Pseudo Patreon British Aircraft Carrier development Since 1945 (as suggested by Kyle Hardman)

Fisher did not remove them all, and the Royal Navy retained a very large pre-dreadnought inventory that still served during the First World War.

Later narratives of British decline are set against the Royal Navy's confidence in its technology and operating methods at the end of the Second World War.

The Royal Navy's 1945 carrier outlook shows what cancellation of the large Malta class removed from the postwar fleet.

They would probably have begun with Firebrands and the contemporary late-war Fleet Air Arm group.

They were national counterparts converging on a large carrier that combined armor, fleet survivability, and a powerful strike air group.

Yes; its large hull and machinery would have given it strong potential for jet-age conversion.

They made the choice understandable, but Britain could instead have sold light carriers and concentrated resources on Malta.

The image appears to show Sea Furies, a twin-engine Sea Hornet or Sea Mosquito, a Westland Dragonfly, and perhaps Fulmars, though the artwork is not definitive.

Yes; their size and late-1940s completion date could plausibly have supported 30 to 40 years of jet-age service.

The existing backlog made Malta politically difficult, but many light carriers were later exported and could have been traded for a smaller, more capable fleet.

He considers Tomcat unlikely and suggests Britain might have waited for a Hornet-family aircraft able to replace both Phantom and Buccaneer.

Yes; he considers that a plausible way to concentrate resources on the more capable Malta class.

Probably not necessarily; the larger deck could have supported the E-2 Hawkeye, removing the size-driven reason to persist with Gannet.

The Royal Navy's effort to operate heavier jets from light carriers leads into the steam catapult, angled flight deck, and mirror landing sight.

Completing Malta promised combat power and greater British negotiating weight after the war.

She was a specialized support carrier whose conversion was not worth the cost, and her light-fleet hull had been built for a short wartime service life.

Postwar Britain compensated for a smaller fleet by pioneering carrier systems that the larger US Navy then adopted.

The proposed P.139B shows the scale and unusual shape required to place a powerful British AEW radar aboard a carrier aircraft.

Nick Goodhart's wartime engineering and flying experience culminates in a landing aid that sharply reduces carrier accidents.

A profile of civilian engineer Colin Mitchell explains the arresting-gear and steam-catapult work that enabled heavier carrier aircraft.

Eric 'Winkle' Brown's record of deck operations shows how flight testing turned new carrier concepts into practical procedures.

The proposed aircraft was roughly 14 meters long with a 15-meter span, weighed about 20.4 tonnes gross, and used two turbofans around a large AEW radar fit.

A compact aircraft survey shows how piston fighters, strike aircraft, and airborne early warning shared British carrier decks from 1945 into the Korean War era.

CVA-01's cancellation undercut his planned naval-attaché path, and his frustration with the decision contributed to his leaving the Navy.

The system required reliable high-pressure storage, seals, and shipboard piping, and lighter early aircraft did not need that launch power.

Early aircraft did not need steam catapults; the system became necessary only when naval aircraft grew much heavier.

By the mid-1950s the Royal Navy must fit larger jets and new air-defence ideas into a fleet dominated by smaller wartime carrier hulls.

About 11,000 tons at standard displacement: roughly 47,600 tons for Malta versus 36,800 tons for Audacious.

The 1956 Suez deployment demonstrates that Britain still possessed carrier capacity matched by almost no navy except the United States.

The Admiralty retained specialist staff, naval constructors, its own yards, and a steady production rhythm that strengthened cost knowledge and industrial continuity.

The 1955 air group combines turboprop strike aircraft, day and all-weather jets, and Skyraider airborne early warning on Britain's increasingly constrained carrier decks.

It did not need shareholder profit, but it did need a steady workload that justified retaining the yard, workforce, and cost knowledge.

Yes; career specialists preserve the institutional memory needed to judge designs, costs, and suppliers across successive programs.

The domestic program includes technology transfer, local infrastructure, and adaptation to Australian operating requirements that the foreign-yard unit price leaves out.

No operational Sea Hunter was produced, although navalized studies existed and a hooked Hunter trainer supported Fleet Air Arm testing.

The early 1960s bring Soviet submarine pressure and a growing requirement to integrate airborne warning, command and control, and missile defence.

It could have kept a slow continuous Collins-class build going, preserving skills and evolving the design instead of rebuilding the industrial base for each program.

Australia would probably have acquired Sea Harriers, and Invincible could potentially have remained in service for decades.

Partly: smaller carriers lost capacity as aircraft grew, while Malta-sized ships could have sustained heavier strike and early-warning aircraft for much longer.

Aircraft could overhang the ship's side while moving, and obsolete centerline lifts could later be removed to save weight and free hangar space.

Yes; the fleet looked sufficient on paper, but modernizing wartime carriers such as Victorious proved extensive and expensive.

Earlier centerline lifts were cheaper, strong, and compatible with armored hangars, while deck-edge lifts became more useful as aircraft size increased.

He argues yes: its displacement margin, large hangars, and adaptable lift arrangement could have supported modernization into the 1990s.

HMS Bulwark's embarked aircraft show how fighters, night interception, anti-submarine warfare, early warning, and rescue fit into one air group.

They shared information but retained different national design concepts and operating styles, so each developed its own carrier.

An unbuilt carrier cannot reveal the construction defects, operating problems, or conversion difficulties that fleet service might have exposed.

The MiG-19 outperformed it but was later and land-based; the MiG-17 is a fairer contemporary comparison, while the Sea Hawk carried more cannon ammunition.

CVA-01's dimensions and air group lead into the wider plan for four British carrier groups with air-defence destroyers, anti-submarine frigates, and auxiliaries.

Many; the displayed drawing is only one of the versions closest to the likely final design.

Only partly: ministers initially understood the ships as helicopter cruisers and did not fully appreciate the future purpose of the ski jump, while naval personnel recognized their carrier potential.

A force-structure argument pairs strike carriers with aviation-capable amphibious ships to preserve deployable flight decks and independent reach.

Yes; Harrier was what gave them a practical fixed-wing carrier role.

A conversion may be technically possible, but he would not recommend it because the current STOVL arrangement better fits Britain's force structure.

It was not suitable for that role; Sea King helicopters provided the carrier group's practical ASW capability.

The area beside the ski jump could support drone launches and uncrewed F-35 wingmen, although this remains a speculative use rather than a finalized system.

Two strike carriers and three LHDs is a plausible minimum; three carriers and four LHDs would provide stronger continuous availability.

The useful size rises with the era: modern aircraft, sensors, support systems, and crew needs make a roughly Queen Elizabeth-sized carrier appropriate today.

He thinks their operational visibility during late-Cold-War and post-Cold-War interventions would have made retention and replacement politically attractive.

The P.139 AEW airframe might have produced an anti-submarine variant during the Cold War.

Probably not as a straightforward conversion, because carrier landing loads would require major redesign of the undercarriage and surrounding airframe.

She was already on course to win, while the Falklands victory strengthened and cemented that advantage.

The first Chinese carriers are framed as deliberate learning platforms rather than finished expressions of fleet capability.

No; the shock loads must be carried through the surrounding airframe, so a credible conversion would require extensive structural redesign.