Patreon 82: WNT Nations during 1920s/30s, what was their biggest mistake & missed opportunity?

Treaty-era choices can be judged by the alternatives available and whether their consequences could later be repaired.

No. It would have been useful, while broader treaty-linked force-structure failures rank higher.

The absence of a Washington Treaty submarine limit offered the Dominions a route to build local underwater forces and Pacific defenses.

Not necessarily. Java and De Ruyter met Dutch needs, while larger alternatives raised other problems.

They might, but greater spending would not guarantee effective equipment or the industrial capacity to deploy it.

An O- or Odin-class design offered a plausible long-range model, while smaller boats could strengthen local defense.

David Beatty's contrasting record as captain and admiral raises a problem of promotion: success in commanding one ship did not establish readiness to direct a fleet.

Civilian naval architects could serve as Royal Navy constructors after training through the Admiralty dockyard system.

County-class cruisers could have linked Canadian sea-lane protection and Empire naval cooperation to investment in domestic shipyards.

No. Admirals could be moved to the non-serving yellow list, while captains could be left on half-pay and out of active employment.

Probably not. The expected political limit was only a few ships, and Washington imposed no separate heavy-cruiser quota.

Continuous construction of small escorts could have created a large escort force while sustaining shipyards and skilled employment across the Empire.

Four mountings gave better redundancy: losing one cost a quarter of the battery instead of roughly a third, while four triples would not fit the treaty displacement.

Finishing a Francesco Caracciolo-class battleship, and perhaps converting a sister hull, could have reshaped Italian naval leverage in the Mediterranean.

Probably not. Italy had precedents among the other powers, while France had strong financial and security reasons to remain in the treaty system.

It would have provided more manufacturing experience. Better quality control was a possible benefit.

A technically good sonar remained a boutique system because Italian industry could not supply enough sets for both submarines and surface escorts.

Total tonnage was easier to misrepresent, so separate classifications offered a more enforceable treaty.

It would have forced earlier decisions about doctrine and service control and given aircraft manufacturers a carrier air group to supply.

Possibly, but the comparison with Eagle does not establish a firm speed for the proposed Italian carrier.

The Abyssinian crisis greatly expanded Italy's interwar empire, which collapsed after the Second World War.

Such a force would have alarmed France and pushed Britain to reconsider the treaty terms.

The Cape's strategic position made South African cruisers and locally built escorts more useful than a token naval contribution.

Possible choices included Cape Town or the provinces of Transvaal, Natal, Orange Free State, and Cape of Good Hope.

Not in the 1920s: maritime aviation lacked the weapons, basing network, and anti-submarine follow-through to replace surface forces.

South Africa could not assume that British ships would be available locally. Its own naval contribution would have strengthened both Cape defenses and its claim on shared resources.

Interwar claims about aircraft often described future possibilities while overlooking the bases, maintenance, surface forces, and payload limits of a force that could actually operate.

Large transport payloads carry fuel and range penalties and do not establish what a bomber can routinely deliver.

French acceptance of naval parity with Italy left France unable to cover both Mediterranean and imperial commitments alone.

It gained a way out of the Anglo-Japanese alliance while France became more dependent on British maritime support.

Possible bargains included permitting Caracciolo in exchange for more French tonnage or arguing for a separate distant-water squadron.

The burden brought influence: France could redeploy ships only when Britain covered the gaps.

Yes. France delayed so long that it used battleship tonnage for tasks a stronger cruiser force should have covered.

It could have widened colonial recruitment or created a naval Foreign Legion using experienced foreign sailors and officers.

A proposed wartime union sought to keep France in the war as its government collapsed.

Cruisers and a larger sloop force could have used Indian dockyards to protect coastal supply routes and build naval capacity before war.

A larger Royal Indian Navy might have created one shared professional institution across communities, although four cruisers could not determine India's political future.

An escort reserve could have threatened the experienced crews needed to expand wartime submarine forces.

Bombay's existing repair and construction facilities offered a realistic base for cruiser, sloop, and later destroyer production.

