Bruships 143: Some Book Tales and Naval History Questions Answered

Broadly yes, although the classes and their fleet roles need more detail than a short answer permits; the Soviet Navy series provides that class-by-class context.

Only if meaningful reform had begun before the Soviet system reached its terminal crisis. Once reform came too late, an orderly transition was no longer realistic.

It could complicate strategy rather than end the war, potentially encouraging an Asia-Pacific-first sequence even though Germany had already declared war on the United States.

No; Soviet practice favored retaining older ships, so the classes would more likely operate in complementary task groups until a later successor replaced the Kievs.

A rough estimate gives 244 meters overall and about 31 meters of beam; extra length matters more than a dramatic beam increase because the original hull was already broad.

The 1920s are the earliest plausible window, but only if German research circulated sooner and received sustained funding instead of being neglected until the mid-1930s.

The Indian-influenced Talwar program differs from Russia's domestic Gorshkov line and its enlarged derivatives, making a simple last-class conclusion misleading.

Only if the cruiser had first been made operational; in its actual unready condition, Ukraine's frigate was the more realistic flagship.

Yes; cruisers would have aligned more directly with protecting German overseas commerce.

A conversion comparable to a light-fleet carrier might carry about eighteen fighters and eighteen strike or reconnaissance aircraft, though the exact result depends on how extensive the rebuild is.

It is mainly American terminology for pushing machinery beyond ordinary full speed, while Royal Navy practice would more likely call for maximum revolutions and all valves open.

Not much; they were aging frigates with difficult service histories, including use of related ships in coast-guard roles.

Triple turrets were understood by about 1908, while French quadruple-turret work was underway by 1913-1914, placing both concepts before the First World War.

Motorboats appeared aboard warships as soon as compact engines became practical in the early twentieth century, with boat engines also contributing to early aircraft-engine development.

The gun and displacement limits define the design: an eight-inch cap suggests twelve guns in four triples, while looser limits could support 9.2-inch guns and more armor.

Technically yes, but completion would have consumed resources on a scale capable of bankrupting the country.

The consequences would be enormous but cannot be reduced to one simple outcome because every failed submarine, aircraft, and surface attack would need to be reconsidered in sequence.

The result could range from about 24 to 28 knots depending on power, external versus internal bulges, and whether saved machinery volume is used for protection rather than speed.

Earlier compact radar would most benefit states able to mass-produce and display it effectively, especially Britain and later the United States, with major consequences for air warning, ships, aircraft, and submarine detection.

No; every Iowa-class ship was a fast battleship, although the design lies toward the battlecruiser end of that spectrum.

Not realistically: Britain distrusted Germany's naval challenge, Germany demanded recognition of its place in the sun, and neither side had the political maturity or shared assumptions needed for a durable settlement.

With fragile protection, manual fire control, and poor stabilization, designers valued the largest possible volume of fire to disable an opponent before their own ship was hit.

The speed came primarily from the hull form and the distribution of weight within that hull.

Probably less than expected, because the ship would need ballast or a wider rearrangement to restore trim; displacement and speed do not relate as simply as vehicle weight on land.

Potentially, but only by using yards that the Grand Fleet needed for maintenance and repair.

Roughly six to eight groups would sustain presence in the Mediterranean, North Atlantic, and Indo-Pacific while allowing maintenance and rotation.

Yes, but proving it would be extremely difficult because thousands were built, repeatedly repaired, and followed a long-lived standard pattern from roughly 1760 to 1960.

Yes; the Great Kanto earthquake damaged the hull on the stocks, an external geological event that planners could not reasonably design around.

Yes, perhaps to an extreme speed near 45 knots, but the remaining four 8-inch guns would leave the ship too weak to survive interception or air attack.

It would improve food quality, reduce reliance on salting and faulty canning, and help long voyages and winter survival, but it would not by itself transform naval tactics.

It would be a roughly 35,000-ton fleet carrier comparable to Lexington, probably with a single large hangar, substantial dual-purpose guns, and a mix of centerline and deck-edge lifts.

Possibly; a hull afloat in the bay might have been damaged without having its back broken on the stocks, leaving it repairable for carrier conversion.

No; Britain would lose the centerpiece of its global battlecruiser strategy, still need a second equivalent carrier, and provoke a capital-ship ratio that also disadvantages the United States.

No; the proposal addresses Germany's numbers but ignores Britain's qualitative competition with the United States, Japan, Italy, and other navies.

