Bruships 96: Vikings, Okinawa & 2nd to Last Pre-Christmas 2022 Naval Chat

Coastal sea-denial needs differ from prestige or presence arguments. The force depends on what the coast must be protected against, and nuclear submarines are not automatically required.

Fisher removed almost everything he could justify, including battleships, cruisers, and smaller ships that still had value as overseas presence vessels.

A longship is a plausible model, since a ship that could be folded or carried would fit Viking needs on rivers and over portages.

Celebrations depended on what a ship could obtain, but decorations, special meals, and officers serving the crew were recurring morale-building customs.

Little was genuinely new at Okinawa. The campaign chiefly applied established methods of naval and air attack with greater scale and effort.

The idea can make sense because a battleship hull has structure, magazine volume, radar capacity, and enough displacement to carry very heavy anti-aircraft firepower.

A follow-up traces the officers-serving-sailors custom beyond modern Christmas practice while carefully separating fragmentary evidence from certainty.

It might retain strong deck protection without needing the full traditional belt, although converting an already-built Iowa hull would leave much of its armor in place.

Its technological power would dwarf the historical United States, but modern political division could make internal cohesion a more immediate problem than defeating an external enemy.

The extra turrets and weight pushed the design toward a size at which fewer, larger guns could make more sense than adding six-inch barrels simply to increase the count.

It might operate for months on adaptable fuels and replacement lubricants, but missiles would probably last one engagement while spare parts became the decisive constraint.

The estimate is roughly 1921-23, possibly earlier if replacement dreadnought construction moved quickly.

Only a tightly constrained reconstruction was realistic because the Revenge-class hulls lacked the internal space and margin that made the Queen Elizabeth ships better candidates.

No; an N3's nine 18-inch guns would overmatch either raider so completely that their rational choice would be to stay away.

The U.S. Navy still wanted heavy cruisers after wartime losses, and the Oregon City design supplied that requirement with an updated, heavier anti-aircraft arrangement.

The likely reason offered is that the Royal Canadian Navy, or the Canadian government, did not want the transfer.

The PT boats have the advantage because their numbers and torpedoes would force the Iowa to rely on secondary weapons while facing too many close targets at once.

Yes. The Soviet Navy needed missiles for reach, while Western navies relied on carrier aircraft and submarines to extend their striking range.

A seasonal aside recalls the December 1796 frigate action in which Nelson's Minerve captured Sabina before the prize was retaken.

The ships resemble the heavy or armored cruisers that might have emerged naturally had treaty categories not constrained cruiser development.

HMS Vanguard's dense 40 mm battery and fifteen-inch guns could have added local air defense and far-reaching naval gunfire support around San Carlos.

To an extent, but Fisher's later self-presentation made his foresight look greater than it really was.

It could not do so in any practical sense; even extreme lead protection would not remove the destructive effects of the explosion and would create an unusable ship.

Their occupied slipways and existing building programs meant that even starting a response would take at least two to four years, with Japan probably taking longer.

A plausible design is a roughly 2,500- to 3,000-ton vessel based on Singapore's Formidable-class frigate.

The follow-up matches Vanguard's dense close-range battery to the terrain that forced Argentine aircraft into short pop-up attacks over San Carlos Water.

A second pass through the counterfactual separates spectacular Tillman-style concepts from buildable ships with mature machinery, protection, and yard support.

Not exactly; the navy buys the engine, while Rolls-Royce may later buy it back so the company can study wear and service-life damage.

Missiles were scarce and quickly expended, while Belgrano's guns could keep firing and inflict sustained damage.

The later Vanguard follow-up focuses on how sustained fifteen-inch fire would affect poorly supplied Argentine positions ashore.

Bristol was already far enough into construction that canceling her would save little, while canceling the unstarted follow-on ships still reduced expenditure.

Yes. The design was practical and close enough to realization that steel cutting was only weeks away when it was canceled.

Their speed and fifteen-inch guns could have made them useful convoy escorts and cruiser hunters in the Mediterranean and South Atlantic, including against Admiral Graf Spee.

Britain could have pressed for a larger capital-ship limit, supported a 10:7 accommodation for Japan, and preserved more hulls rather than accepting so deep a numerical contraction.

Not necessarily; the task was short-range defense against non-stealth aircraft in confined terrain, and less sophisticated radars might have coped with San Carlos clutter better than North Atlantic-optimized systems.

