Bruships 151: Naval History Questions Answered, Boxes Packed & July Patreon Vote

They would bring overwhelming bomb load and speed, but carrier recovery would not be realistic, so Pearl Harbor airfields become the practical base.

The answer places early major-gun automated-loading attempts around 1901, before HMS Dreadnought, alongside late-1890s dreadnought-era thinking.

Probably not immediately; existing orders could keep Brewster operating, while the strain of rapid wartime expansion was a major source of its difficulties.

Cruisers, torpedo boats, sloops, and possibly monitor or battleship guns could have strengthened Finland, though many hulls would be worn.

The attribution rests on the balance of probabilities created by salvo timing, firing angles, and which German ship was most likely to hit the fatal location.

Age, staff structure, and role expectations mattered; cruiser captains were expected to be more judicious, though some cruiser jobs still wanted aggressive officers.

The likeliest European crisis point is 1942, although Japan might still begin its own war in 1941 while a European conflict takes longer to ignite.

The Luftwaffe would be destroyed within hours, with most of that time spent flying east to reach aircraft retreating over Germany or Poland.

The likely alignment is an Anglo-German-Austrian-Italian bloc against France and Russia, with possible Japanese involvement and major Mediterranean consequences.

The allied European navies would hold a large maritime advantage, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance could draw Japan in if the United States and Venezuela counted as two opposing powers.

That simple ranking does not hold: the US Navy's expanding infrastructure makes it a major beneficiary too, while Japan gains little if it still chooses war in 1941.

The heavier, more complex powered mountings would drive rapid growth in hull size because ships need greater volume and stability to carry them.

The preferred group adds a command cruiser, three air-defence destroyers, four anti-submarine frigates, an attack submarine, and suitable supply ships.

Adelaide reflected Australian escort requirements, not the conversion policy Admiral Henderson might have chosen for Royal Navy Town-class cruisers.

The redesign would effectively create an early Daring-class ship, using twin 4.5-inch dual-purpose guns, torpedoes, and radar while ignoring treaties that were about to expire.

No; once a main magazine detonates, catastrophic destruction of a large portion of the ship is a recurring danger rather than an Arizona-specific anomaly.

Converting even half of the torpedoes that failed or ended on the harbor floor into hits could raise the total to roughly eighteen or twenty and make the attack substantially more destructive.

Together with Victory and Warrior at Portsmouth, they could form one of the world's finest and most heavily visited naval museums.

The concept could produce an effective anti-aircraft cruiser, but the Dido hull would need more length and beam, approaching Town-class dimensions, to support the extra firepower properly.

Drums, bugles, or station calls summoned the crew to battle stations, producing the phrase 'beating to quarters.'

Their very large size may pressure China and allied navies to respond, while Britain delays fixing the Type 83's dimensions until it can judge the emerging benchmark.

Displacement follows the required troops, landing craft, aircraft, flight spots, and operating concept, not the tonnage of a different ship already in service.

It appears when designers reach the practical power limit of a single engine and use two engines to obtain the performance the mission demands.

Britain would blockade France and Russia while Germany and Italy attacked Austria-Hungary from opposite directions, leaving the latter unable to defend both fronts.

Britain would probably complete the class, possess several 18-inch-gunned capital ships, and push any Washington settlement toward much larger displacement and gun-calibre limits.

Shells can rapidly make flooding holes as well as damage exposed systems, which is why belt armor protects the vulnerable waterline.

A steady program could replace World War I-era battleships by the early 1930s, assuming roughly four new battleships every two years.

The force would use New York, Texas, Wyoming, and Arkansas with as many cruisers and destroyers as possible, using the newest American battleships to overmatch von Spee.

Continued neutrality is more likely, with the United States trying to influence events from the sidelines unless another overwhelming cause for intervention appears.

A 16.5-inch gun could offer a better rate of fire, and a 50-calibre version would be a more practical high-performance weapon than an 18-inch 50-calibre gun.