Often yes, but official disposal orders and photographic evidence can disagree because yards did not always act immediately.

Yes; rather than follow a single long program, British governments would keep ordering annual batches while rival American and Japanese construction remained active.

The decisive bottlenecks would be armor-plate supply and the number of suitable building slips; many other constraints could be worked around.

Roughly 64 per year could be laid down across Britain, Australia, Canada, India, and South Africa, with completion taking about two years.

Probably about the same overall: added armor and firepower improve combat value, while deeper draft and a larger turning circle offset some of the gains.

No; eight 5.9-inch guns would still be outmatched by twelve-gun light cruisers and 8-inch heavy cruisers, while Hipper remained too large to evade capital ships.

Yes; the 5.5-inch gun was a promising system that could have offered much of a 6-inch gun's effect at lower weight.

It could support roughly 30 knots and twelve heavy guns, probably in four triple turrets rather than three quadruple mountings.

An admiral-name group is likely, with Duncan, Collingwood, and Jervis as plausible available choices.

A domestic utility helicopter of that class is plausible because the requirement is useful and technically attainable. The later engine sequence works only if powerplant development still follows its historical timing.

No; the Royal Navy conceived it as a large light cruiser succeeding Town- and Hawkins-type ships, a frame in which the design makes more sense.

The Baltic and Pacific fleets would probably receive roughly comparable strength, while the Black Sea fleet would remain tailored to regional needs and a Northern Fleet had not yet been established.

A roughly 28-knot fast battleship with twelve 15-inch guns, or possibly eight 18-inch guns, would have stronger protection and could allow all four ships to survive the post-Jutland redesign crisis.

Yes; the Netherlands might receive the hulls as German reparations, while completion in British yards would provide welcome postwar work.

Quite possibly; avoiding the American war removes the disruption that made completion of the entire class unrealistic.

Classical mythology and historic admirals fit better than saint names or HMS Great Britain, which carried religious, political, and public-relations problems.

Yes, although an A-X-Y centerline arrangement would remove the wing turrets while keeping the aft firepower concentrated.

Quite likely, with perhaps six Lions entering service, although Italian ships could also meet modernized Queen Elizabeths, Vanguards, or King George V-class battleships.

Monitors were already permitted without a dedicated strength category because they supported land and amphibious operations rather than the battle fleet.

Unlike one-off Hood, four 18-inch fast battleships would force American and Japanese equivalents and could push the treaty limit toward 18-inch guns and about 45,000 tons.

Later British ships could carry twelve 15-inch guns and perhaps reach 28 knots, while Germany would face the costly burden of developing both larger guns and triple turrets.

Responsibility was collective: Labour strongly supported the 1930 London Treaty, while Conservative governments had accepted the Washington framework.

Yes; Italy's preferred scenario was a limited war against France in which Britain stayed out, because British intervention placed Italy in serious difficulty.

Yes; Italian leaders recognized the danger but lacked the budget to prepare for the full British threat, so they planned for narrower cases and hoped Britain stayed out.

Yes; Britain could answer quietly with about four ships per year rather than treating the program as an intolerable challenge.

No major-caliber batteries are identified there, and the narrow, easily blocked strait made other defenses adequate; batteries near Marsala or farther west could be more strategically troublesome.

A guaranteed single-hit disablement would require something like a 24-inch torpedo against weak underwater protection or an 18-inch heavy shell, and even then more than one hit is preferable.

That pressure already existed: slower American battle-fleet doctrine demanded more firepower, while British designs helped drive US ships toward the canal's dimensional limits.

Not in a robust sense; Italian calculations depended on meeting a limited squadron of older British ships without Nelson, Rodney, or modernized Queen Elizabeths.

Yes; Vanguard was part of a plan to expand toward 20-25 or ideally 27 capital ships while replacing the least modernizable R-class battleships.

An improved pom-pom could retain its rapid-fire mechanism while approaching Bofors range, potentially removing the need for the Bofors in British service.

Yes; shipyards already capable of building battleships could accommodate a cruiser of that size without major difficulty.

A single hangar could carry about 96 aircraft, with a notional mix of fighters, dive bombers, and a larger torpedo-reconnaissance component.

Yes, but that development path effectively produces the Scharnhorst concept by extending the hull, adding a third turret, and changing the machinery.

Britain would adopt triple turrets, expand battlecruiser output, and perhaps build four battlecruisers plus six battleships annually to preserve superiority.

