Bruships 147: Naval History Questions & Book Boxes Getting Packed

There is no defensible single design because the new ships would change treaties, rival construction, and several intervening generations of British capital ships.

It would likely place the heavy guns forward, combine missile and aviation facilities aft, and make propulsion and shock protection central design choices.

It would probably remain the world's largest navy, while British strategy might stay focused on Russia and produce a very different alliance structure before 1914.

Rams were a proven fallback, so they stayed alongside newer guns as insurance against the failure of less established weapons.

They could patrol lower-threat regions and scout fleet routes, but they would be too vulnerable for heavily defended waters or missions behind enemy lines.

Usually not. Working guns were reused, sold, or placed in the general pool, with remounting far more common than recasting.

Existing-pattern 41 cm guns might arrive around 1937, but a custom 42 cm weapon would take several years and disrupt Japan's own 46 cm development.

Metallurgy, understanding of pressure, manufacturing technique, and someone conceiving the design were the principal constraints.

A much larger and more routine test-firing programme gave the Royal Navy more chances to find faults before combat, despite continuing imperfections.

It could create a super-Warrior with contemporary iron-and-teak armour and about twice Warrior's armament, though the paddle wheels would divide and complicate the citadel.

Usually after laying down, with only broad facts such as gun calibre disclosed and detailed protection or arrangements kept secret.

Britain gains earlier infrastructure and private knowledge of its own mistakes, while rivals gain the chance to watch those mistakes before building their answers.

Potentially. A limited Baltic-oriented technology race would be much less threatening and could support cooperation against Russia, though geography would still complicate an alliance.

Yes, with continued technical development and sacrifices elsewhere in the airship's equipment and payload.

Coral Sea could become a night battle with radically different losses, potentially changing or eliminating the historical Battle of Midway, but only if radar and training supported the doctrine.

It would be an important technological and prestige race, and Britain could compete if its broader carrier and industrial programmes remained strong.

The Royal Navy could have built a longer Implacable-style carrier programme, with larger hulls and more freedom to develop the fleet-carrier force.

Yes. Britain already used cruiser construction in part to support industry and employment while renewing the fleet.

No. Its low rate of fire and inability to conduct effective salvo ranging would make the layout less threatening than the calibre suggests.

It could carry about eight 12-inch guns in four mountings and gain considerable range, creating something like a very early all-big-gun battleship.

It could be built on a larger hull, but the turrets would need to sit fore and aft and the design would require much better freeboard and stability than either original ship.

Not in the same form; ordnance departments existed, but the Third Sea Lord, Controller, and First Sea Lord exercised closer authority over them.

No compelling need remained after Argus and Hermes; experience suggested that about 15,000 tons was the practical minimum.

British industry could plausibly produce about four per year and potentially more, yielding dozens of additional cruisers and a much stronger wartime trade-protection force.

British diplomats did convey the warning, but in diplomatic language the Kaiser discounted; a blunter statement backed by fleet posture might have deterred more effectively.

Probably around 1939-41, because Germany would be rebuilding the entire heavy-gun development and production system.

Only at the margins in close boarding; limited shots, slow reload, smoke, and cannon effects prevent it from changing the battle as a whole.

The Royal Navy would probably assign a differently named sister ship, such as Duke of York or Anson, because a ship bearing the king's name was unlikely to receive that exposed deployment.

The Royal Navy would abandon the historical 14-inch King George V configuration and build at least six larger 15- or 16-inch-gunned ships with more speed and protection.

Britain could build numerous small carriers for worldwide presence while reserving the treaty allowance for five or six substantially larger fleet carriers.

The German First Scouting Group is likely destroyed by a much more powerful and survivable British force carrying about 80 15-inch guns with the Fifth Battle Squadron included.

They should repair communications, use aerial scouting, keep the Fifth Battle Squadron connected, cut across the German scouts, and lead the enemy toward a fully informed Grand Fleet; advance warning also allows gunnery and ammunition reforms.

It watched the programme closely but was not panicked, because Britain already possessed many 15-inch-gunned capital ships and saw the American ships as the next competitive generation.

France and Germany are the strongest contenders depending on the period, with the United States often struggling and colonial India's position sometimes close to impossible.

They supplied an accepted limit on construction that made further readiness and spending cuts easier to defend politically.

Wooden fleets would be devastated, rapidly driving iron-and-teak protection and steam warships that might resemble early Warrior-type ironclads by 1805.

Potentially, but the elevation envelope depends on the turret design and on how much weight and space are devoted to the loading machinery.

Britain would respond years before completion with numerous 16- or 16.5-inch battleships, continued carrier construction, radar, and weight of force; the German industrial buildup could not remain hidden.

It would build battleships and monitors for the guns, probably fielding about sixteen eight-gun capital ships while retaining many barrels as spares.

About 45,000 tons standard, possibly approaching 50,000 depending on the hull design.