Probably not. The Indian armed forces and the Royal Indian Navy remained overwhelmingly loyal during the war.

Possibly. A yard developed through cruiser construction might later have been able to build light or light-fleet carriers.

Yes, but Washington did not cap the total number of cruisers or smaller ships, so Dominion programs still had considerable room to grow.

A tentative account of Indian industrial problems emphasizes preferential contracts, concentrated capacity, and poorly understood economic consequences.

Possibly. It could have contributed ships directly and freed British escorts for the main war zones.

Their designed speed could not exceed 20 knots. Turbine-powered ships could still run faster than that in practice.

No. They could produce most of the ship after sustained investment, although specialized eight-inch guns might still have been imported from Britain.

No. Their four-inch guns were unsuitable against battleships; their real value was anti-submarine warfare, convoy escort, and merchant-raider defense.

Because triple six-inch mountings were not yet available in the 1920s, and Washington placed no overall limit on the number of eight-inch cruisers.

After Amagi was lost to earthquake damage, Japan could have built a purpose-designed carrier instead of accepting Kaga's limitations.

Japan's controlled shipyards and opaque industrial reporting made submarines a more practical field for treaty evasion than conspicuous surface ships.

No. They could still invest in yards and build many uncapped ship types; the failure to sustain that capacity was a government choice.

Purchasing cruisers from Britain could have helped New Zealand gain naval influence while attracting trained personnel and their families.

No. Its restrictions applied to specified Pacific areas, while many Atlantic, Australian, Indian, and Singapore defenses remained open to investment.

Yes in principle: barrels, and perhaps complete naval turrets emplaced ashore, could later be reused, but governments first had to fund them.

The United States had treaty room for cruisers but delayed building the scouting and presence force its fleet required.

American cruiser orders could have encouraged British construction and increased pressure on Japanese budgets and German raiding plans.

Only ships fitted with torpedoes could have contributed. American cruiser armament varied, so an earlier discovery remains speculative.

That criticism fits York and Exeter better than the original Counties. Other classes reflected different requirements and circumstances.

Keeping two Lexington-class battlecruisers alongside two carrier conversions would have produced a different American fast-scouting force.

A much larger Anglo-American cruiser force could have raised the cost of German raiding and signaled that the treaty powers remained willing to defend the maritime order.

Australia understood its maritime exposure but cancelled a shipbuilding program that could have strengthened industry and sea-lane defense.

Domestic shipbuilding orders could direct spending into Australian industry, while tax cuts left investment choices to their recipients.

Distance between population centers and reliance on global trade strengthened Australia's need for collective maritime security.

No. A treaty-compliant aircraft carrier could not carry guns larger than eight inches.

New Zealand could not independently fund, crew, or maintain its Royal Navy battlecruiser; smaller cruisers were a much more plausible national force.

Britain repeatedly assumed it could surge-build small escorts later instead of sustaining a larger annual program.

No. Australia could plausibly grow from light cruisers toward County-class construction, but battlecruisers required a different scale of industrial capacity.

F3 offered at least 28 knots and a possible margin for more armor within the treaty limit, in exchange for some of Nelson's protection.

An F3 gun program could have shaped fleet-wide refits and a nine-gun King George V design, although the planned gun's exact calibre length is uncertain.

No. Canada might have developed the capacity for cruisers, but a capital ship required a far larger and more specialized industrial base.

Possibly. Besides conversions, more cruisers already in service could have allowed Britain to concentrate wartime construction on light fleet carriers.

None had a complete, readily usable independent capability: Soviet, German, and Spanish capacity was each compromised in a different way.

An eight-versus-nine-gun comparison weighs an additional gun against the redundancy of another turret.

Treaty rules left useful construction options open, but governments still had to fund the ships and industrial capacity their security required.

A treaty is easier to sustain when its members consider continued compliance to be in their own interests.

An F3-style Nelson and Rodney could have kept pace with Ark Royal while providing stronger protection against Italian capital ships.

Yes, in European and English-language sources, although that evidence reflects a Western perspective.