Bruships 138: Random Naval History Books from Me, Random Naval History Questions from You!

A comparison with HMS Eagle before Taranto explains why fixing a minor defect early can protect wartime carrier availability.

Adding Stalin's Soviet Union to the 1930 treaty negotiations would disrupt the established ratios among Britain, America, Japan, France, and Italy.

No. Britain could build real capital ships and heavy cruisers, so the treaty-driven German compromise did not fill a useful gap.

It would have been useful earlier, but it was not ready before its testing and training process was complete.

It would broadly combine both fleets and grow somewhat larger because the merged state would have an even wider maritime area to cover.

A Soryu-derived design begun in 1934 could plausibly enter service by 1939, though Britain would respond by adding carrier construction of its own.

They were reasonable when specified, but long development cycles and rapid technological change made them obsolete quickly.

It would probably retain the Invincible concept and join the Sea Harrier program rather than adopt a much larger American amphibious carrier.

They would probably resemble a more armored American County class with four twin turrets and could influence the Pensacola design.

An adapted older American carrier, perhaps a Midway-class ship, is more likely, although its heavy crewing demand would be difficult for Greece.

Yes. It was useful for rapid fighter launches at first, but aircraft growth overtook it and the area became an anti-aircraft position.

It did not fit the Fleet Air Arm's requirements or improve on the aircraft already serving its current missions.

No. Britain retained dive-bombing capability but preferred rockets and other systems over a dedicated dive-bomber force.

It would diverge sharply in crewing, sensors, weapons, automation, and hull form, undermining most of the hoped-for commonality.

It could transform battles such as Midway and trigger earlier British and Japanese investment in night fighters and carrier defense.

Yes. Multiple launch routes are useful, but more hangars would help only if the hull could support the added capacity.

Versailles restricted individual warships, and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement capped Germany at a percentage of British strength.

Very little immediately; they were the available aircraft and filled training and operational gaps until better types entered production.

It was expected to work and to give the aircraft a wider defensive sphere.

Not really; the design needs an unusual combination of capital-ship industry and a political or treaty reason not to build a true capital ship.

They were repeatedly considered for reconstructions because the US Navy had many Essex hulls and was unusually attached to the class.

In theory, but fitting adequate armor around that concentrated armament would be difficult.

Essentially all of them; its guns and torpedoes would overwhelm the armor carried by likely German and Italian opponents.

Yes. They also investigated crash mats and Skyhook-style recovery among many competing shipboard landing ideas.

The combined cost of rebuilding Victorious, Eagle, and Ark Royal could instead have purchased several new carriers or completed the Malta class to a modern standard.

Re-engineer the lifts, replace the deck-control systems, and improve the machinery enough to use her as a limited escort carrier.

They could use Fulmars or similar aircraft to suppress defenses before torpedo bombers attacked, especially at Taranto.

The missile families have plausible Mark 41 paths, but the ship or land system still needs the supporting launch and control equipment.

Possibly; Kirov-sized ships may return, but whether they need nuclear propulsion remains open.

About 28 knots is plausible, using the F3's larger machinery spaces and finer hull while carefully managing treaty displacement.

British orders looked smaller than American programs because the Admiralty advanced successive classes through an already extensive yard system instead of announcing one congressional-style batch.

Their design intent and sustainment fit air-defense frigates, while Britain sought a larger, more independent destroyer for expeditionary operations.

Potentially yes; a deliberately modular construction system could assemble those functions with relative ease.

Italian domestic designs can be stronger than compromise projects because workshare negotiations encourage Italy to concede requirements it could meet well on its own.

Begin with length-to-beam ratio, then consider endurance, operating partners, and whether the hull is optimized for air, surface, or submarine warfare.

The gun offers much more shell effect than an 8-inch weapon at a similar rate of fire, helping it compete with rapid 6-inch batteries.

Norway in the Second World War is a partial example, mainly through the Free Norwegian forces; Sweden had strong coastal capability but did not start from nothing.

The light cruisers would change little, but the 9.4-inch heavy cruisers would be substantially more dangerous.

World War One veterans, gamekeepers, and experienced marksmen gave the Home Guard a serious capacity for local resistance.

There is no single figure without the flight profile; steady cruise lasts longer, while maneuvering consumes the remaining fuel much faster.

The extra command and scouting capacity would probably detect the Germans early enough for Glorious to evade, strike, or summon support.

It was not unusual: submariners understood torpedoes, which were the principal strike weapon of early carrier air groups.

Probably by about 1924 or 1925, although Britain's large existing yard network meant much of the work could be expansion rather than entirely new construction.

Yes in confined littoral waters, where geography and stealth together can conceal the approach to an unarmored modern target.

After fixing healthcare and accommodation, it could field new cruisers, more guided-missile submarines, and sustain carrier production.

They would probably keep shadowing at first, but might join once Holland arrived because their guns could inflict serious damage.

Some work can be safer, but programs usually begin with certified crewed airframes and still carry a pilot during early autonomous trials.

Buccaneers and Phantoms could serve into the 1990s, then be replaced together by Super Hornets, with an AEW aircraft added if feasible.

Very little until a final design is authorized; the program remains distant and many concepts will appear first.

No. Carrier suitability would require a comprehensive redesign funded largely by Britain, making Super Hornet the cheaper path.