No. The hull, gun mountings, industrial tooling, testing, and transport would expose the project well before the ships entered service.

Ships could be larger and use broader, less sharply narrowed hull forms, improving stability and ride, especially for the Iowa class.

Britain would have more capable capital ships available, improving fire control, protection, air defence, and flexibility in key 1941 deployments.

Britain would most likely control it by the twentieth century and use it as a major naval base and blockade position close to Germany.

It would likely be shorter and broader, make about 28 knots, and carry more dual-purpose guns for stronger sustained anti-aircraft defence.

It would normally be built around full flotillas with a leader and compatible destroyers, not a collection of isolated individual ships.

No. Closer descendants would remain ahead of him, and a broader succession crisis would bring Parliament into the choice, with a British relative such as Louis of Battenberg presented as more acceptable.

Carriers had fewer specialized long-lead items, while battleship guns, turrets, armour, hoists, and machinery locked the design much earlier.

Probably not; superior speed, fire control, 15-inch guns, and protection would turn many historical German damage cases into sinkings while preventing British battlecruiser losses.

Usually not; 8-inch guns are too slow against destroyers and offer too little advantage over 6-inch weapons against cruisers.

The evidence supports caution: it may have been lower quality than the best British or American armour, but that is not the same as being poor or ineffective.

They would probably become a Cold War anti-Soviet symbol and live within international royal and wealthy circles, while remaining politically marginal.

He could prevent wartime construction pauses, produce more carriers and capital ships, strengthen the Far East, and bring crucial escorts into service earlier.

Spending might fall, but construction would continue because Britain still needed active and reserve squadrons for the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Indian Ocean.

Probably less than expected; Britain might handle the emperor more matter-of-factly, but its goals and governing tools would be broadly similar to America's.

Britain would demand more aggregate tonnage to retain its 15-inch ships and build Nelson and Rodney, producing a stronger fast-battleship force that would influence later German designs.

It would likely choose 9.2-inch guns for the heavy fighting cruiser and continue building 6-inch ships for scouting and trade protection.

It would pass through the Skagerrak and Kattegat and likely use the deeper Danish strait farther from Germany, while contesting German moves against Denmark.

Not necessarily. Future choices would depend on how the Royal Navy balanced strategic mobility against armour, subdivision, and fleet fighting strength.

Not for independence alone, but a pro-German South Africa would likely face a severe British blockade and would lack a navy able to contest it.

The design was probably adequate, but cost, industrial disruption, army competition, and the likelihood of a stronger British answer made adoption unattractive.

Execute the war plans immediately: disperse forces and aircraft, keep fighters ready or airborne, protect exposed positions, and move civilians away from likely combat zones.

Treaty-driven compromise mattered; more auxiliary power and Implacable-style underwater protection would make the same hit far less likely to sink the ship.

Yes, but the larger effect would be severing Germany's Scandinavian supplies and tightening the blockade enough to threaten collapse within weeks.

No. Britain was already building Hawkins-class cruisers and studying follow-on designs while the G3 programme was active.

Some could reach them, especially ships already deployed or modified long-range submarines, but Allied interception and poor local support would limit their value.

The ships would be faster and more efficient, but limited oil supply and competition from aircraft and vehicles would make the fleet more expensive and difficult to sustain.

Its ideas could provide the starting point, but the actual ship would be an extensively improved iteration rather than the old design built unchanged.

The entire 15-inch capital-ship family becomes larger and carries about 50 percent more guns, with major effects on speed, modernization, and wartime firepower.

Both, together with operational culture; the weaknesses reinforced one another rather than operating separately.

It would likely retain four triple turrets, accelerate the shift to twelve 16-inch guns, and reconsider the low speed of the standard battleship programme.

No. Britain made the right to build two new 16-inch battleships a condition of signing the treaty.

They would be valuable in war or remote theatres with weak support facilities, but one or a few were enough for normal postwar needs.

Yes, while others have escaped deserved punishment, but every case requires comparing the original decision with the information available at the time.

Probably less, but the Town class's reputation for toughness would still shape judgment, and once the scuttling sequence began poor communications made reversal impractical.

Britain would maximize the 9.2-inch allowance and then build as many 6-inch cruisers as the government was willing to fund.

It would help, but a ship the Royal Navy actually built would more likely be a roughly 50,000-ton scaled-up Renown than Fisher's full proposal.

Carriers need little more than Ford-class scale without much larger aircraft, and battleships become inefficient beyond something like twelve 18-inch guns or a dense 16.5-inch battery.

The Lord Nelson resources would have been better used on several first-batch Dreadnoughts, while Captain was a costly design failure that contemporary validation methods struggled to prevent.

A brief calibre race could reach 20 or 21 inches, but testing would reveal poor firing and ranging performance and drive designers back toward denser 16.5- or 18-inch batteries.

Not automatically. The Navy could recruit and pay more people, increase automation, or combine those measures, with continuous construction encouraging automated systems.