To an extent; the effect depends on the combination of shaft torque, propeller number and geometry, shaft length, and rudder design.

Closer than LCS advocates might admit but farther than Visby advocates claim, because it lacks payload and does not fit American crewing standards without major redesign.

Yes; Britain would question the mission behind the ships and consider how many cruisers it needed to station against them.

The Stuka looks superior on paper, but this is a 50-50 contest because the Swordfish repeatedly performed beyond what its specifications suggest.

No; their endurance was inadequate, while Royal Navy submarines could reach the operating area and interfere with the attempt.

Yes; Britain might dismiss Mussolini personally, but a capable Italian fleet occupied a strategically disruptive position across vital Mediterranean routes.

It would enlarge protected industrial and training capacity around the Great Lakes and simplify movement of aircraft and other matériel between the United States and Canada.

It would radically expand Roman strategic reach by removing major maritime logistics limits, allowing armies and fleets to operate far beyond their historical range.

Yes, though not in its usual form; a joint assessment with Andrew Lambert concluded that success needed numerous 28-knot Queen Elizabeth-class battleships able to break through before Germany concentrated.

Yes, but Italy could respond before the first Alsace was laid down because its yards were capable and Italy did not accept the 1936 treaty limits followed by Britain, France, and the United States.

More navies would build snorkel submarines and more escorts, but existing confidence in ASDIC would delay doctrinal change; German output would still be constrained by dysfunctional procurement.

A destroyer comparison shows why numerous quick-firing guns that work during violent maneuver can outperform heavier weapons built for stable long-range fire.

No. The movement of the 1930s lacked the revolutionary strength it had shown during the violent struggles of 1918-1919 and the early 1920s.

A rapid French collapse would free far more British troops and ships for North America, leaving the United States under pressure to seek peace before attacks on Washington, New Orleans, and its coast became much larger.

Not necessarily, but Britain already had ample Walrus aircraft whose transport and recovery capabilities matched Royal Navy requirements.

Probably; the Bearcat offered a sound continuation of the Wildcat and Hellcat line, although Britain might also prolong Seafire production to avoid expensive American purchases.

Only the United States is likely to have a candidate, but the loss of nuclear Enterprise makes preservation doubtful unless a future ship gains exceptional wartime significance.

Its larger population and strategic importance could encourage incorporation into the United Kingdom with representation at Westminster rather than government only as an overseas possession.

With fuel limited and the world in an Ice Age, the fleet should first secure a base in southern Britain or possibly Spain rather than attempt a distant operation.

No; Enterprise was the more mature hull design, while Fujian is an impressive but hurried step in China's rapid carrier-development program.

Yes; concrete, guns, stores, and the island's physical resilience could make it extremely difficult to seize, although Britain historically transferred it to improve relations with Germany.

The Hawker Sea Fury offers carrier compatibility, 400-knot speed, four 20 mm cannon, rockets, bomb load, and long range.

It would become even harder to attack and perhaps the Mediterranean's most important strategic position, provided Britain secured a reliable fresh-water supply.

They attempted to keep a proven and comparatively cheap design family useful by evolving it into a higher-performance successor.

Probably only if naval control continued from the First World War; a late transfer would force the Navy to rebuild personnel and procedures nearly from scratch.

The priority list includes the four surviving British Tribals, Warspite, Illustrious, Renown, Furious, and representative cruisers, distributed among accessible ports around Britain and Freetown.

Broadly yes, with a 4.5-inch belt and roughly 2.5-3 inches of deck protection, while spare plate could reinforce turret faces, sides, and roofs.

Britain would still build 28-knot, four-turret battlecruisers at roughly four per year while its battleship program answered the United States, Japan, France, Italy, and Russia.

Shaping can help small transports and helicopters, but the benefit falls sharply as payload and airframe size grow. A very large transport remains a conspicuous radar target even after an expensive reduction in its signature.

Not very effective; the few viable firing positions would be easy to identify and attack by counter-battery fire, aircraft, or commandos, while using Spain would also carry major political costs.

Not practically; the battleship would need to pause for launch and recovery, whereas the Walrus was chosen partly because it could be recovered quickly while the ship kept moving.

Most qualified; those who did not could move to staff duties, retire, or transfer, while postwar demobilization and force reductions absorbed much of the issue.

No; the original hulls were about 19,000 tons standard and gained roughly 5,000 tons in conversion, so adding another 10,000-15,000 tons would overstress the structure and amount to building a new ship.

