Bruships 121: Questions till the Bru Runs Out!

Constraints existed, but unstable politics and indecision over spending were the decisive practical obstacles.

Generally no; carriers inspired theories about operating aircraft in both directions, but the arrangement proved impractical.

Britain's industrial and naval position meant that its absence could unravel limits for everyone else.

No; its firepower, speed, and likely 45,000-ton displacement would force the treaty system to adjust.

It was a capable multirole aircraft that delivered the range of functions the Royal Navy needed from one type.

They could mislead the first salvo, but their value faded once the enemy tracked the ship and corrected its fire.

It was technically plausible if Brazil maintained its infrastructure and supplied the money and political support.

No; Britain generally relied on superiority in numbers and the better training that a larger fleet could sustain.

It would probably apply an escalator clause to the carrier category.

It would be capable in the large-cruiser role, but that role still has to justify building it instead of an Iowa.

They could be worse in general because the ship had fifth-rate space but a crew closer to a third rate's size.

Those changes amount to a new hull, so their plausibility depends on a mission that justifies the redesign.

The smaller guns can fire more often and in greater numbers, which may create a much larger volume of fire.

A 20-inch naval gun is constrained less by a single crane or pit than by barrel metallurgy, weight, handling, and turret machinery.

Tight shell grouping is not enough if the range solution is wrong, and early radar still depended on human fire-control work.

Yes; early American confidence weakened at London in 1930 and after closer inspection of Britain's treaty battleships.

He would press for the largest Tillman battleship the United States could build.

Yes in principle, but only if metallurgy and sabot technology were developed far enough to make it reliable.

Both, but displacement was the primary classification and gun calibre was secondary.

About eighteen months for the cited peacetime example, with wartime examples taking around a year or less.

Its armament and belt were plausible, but the finished ship would probably need to displace about 13,000 to 14,000 tons standard.

Using captured provisions was fairly common, but deliberate poisoning was very rare.

Linen and cotton were common, with hemp and earlier wool also used; cotton became more practical for large sails.

Start with B. J. Armstrong's 21st-century series and consider Alessio Patalano's Maritime Strategy and Naval Innovation for a deeper, more expensive option.

Yes; it would be difficult and expensive, but the necessary heavy-engineering capabilities already existed.

A 16.5-inch gun could retain a 16-inch weapon's rate of fire while delivering a meaningfully heavier shell.

Yes; the limiting factors include docks, construction and launch capacity, and the ability to fuel and operate the carrier.

Japan might have remained more politically balanced and less dominated by militarist leadership.

Space, firing arcs, and the amount of reconstruction made the upgrade poor value for Argus.

It would strengthen hulls, support heavier armament, and make more efficient use of available timber.

They could become useful eastern Mediterranean fleet units after machinery and anti-aircraft upgrades, probably operating with the Royal Navy.

The added height, weight, exposure, and layout costs were not worth the extra battery.

They would be more survivable and flexible, potentially contributing more to Far East deterrence and escort work.

Neither would be trouble-free; both would have different problems, and the American design might lead toward a quad 16-inch turret.

Probably to save weight and hull space, although four shafts would have been better for survivability.

More coastal-defence pairs backed by reinforced destroyer flotillas and fortifications.

Only after accounting for the large cost of rebuilding, locating, staffing, and operating public shipyards.

An Iowa-sized, fast Aegis strike-cruiser type with missile launchers and substantial guns.

Blockade and commerce raiding are the closest equivalents because they wage prolonged economic attrition at sea.

The engines may start quickly, but preparing the associated systems can take a couple of hours or more.

About four cruisers, eighteen destroyers, and eighteen sloops, divided into balanced Atlantic and Pacific forces.

Most plausibly in the 1950s, or perhaps the 1940s after uninterrupted development without treaty constraints.

Mainly no; the label was political, though German naval rank terminology reinforced it.

Beatty proposed a carrier-based torpedo farm, but the range disadvantage against guns made it a poor idea.

Nelson and Rodney, although British firms had built triple turrets earlier for testing and foreign ships.

After modernisation, they would probably serve as convoy escorts, while Tegetthoff-class dreadnoughts could join fleet actions.

The Lion-class battleships and the planned carriers would be completed, including the later fleet carriers.

The extra machine guns add little beside twenty-four pom-poms; 20 mm Oerlikons are more useful, and removing four 4.7-inch guns is hard to justify.

Full-length widening would amount to rebuilding the ship; deck-edge lifts are a more practical way to improve aircraft capacity.

Roughly 55,000 to 60,000 tons for a ship carrying twenty-one 16-inch guns.

Two would provide emergency escort-carrier capacity, but a fast 30,000-ton rebuild would really be a new ship.

Ark Royal was optimized for a large strike group, while Illustrious was armored for close fleet operations and distant theaters with limited repair support.

