Kongōs at Jutland: IJN goes all or nothing in the North Sea in WWI... Patreon Premier 3

Japan's proposed European deployment depends on whether committing its fleet to Britain offers more security than keeping the ships at home.

A November 1915 decision allows time for Japan to reconsider Pacific security, gain European combat experience, and strengthen the British alliance.

The proposed deployment sends Kongo-class battlecruisers, Fuso, older battleships, and Togo Heihachiro to make Japan's alliance commitment impossible to ignore.

The Kongos' 14-inch guns and intended battle role explain why they would be a powerful addition to the British battlecruiser force.

Japan's semi-dreadnoughts would complicate Grand Fleet gunnery, but their mixed batteries could reinforce Channel defence and provide fire support ashore.

Fuso's twelve 14-inch guns would add fighting power, while sending Japan's newest dreadnought would give the deployment greater diplomatic weight.

Togo's standing after Tsushima would give Japan a senior representative able to press its interests with British naval and political leaders.

Fuso would join Jellicoe's battleships, the older Japanese battleships would reinforce the Channel, and the Kongos would enter Beatty's command after months of joint training.

The expedition needs a vice admiral with senior command experience, while Japan must retain capable leadership for the fleet left at home.

Fuso's sister could join in 1917, while accelerated construction of two later ships might eventually create a four-ship Japanese battle squadron.

Kawachi, Settsu, a Japanese rear admiral, and a destroyer flotilla could give the Channel force enough strength and seniority for a larger command.

Attaching part of a Japanese destroyer flotilla to the Harwich Force would provide almost continuous operational experience before Jutland.

Fuso's place near Jellicoe would allow time to learn British procedures before its rear admiral potentially took command of a division.

A Japanese vice admiral could become Beatty's second in command, while culturally sensitive squadron naming and months of exercises prepare the combined force.

Accommodating the Kongos at Rosyth could lead to rotating British squadrons through Scapa Flow for more gunnery practice.

Kaba- and Kamikaze-class destroyers would provide escorts, while Ibuki- and Tsukuba-class armored cruisers offer support subject to fleet speed requirements.

Adding the Kongo-class battlecruisers would give Beatty a larger fast force whose 14-inch guns could put the German scouting group under pressure from the opening action.

A Japanese report of the opening action could reach Jellicoe despite weaknesses in Beatty's communications and accelerate the Grand Fleet's approach.

Early damage to the German battlecruisers could spare Queen Mary their concentrated fire, while Indefatigable remains especially vulnerable.

If Scheer presses into the Grand Fleet, the combined British-Japanese force may turn Jutland from an ambiguous battle into a decisive High Seas Fleet disaster.

A lesson drawn from Tsushima could keep the combined battlecruisers out of Jellicoe's main line and free them to fire from the flank or block a German retreat.

Repeated simulations suggest that Scheer is more likely to abandon the pursuit after a bloodier run to the south than accept a decisive fleet engagement.

Keeping Fifth Battle Squadron with Jellicoe would bring its strongest gunnery ships into the fleet action before they had endured the battlecruiser fight.

In the decisive branch, Jellicoe could commit destroyer flotillas and supporting cruisers to the melee, with possible Harwich Force intervention adding pressure on the German retreat.

Destroying the High Seas Fleet could bring public acclaim for Jellicoe and Togo, while Beatty's commemoration would depend on whether he survived.

Concentrated Allied naval gunfire could support a coastal advance, but six to eight months of repairs or more would constrain a Baltic offensive.

If Japan loses a Kongo at Jutland, Britain might offer Renown or Repulse as visible compensation for its ally's sacrifice.

In the decisive branch, closer Anglo-Japanese ties and an earlier peace could change naval treaty negotiations and future fleet construction.

A negotiated settlement in 1917 might force Wilhelm II to abdicate while preserving the monarchy, given the interests of the Allied monarchies.

A Jutland that ends at close range could favour ships combining pursuit speed with heavier protection and prompt investment in facilities for larger capital ships.

No. Anglo-American cooperation would probably continue alongside political disagreements, without a plausible trigger for war.

An earlier peace could reduce losses and encourage trade with Japan, while leaving some anti-submarine lessons to be learned in a later war.

In this counterfactual, former German possessions would become direct imperial acquisitions without a League mandate system, and Japan might receive more territory.

The counterfactual leaves room for completing American capital ships and retiring older British vessels, while Jellicoe's influence could favour new fast battleships.

A decisive naval victory could strengthen H. H. Asquith enough to prevent David Lloyd George from replacing him as prime minister in December 1916.

Years in Britain might change what Togo teaches the future emperor about how a constitutional monarch influences policy without directly ruling.

If the war ends early enough in 1917, Russia may still overthrow the tsar without proceeding to the Bolshevik October Revolution, radically changing the postwar balance.

Japan might consider heavy naval losses acceptable in return for the gains from victory, leaving it with a different view of war from its European allies.