Probably in the short term, but medium- and long-term continuation would have faced greater difficulty.

Given crews and time to reactivate them, Bulwark could add a flight deck and aircraft capacity, while a Tiger-class cruiser could strengthen gunfire and air defense around San Carlos.

It helped establish the necessary institutional base, but later pressure also came from the need to protect both coasts and from conspicuous Royal Navy visits to Pacific ports.

There is no decisive winner: Sea Cat performed poorly, Sea Wolf was scarce, Sea Dart was ill-suited to the confined engagement, and manually aimed guns filled dangerous gaps.

Depth charges probably led by raw number of kills, but Hedgehog may have been more effective across the period it was available.

The ships were packed so tightly that adding new systems required removing existing guns or equipment, which made postwar modernization difficult.

A brief Falklands assessment explains why contemporary Rapier claims cannot be accepted simply by adding the reported totals.

Imagined tonnage totals would have been a poor negotiating point, and Lexington-style eight-inch guns make more sense under later cruiser limits than under the Washington Treaty itself.

A Falklands veteran's account shows how computer-selected Rapier sites protected the shore depot while leaving ships in San Carlos poorly covered.

No; the Harriers had already transferred to Hermes and Invincible, while the ship still carried Wessex, Chinook, and Lynx helicopters.

Trincomalee and Ceylon offered more strategic routes than Singapore and could support a larger ABDA force with cruisers, destroyers, staff facilities, and a carrier.

The detailed follow-up shows why losing three Chinooks mattered more to the land campaign than the mistaken story about Harriers aboard.

Italian troops and ships already served alongside the Allies after the 1943 armistice, and their naval forces would likely have been drawn east if an invasion of Japan demanded every available ship.

The proposed force has a Far East presence ship, one large air-defense ship per carrier group, another for the South Atlantic, and enough Type 45, Type 26, and Type 31 escorts to sustain carrier and general duties.

A later qualification separates the helicopter lift needed for supplies from the much larger capacity required to move the whole ground force.

Long Beach made sense as a test bed, but her two reactors and tall superstructure would have benefited from a broader heavy-cruiser hull lineage rather than a light-cruiser-derived one.

It would have drawn in nearly every available Allied and friendly navy, creating an armada larger and more multinational than the fleet assembled for any earlier operation.

Nuclear surface ships competed for scarce reactor-design and engineering capacity even though the Navy did build some beyond carriers and submarines.

No; Japanese submarines were unlikely to sustain an Atlantic threat, so anti-submarine forces could shift toward the Red Sea and Indian Ocean approaches.

The command follow-up divides the invasion fleet into Soviet-led northern, American eastern, and British/Commonwealth southern approaches.

No; coverage, data access, allied dependence, communications, and the possibility of satellites being disabled all make organic sensors necessary.

The tank discussion compares limited Japanese production and maintenance problems with the thousands of Allied vehicles available for an invasion.

The tenders would be numerous and deliberately convertible, with trunking, removable superstructure, hangar levels, and a deck-edge lift arranged to accept a wartime flight deck quickly.

The featured Viking history book uses Gotland and Faro to connect Norse language, island travel, Bronze Age ship settings, and newly discovered rock carvings.

A follow-up distinguishes total Chi-Ha production from the much smaller number of Japanese tanks carrying the most powerful late-war guns.

Turkey needs to win customers, while established American and European helicopter producers already have large domestic and allied markets for their next designs.

Phantoms and Buccaneers would help, but the Gannet airborne-early-warning aircraft supplied the most important capability.

Only if the ship can also house and feed the gun crews, store enough ammunition, and sustain the weapon without creating a separate supply burden.

A tank-history aside explains how the Tiger purchased for Japan remained in Europe and was taken back into German service after D-Day.

The Okinawa book discussion turns into a concise tour of Operation Iceberg objectives, landing beaches, airfields, anchorage needs, and naval task-force organization.

Japan's lighter tank designs reflected roads and terrain that would also constrain Allied maneuver during an invasion.

A ship-list passage makes the scale of Okinawa visible through American fast carriers, the British Pacific Fleet, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers.

A land-war aside connects the Soviet victory over Japan in 1939 with the combat reputation of formations later transferred west.

A plausible refit would draw from equipment already developed for Bristol and the Type 42 line, with a mix around Type 1022, Type 996, and Type 909 illuminators.