A shared RFA could pool funding and standardize oilers, stores ships, and supply ships while allocating enough support to each participating navy.

Yes; stories of water-skiing behind major warships as plausible examples of controlled high jinks that captains could use to sustain morale.

He would probably face much less opposition because his connections to the German, Austrian, and Italian royal worlds would make him valuable to the alliance.

No; Britain used public work and naval construction to sustain employment, so continued building, maintenance, and deployments could serve economic as well as military policy.

Probably not; after the G3s and later battlecruisers enter service, the older fast ships may be retired in the third or fourth replacement batch while the Queen Elizabeth class remains useful against standard battleships.

America faces a grinding war in which its fleet cannot simultaneously protect the Atlantic coast and the Philippines from the Royal Navy and Japan.

He chooses HMS Nubian, HMS Warspite, an Illustrious-class carrier, and a Second World War U-class submarine.

Britain would probably bid aggressively, largely to prevent a rival power from acquiring strategically useful colonial territory.

Popular and scholarly narratives concentrate on wars, often compressing the two interwar decades despite their importance to ship operations and naval aviation development.

American influence over the settlement would be much smaller, making Wilson's Fourteen Points, the League of Nations, and the historical naval-treaty system unlikely.

Not really; Britain was unusual because it possessed enough cruisers for some relatively modern, adaptable hulls to become surplus.

A long budget digression challenges the claim that postwar Britain lacked the economic capacity to build the G3 battlecruisers.

Not to a decisive degree; the Royal Navy offered higher senior rank, more prize-money opportunities, and greater martial prestige, while the company also needed merchant-mariner skills.

His headline examples include judging navies only by battles, claims of an American naval victory in the War of 1812, Italian Mare Nostrum narratives, and accounts of Tsushima that neglect the Russian fleet's condition.

Britain would probably retain them for a long time, institutionalizing a separate long-range fighter fleet and perhaps creating a path toward operating the F-22.

Alaska would likely become part of Canada, strengthening it with territory and resources and producing a Canadian-led Aleutian campaign during the Second World War.

Probably not; Nelson's structure was already a reduced N3-G3 form, and pre-radar visual rangefinding encouraged designers to keep important equipment high above the water.

Both tend to survive longer in fresh water, while wooden hulls also acquire different biological growth because freshwater algae differ from marine fouling.

The plan would first improve pay, housing, retention, readiness, and the numbers of existing platforms, then add carefully chosen capabilities and long-term research.

A discussion of rejected aircraft warns that official cost explanations can be true without revealing the whole policy choice.

Matapan and North Cape are the strongest examples, where radar information was at least as important as visual identification.

Moving all three turrets forward could shorten the armored citadel, reduce displacement toward 50,000 tons, and allow construction roughly a year to a year and a half earlier, though speed might fall toward 28 knots.

It could plausibly establish a permanent lunar base and a Mars program, especially if the space race continued long enough to make a Moon station politically difficult to abandon.

It would gain a reduced-observable carrier strike aircraft and might retain a separate high-end fighter line, potentially replacing the F-14 with a naval F-22 rather than relying on the F/A-18 for both roles.

Absolute crashes might remain similar, but more aircraft, easier landing areas, better maintenance space, and improved barriers could reduce losses as a share of the force.

Such a layout was plausible and could make later conversion easier because the quadruple 14-inch barbette could accommodate a triple 16-inch mounting, unlike the smaller twin position.

Its history is evolutionary: an American appears in the early written record, Britain may have implemented a version first, and French and Japanese ideas also contributed.

Probably not; the missing twin turret and the redesign needed to fit it would defeat Vanguard's purpose of reaching service quickly with existing British 15-inch guns and rebuilt mountings.

Plans for ordinary toilets aboard certain Second World War carriers remained classified even though related catapult and arresting-gear details had been released elsewhere.

Dr. Clarke recalls an aircraft bouncing into the after part of HMS Furious during landing, with the people involved surviving.

Its components were not exceptionally advanced, so it could appear earlier once faster landing aircraft made precise glide-path guidance an urgent problem.