Probably not; four triple turrets still provide twelve guns and preserve more firepower after a turret casualty than three concentrated mountings.

No; the Royal Navy built new ships for anticipated future requirements, while older hulls could enter ordinary reserve or be sold according to whether they retained any use.

No; Lion develops the battleship line through King George V, while Vanguard draws more heavily on the fast battlecruiser lineage of Admiral and G3 concepts.

Increase funding and fleet size, improve pay and family housing, and make reserve service easier through accessible local units and fewer administrative barriers.

The design began with three quadruple 14-inch turrets to preserve a twelve-gun broadside, but weight growth elsewhere forced one quadruple mounting to become a twin.

Britain would have to use whichever conventional capital hulls replaced them, most plausibly an Admiral-class or G3 design available when the treaty conversions were chosen.

Retirement would not fund the program; decommissioned ships could remain in ordinary, and depressed postwar scrap prices yielded far too little money to build replacements.

At least one hull may have been considered for conversion into a strike carrier, based on internal discussion surrounding the allocation of Ark Royal's construction work.

A hard-won Japanese-language book opens a path to studying Satō Tetsutarō, a major Japanese naval theorist, through photography and OCR.

No; the Treaty of Versailles had removed machinery and damaged or dismantled much of Germany's heavy naval construction capacity, which first had to be rebuilt.

Swiftsure or Triumph would be plausible, while names soon used by the Bellerophon and St Vincent classes also show the pool available to the Admiralty.

Very useful if cycled through preservation and upgrades, because the US Navy would retain modern cruiser hulls with substantial service life.

No; they were specialized large light cruisers built for the Baltic concept, much smaller than Tiger and too lightly armed for long-range battlecruiser gunnery.

Possibly, but recommissioned Iowa-class battleships ended the visual competition by providing a more imposing symbol of power in port than concealed missile batteries.

The cruiser name carries imperial associations, while large air-defense destroyers and anti-submarine frigates now perform the presence and cruising missions once assigned to cruisers.

It would likely combine Tiger's four-turret lineage with Renown-era machinery and armament in a roughly 31,000-32,000-ton design.

A design tangent shows that replacing Courageous's sparse capital-ship battery with three triple 9.2-inch turrets creates a coherent heavy-cruiser concept.

The ships entered service too late to earn a defining wartime reputation, while the Iowas and 8-inch cruisers had already become the celebrated and proven types.

Both active and passive protection are necessary: layered defenses keep threats away, while armor and subdivision reduce damage when something gets through.

Britain could use the same nominal allowance as the United States, but might convert Renown and Repulse rather than newer conventional battlecruisers and accept the same convenient tonnage accounting used for Lexington.

The United States would likely complete Illinois and Kentucky, Britain would revive Super Lion work, and Western navies would retain or finish more battleships alongside carriers.

The cut-and-insert operation is normally done in a dry dock, sometimes a floating dock, and remains common on large commercial vessels as well as historic warship rebuilds.

It was not unusual. Sailors and owners repeatedly chose names associated with speed, prominent people, or famous places, even when the vessels served in different eras and roles.

Yes; that displacement range is plausible within a few thousand tons.

Navies would field more gun-balanced ships rather than true gunships, retaining twin medium-caliber mounts on destroyers and frigates for longer.

Old County-class hulls would favor new construction, but a larger 9.2-inch cruiser built near the war's end might justify conversion because it retained decades of useful life.

A member of the Duncan family may have commanded one of the ships named Duncan, but the recollection is uncertain and no equivalent Collingwood or Nelson example comes to mind.

Armament would stay similar and the belt might grow from about 3.1 inches to 4-5 inches, but six knots of sacrificed speed does not free enough weight for a dramatic transformation.

No; force size reflects government funding, recruiting systems, pay, career prospects, and medical rules more than public willingness to serve.

It would evolve from light-fleet-carrier practice but also draw on the Malta-class design, which such a navy would likely complete.

Overreliance is unwise, but NATO forces train and organize around integrated employment in ways Ukraine has had to develop during an active war.

They were evolutionary test beds that taught the Navy to reserve space, manage weight and balance, and plan crew movement before purpose-built missile cruisers.

They would make large carriers easier and faster to build, enlarge later designs, encourage twin-engine carrier aircraft before the war, and complicate treaty limits by creating several undeniable large capital hulls.