Sea Lords, whose performance is judged favourably. The construction drive is not presented as evidence of neglect.

On paper the Italian ships were formidable, but they were never completed, and British construction was moving fast enough that Agincourt or another successor could have entered service by the time they did.

No. Belt armor on both ships varied by height and position, and quoted maximum thickness usually describes only the main waterline portion.

It was a gamble. One ship could establish a visible British lead without the provocation of a whole class, but that depended on how American industry and Congress responded.

No. The office often worked on three or four capital-ship designs concurrently.

It could, but Britain had the capacity to match that rate, and the United States would first need time to develop an 18-inch gun.

Only if the comparison also overcame Agincourt's proposed speed advantage. More guns would still leave Britain able to claim that its ship could choose when to fight.

Not consistently. Squadron organization was desirable, but changing gun generations, budgets, political additions, and industrial decisions produced uneven batches such as the four-plus-one-plus-one Queen Elizabeth sequence.

An early qualitative leap might exploit the continuing German race and American anxiety about battleship costs.

Political pressure demanded eight ships at an acceptable total price, and the funding available could not buy eight more Queen Elizabeths.

Predictions based on Russian gun numbers at Tsushima illustrate the limits of public comparisons of fleet strength.

There are personal discussions, but the policy is inferred from them. No explicit minuted statement of it is identified.

Yes. Building an earlier battlecruiser with triple mountings could bring the technology into construction sooner and change the choices available to later designs.

At least one suitable dry dock, preferably two, about two building slips for continuing construction, and industry able to supply steel and armour plate.

No. Similar broad parameters did not mean the same gun: calibre lengths differed, and the gun's power had to be reduced for Furious's framing.

Britain possessed more heavy shipbuilding capacity than even a major naval program continuously employed, and procurement choices did not distribute orders evenly among yards.

A reader's counterfactual caution: earlier British improvements would also alter later rival designs.

The Royal Navy was unlikely to accept that arrangement because one disabled turret removed one-third of the main battery; four triple turrets were more plausible, while three turrets appeared later under treaty pressure and remained unpopular.

The figures use different loading conditions and definitions. The treaty-standard comparison given is 27,500 tons for Queen Elizabeth and 25,750 for Revenge, but the competing design figures are not fully reconciled.

An extrapolation from small-tube boilers paired with geared turbines suggests roughly 120,000 shaft horsepower, or about 110,000 conservatively. It remains an estimate, not a recovered trial result.

They refer to overall length. Estimates of about 210 metres remain uncertain, and the larger armament explored in a game depends on the assumed hull.