Toulon's inshore squadron and third-rate risk
Toulon's blockade shows why the Royal Navy sometimes risked third-rate ships close inshore when the enemy fleet was dangerous enough.
From Blockade!! ·
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Toulon's blockade shows why the Royal Navy sometimes risked third-rate ships close inshore when the enemy fleet was dangerous enough.
From Blockade!! ·
The opposing orders of battle show why Britain kept first- and second-rate ships concentrated against Toulon while the War of 1812 continued across the Atlantic.
From Blockade!! ·
French commanders used favorable winds to exercise outside Toulon, while Edward Pellew held the main fleet back in hopes of cutting them off for battle.
From Blockade!! ·
On 5 November 1813, a sudden northwesterly wind left the French advanced squadron to leeward and prompted Henry Heathcote's inshore force to attack.
From Blockade!! ·
Both fleets fired high to damage masts and rigging until the French reached shore-battery protection, leaving light casualties but important tactical lessons.
From Blockade!! ·
Even after Pellew withdrew much of the fleet to Majorca, the French remained cautious because the sudden British reinforcement had made the blockade seem tighter than it was.
From Blockade!! ·
Because warships spend more wartime on blockade, commerce protection, and convoy work than in fleet battles, those routine missions must shape force design.
From Blockade!! ·
Allowing merchant traffic into a blockaded naval port can preserve the enemy fleet by feeding its sailors and replacing water, rope, clothing, and other stores.
From Blockade!! ·
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