Potentially, but the equipment would displace other missions and make a highly valuable support ship still more important and vulnerable.

Because the weapon was designed to a French metric dimension that English-language sources round to about 22 inches.

None at sea; they could serve only as stationary accommodation hulks in shipyards.

Not easily; ship-sized propellers move so much water that the resulting forces create severe mechanical and structural problems.

The carrier would gain a very long-range strike package, and a larger naval derivative is plausible if the navy accepts the adaptation cost.

Britain's Washington treaty position and carrier-conversion choices could shift, possibly toward converting Admiral-class hulls.

Italy could answer with existing design experience, while Germany would probably build larger; ordinary 8-inch cruisers would become inadequate against them.

Roughly sixteen and a half years at an aggressive minimum, and more plausibly twenty to twenty-two years under normal conditions.

Probably not; Malta hulls could serve into the 1980s or early 1990s and delay the need for a successor.

It would more likely make the Invincible class much larger, perhaps roughly 30,000 to 36,000 tons full load.

No, but larger guns would not remove the hull-stability and sighting limits that already constrained useful range.

No. They proved that old armored cruisers were obsolete; a modern, larger continuation could still fill valuable roles.

Britain could buy or adapt the modified JDAM anti-ship weapon if it needs the capability, using its own rapid-procurement process.

Aircraft already in service do not change, but American designs entering service from about 1941 could become more capable.

To the ambassador locally, then through a naval hierarchy that included an admiral and intermediary officers rather than directly to the CNO.

Saratoga and Independence are essential, with Nagato and an LST favored to preserve historically important types that otherwise lack survivors.

They combine near-twelve-inch weight and rate-of-fire penalties with too little advantage over 9.2-inch guns.

No. 'Type 64' was a joke for the Type 42 and Type 22 pairing, not an official class or project.

Probably a STOL transport around C-295 or Short Sherpa size, with wingspan and deck handling limiting further growth.

They could produce devastating rapid fire and encourage twelve-gun ships, provided German designers resisted adding crippling complexity.

A research answer should be repeatedly tested against broader evidence, including sources that challenge the initial view.

Eighteen-inch weapons were lighter and easier to drop safely, while ships could exploit the greater range and power of a 21-inch torpedo.

Her armor: researchers could examine how such thick plates were made and whether they had set properly inside.

Use an internal magazine and rail-guided carriages that remain locked to the ship while removing empty canisters and inserting loaded ones.

They become much larger and more powerful and could retain useful 8-inch guns alongside their missiles.

British orders were incremental, its yards already existed, and fast battleships would not necessarily remove the need for still faster battlecruisers.

Madden's papers envisioned dozens of carriers and several fleet-sized formations, warning against reading the announced G3 and N3 orders as Britain's maximum ambition.

Classification is outside its normal remit; the Treasury controls money, while cross-department terminology is a Cabinet or prime ministerial matter.

The Geddes-era cuts depended on treaty-backed fleet reductions; without them, Britain would have to buy maritime security through construction.

They become more capable through a much greater volume of fire, especially if early production accelerates reliable quadruple-turret development.

About twelve probable losses, depending on how disputed attacks and scuttled damaged ships are counted.

They gain turreted 4.7-inch guns and more torpedoes, approaching a stripped-down Daring-class combat fit.

It would use carrier airpower and AEW to dominate the air, sink or contain Belgrano, and likely land directly near Stanley.

No. A 6-inch automatic able to meet the same target profiles would make the 5.25-inch gun unnecessary.

The song association was anachronistic, and religious, Irish, and naval-tradition complications made a patron-saint group politically implausible.

Fit 9.2-inch guns, adopt high-pressure steam turbines, and add roughly four inches of armor protection.

Yes, and it retained even more just after World War One, when many yards could compete for new capital-ship orders.

Italy stands out over the long term, although France and Britain also retained important capabilities.

Britain gains overwhelming cruiser firepower and radar, with ammunition supply for the 5-inch battery as the principal difficulty.

In theory yes, but only in limited numbers because the ship lacks the space of a larger carrier.

Two strike carriers plus three F-35-capable LHDs would give Britain enough overlapping hulls to absorb maintenance and operational surprises.

Yes, especially in support capacity, although the United States planned to build additional facilities.

They carried different internal systems, warhead and propulsion choices, and features adopted from British testing.

A Yorktown-class carrier, probably Enterprise by the audience vote, would reinforce Force H and expand British options from Mers-el-Kebir to Taranto.

Probably little better, because political distrust of France's own armed forces would remain the overriding problem.

Yes. The Navy's need for fighter-based outer air defense would push fighter profiles and supporting technology forward.

Improved fighter direction, continuous defensive organization, and experience with smaller daytime and major nighttime carrier strikes.

Warship orders spread employment across shipyards, steel, timber, engineering, research, food, and local services more broadly than many other defense projects.

Only if technology is defined as the best fit for war, including production, repair, and numbers, rather than the best individual specification.

Probably not; the major expansion point comes late enough that Britain would build Audacious-class or equivalent improved carriers.

No. Britain had a clear initial requirement, then changed it as new wartime evidence altered what a viable ship needed.

Pensacola and Northampton: they were convincing on paper for a mission that did not align well with operational reality.

Broadly yes, but the more important design question was what specific operational standard and threat the cruiser was being built to meet.