They would likely gain 14-inch guns, stronger machinery, modern anti-aircraft control, and serve as Far Eastern flagships with Force Z or ABDA.

Probably not as a normal type, because the fourth deck created excessive topweight and stability problems.

Overall the United States, because it both built the ships and developed the supporting fleet, although the answer varies by period.

They would enter the fleet before the 1936 design lock-in, improving most new ships and major refits with faster, more efficient machinery.

On a fifth rate the captain could be displaced, while fourth and third rates had enough deck space for separate flag accommodation.

Quadruple machine-gun mounts are a stronger candidate than the UP launcher because they wasted space and produced no useful development path.

Yes, but the replacement would be a normal carrier rather than another experimental ship like Hōshō.

Britain would likely seek four faster treaty battleships and prioritize speed upgrades across more of the Queen Elizabeth class.

Yes for an American battle fleet, while Japan could reach a different answer because it wanted deterrent value from exceptional guns.

The other powers would protest strongly, but treaty revision is more likely than war or forced scrapping.

Australia would claim the first and probably seek both; New Zealand could receive the second, which would likely operate mainly from Australia.

It would preserve the industrial base and make the later wartime expansion much easier.

No; Russia lacked sufficient large icebreakers and logistics, and the squadron risked breaking down or becoming trapped.

Only after such extensive rebuilding that it would effectively be a new ship with the old name.

The Royal Navy ranked first and Australia second; the others were held back by limited numbers, funding, or government support.

Yes; converting an unfinished Admiral would allow a cleaner Lexington-style redesign without rebuilding a worn completed hull.

They retained niche advantages, but fast battleships covered enough of both roles to be the better financial and operational choice.

It could be designed that way, but swapping thick one-piece belt plates would require advance manufacture and a major refit.

It depends on range, but roughly eight inches is the suggested protection level.

Escorts would need to be larger, with room for hangars and multiple helicopters, but could still be built in useful numbers.

Britain saw advantages, but the United States feared that separate ratios would produce new allocation disputes and fleet imbalances.

Use a mixed air group: fixed-wing aircraft for long-range patrol and a few helicopters for close ASW prosecution.

They were highly important because they supplied Baltic operating experience, especially against Sweden, while other groups helped build the wider fleet.

Four Francesco Caracciolos plus selected rebuilt dreadnoughts could fit, but Italy probably could not retain all of its older ships as well.

Probably, because they could mine American harbors and Pearl Harbor's approaches to create sustained disruption.

Probably nothing directly: 40 mm guns would remain, while 76 mm weapons might become more common.

It would begin as a heavily one-sided Western carrier offensive, with Soviet weakness at long-range submarine warfare and a serious risk of nuclear escalation.

It becomes a bitter, high-loss fleet battle in which British numerical superiority probably wins.

It depends on the war situation, available replacements, and whether the navy has enough crews for the ships it keeps.

It was a valuable peacetime station and a critical wartime logistics and operating base for the Indian Ocean.

Not by length alone; with more machinery it could probably reach about 27 knots and perhaps approach 28 after further work.

When it is large enough and its guns, rather than torpedoes, become the primary fighting system.

It is plausible because Scandinavian yards, especially Sweden's, could build large and powerfully armed destroyers.

Yes; about six twin 5.5-inch mounts would provide a practical replacement battery.

Eight to twelve a year, potentially about 120 by 1939, with most reserve-manned until mobilization.

They would dominate Royal Navy planning, multiply fast-battleship coverage, and force rival designs to become substantially stronger.

Their speed and four 15-inch guns would make them dangerous opponents for Deutschland-class raiders.

Not the treaty-era destroyers, but the larger Battle class could plausibly carry it.

Radar, codebreaking, and early computers would become easier to build and substantially more capable.

Not necessarily: global commitments made the ability to field carriers in many places more valuable than maximizing each hull's size.

It carried extra accommodation, radios, medical support, and command spaces for the flotilla staff.

Because a useful fleet carrier needed roughly 11,000 to 12,000 tons; smaller designs did not work well enough.

Usually slightly below the deck, but not four to six feet down; aircraft approach speed shapes the final compromise.

Prioritise carriers and their support, escorts, submarines, destroyers, and rapid refits over slower prestige projects.

Missile threats are difficult to armour against comprehensively, making compartmentalisation a more useful survivability investment.

Probably a suitably fast third rate with a large escort, because contemporary royal yachts were not designed for transatlantic voyages.

The Deutschland class and secretive Yamato programme stand out, while some U.S. shortcomings were doctrinal rather than failures of ship design.

It can protect a wider area, whereas all-or-nothing armour gives a smaller citadel much greater protection.

They were sound ocean-going ships, although their power attracted stronger enemies and President's weaker bracing reduced her seakeeping.