The counterfactual favors a compact, well-armored, economical vehicle over a heavy tank unsuited to Japan's roads and fuel position.

The invasion-of-Japan discussion explains why one kamikaze hit could remove an American carrier from the campaign even when it did not sink the ship.

Daring-class destroyers offered 4.5-inch guns, numerous 40 mm weapons, and space to act as local command ships despite their lack of missiles.

No; attacks could begin in mass, but fighters, heavy anti-aircraft fire, and 40 mm defenses progressively broke formations into the isolated aircraft seen reaching individual ships.

Their wartime organizations and experience differed from the modern units; other commandos and Far East formations were more immediately prepared, while postwar forces later absorbed these wartime lineages.

A trial group of three or four ships could test the concept before the navy committed to mass production.

Yes, especially during long operations in the Indian Ocean and Far East; shorter Mediterranean sorties often returned to port before food and fuel became the limiting factor.

A comparative aside links wheeled armor and mobile air defense in Japan and Italy to mountains, islands, and constrained road networks.

The British carriers were never meant to enter San Carlos Bay. They stayed at sea to provide fighter cover while the amphibious force and shipping handled the bay, and bringing carriers into that confined water would have been operationally absurd.

Japan could be divided like Germany, tying British forces to an occupation that balanced Soviet power and making Britain's 1956 Suez intervention harder to attempt.

The Royal Navy would probably combine the islands during a major conversion. The quoted 80- to 108-aircraft capacity applies to smaller late-World War II aircraft.

Japanese radar development followed a cottage-industry pattern, producing successive small batches that improved incrementally without converging on large standardized production.

Probably; preserving the throne could provide a symbol for eventual reunification and deny the Soviets an important source of political legitimacy.

A short follow-up shows why possessing advanced working magnetrons did not give Japan an Allied-scale radar system.

Uniform guns would make the design more coherent, but 16.5-knot speed and weak modernization margins still confine it mainly to useful Baltic service rather than front-line North Sea battle.

The post-battle aside links Ottoman alignment with Germany to conspicuous British, French, and American sympathy for Greece in 1913.

The effect would probably be delay rather than permanent denial, because magnetron work was not uniquely British; particular cathodes, applications, and implementations were the more sensitive knowledge.

The political aside warns that image-driven argument collapses distinct traditions into emotionally charged labels.

A sustained social-history discussion rejects a single cause for falling birth rates and links family choices to mortality, marriage, contraception, cost, care, and public services.

No. Public provision of infrastructure, education, healthcare, and military support is separate from centralized control over peaceful private life.

The feat would make Spee a national naval hero and likely propel him to full admiral, a high command, the Baltic, or a major advisory post even if the exact succession remained uncertain.

Without the 1945 slowdown, ships could launch in 1946 and commission during a long campaign; crews would come from new entrants and from escorts and older carriers released after Germany's defeat.

A blockade would not produce a quick decision. It would take years and still might not achieve the desired political result.

No; British, French, Italian, and Ottoman ships all provided relief when they encountered disasters, although large centrally organized deployments are more recent.

A command-culture anecdote recounts the king's reaction when Beatty stopped a fog exercise rather than accept defeat by a subordinate.

The route follow-up explains how the East Asia Squadron's unlikely return depends on the Grand Fleet watching a larger German movement while Spee hugs Norway.

No. Armored cruisers were genuinely useful for the missions and strategic conditions of their own period.

Britain would finish more Battle-class ships, accelerate and possibly enlarge the Daring class, and shift production away from Atlantic corvettes and frigates toward destroyers, cruisers, and carriers.

Dual mounts offer wartime concentration of fire, while modern single mounts are often chosen because they are simpler and cheaper to maintain.

British postwar bankruptcy was real, yet the state still invested in nuclear weapons, aircraft, sensors, and ships.

They normally liaise with local authorities and respond to requests, while the naval officer retains responsibility for deciding what the ship and crew can carry out.

The Sea Fury and related late-war aircraft would probably enter broader operational service because the carrier war would still need new fighters.

The institutional-history aside explains why 1948 marks an amalgamation of existing services as well as the foundation of a national system.

A council case study connects pay settlements to independent negotiation, post-freeze recovery, London wage competition, and retention of experienced staff.

Yes; Britain spent heavily to slow the two-ship program, a third hull would benefit from accumulated yard experience, and three ships preserve two-carrier availability when one suffers a defect or accident.