Yes; the plan first builds a reliable Earth-Moon system, then adds lunar observation and fuel support plus communications around Mars before sending a crew.

Merchant ships could become helicopter anti-submarine carriers quickly, making surfaced U-boat operations far more dangerous and possibly accelerating German development of Type XXI submarines.

The canals would become critical objectives, and control of them could let the Royal Navy dominate the lakes with ocean-going warships.

Pilots needed experience to judge a moving, pitching deck, and flush-deck carriers deprived them of an island structure that helped show the deck's rise and fall.

Only part of Military Sealift Command matches the RFA; the American organization is larger and performs a broader range of sealift and support missions.

Not necessarily; merchant shipping and a global base network could carry stores over long routes, leaving fast auxiliaries to bridge the shorter distance from the nearest base to the fleet.

It would operate along imperial bases from Suez, India, Ceylon, Singapore, Canada, and the Caribbean, choosing objectives that forced opponents to the end of their own supply lines.

Britain avoids the North African and much of the Mediterranean war, keeps the Suez route open, and can concentrate carriers and modernized battleships against German surface raiders.

It should invest continuously in cruisers, fleet growth, and supporting infrastructure, including Pearl Harbor.

A long strategy discussion rejects Singapore's fall as inevitable and connects command failure, interwar economies, and treaty constraints to the base's weakness.

He offers several choices: Cossack during the Altmark incident, a ship serving under Reginald Henderson, or Admiral Duncan's fleet at Camperdown.

More oilers and supply ships would let American forces deploy and advance faster across the Pacific instead of carrying so much support across long distances from limited bases.

Much of the error lies with Churchill and other politicians, arguing that British intelligence and naval officers repeatedly warned about Japan and requested carrier support.

The Royal Navy's overwhelming size would destroy Spain's fleet and let Britain seize Spanish possessions across the Caribbean and the wider world.

Yes; the route ran through Suez, the Indian Ocean, Singapore, and the South China Sea, following British bases toward Japan.

The estimate is roughly 10,000 additional tons once guns, ammunition, armor, torpedo defence, machinery, crew, and stores are included.

Gibraltar would become a major battle zone, and an Allied operation in Iberia could begin as a relief of Portugal before advancing through Spain toward France.

The South Atlantic is slightly worse, noting that broad southern latitudes contain fewer land masses to interrupt wind and wave systems.

Four or five twin turrets would be sufficient, or six for an especially powerful battery, controlled by directors on the Rock with backups below.

Britain could draw on the Dominions and empire and, crucially, on a much deeper civilian maritime industry with widespread practical technical knowledge.

Designers would exploit the wording aggressively, treating armor and equipment as detachable load and producing ships that obeyed the letter while defeating the limit's purpose.

Hood likely keeps shadowing or engaging while King George V comes up; losing Prince of Wales could push Lion-class battleships or accelerate carriers depending on how Bismarck is stopped.

The much larger Royal Navy could blockade the whole United States, crushing trade and aggravating existing political divisions before American continental infrastructure matured.

Yes; once guns, armor, and machinery approach practical limits, better shells, accuracy, and targeting information become the most useful ways to increase battleship lethality.

A no-treaty discussion explains why repeated construction cycles produce different risks from leaping directly to a Yamato-sized design after a long pause.

A limit applies to the technology of its moment; radar and other new systems change requirements and force the design to evolve even if hull size stops growing.

Washington under Willis Lee would add exceptionally accurate 16-inch fire, but the result would still depend on shell impact points, damage, and the allied command arrangement.

The classes were broadly comparable; the difference was that Britain invested more in upgrading V- and W-class destroyers while using transferred American ships mainly to fill urgent gaps.

Both countries had their own work, but shared information and joint teams eventually fused the development paths so thoroughly that later systems cannot be assigned neatly to one side.

Because construction still depends on Congress: Senate delays could interrupt the American response even as Britain resumed a familiar continuous-building pattern.