Complete directory
Explore every watch point in reverse video-date order, then in timestamp order within each video.
Using nuclear weapons in Korea could normalize them for limited wars, accelerate proliferation, or force an early international ban on tactical use.
From Bruships 232: Naval History Questions Answered Live... ·
Large-calibre quadruple mounts retain conventional gun lines, while smaller weapons allow rotary multi-barrel arrangements.
From Bruships 232: Naval History Questions Answered Live... ·
A disputed game comparison contrasts idealized naval memory with darker historical associations and collective images of ships.
From Bruships 232: Naval History Questions Answered Live... ·
A proposed 200,000-ton battleship or carrier raises questions about nuclear power, missile capacity and the practical coordination of a very large air group.
From Bruships 232: Naval History Questions Answered Live... ·
A second uncrewed air wing would still compete for maintenance, handling and coordination capacity aboard a carrier.
From Bruships 232: Naval History Questions Answered Live... ·
The Blackbird's ground fuel leakage is raised as a shipboard handling constraint when discussing unusually large carrier aircraft.
From Bruships 232: Naval History Questions Answered Live... ·
A little-documented British Talos cruiser remains difficult to reconstruct from the surviving preliminary material.
From Bruships 232: Naval History Questions Answered Live... ·
Information can remain effectively concealed through an unhelpful catalog and an innocuous project name even without unusually heavy formal classification.
From Bruships 232: Naval History Questions Answered Live... ·
The timing of a hypothetical Italian peace determines how much of the Mediterranean and North African commitment could be redirected to other theaters.
From Bruships 232: Naval History Questions Answered Live... ·
Heavier losses ashore or a larger Taranto strike are proposed as possible pressures for an Italian peace in 1941.
From Bruships 232: Naval History Questions Answered Live... ·
Swedish and Austro-Hungarian examples show why enclosed seas favor different ship sizes and support requirements from oceanic fleets.
From Bruships 232: Naval History Questions Answered Live... ·
Weather, bomb trajectories and moving targets limited what the Norden bombsight could deliver, with train-bombing trials adding a comparison to attacks on shipping.
From Bruships 232: Naval History Questions Answered Live... ·
Accuracy can expand the number of targets attacked, limiting the stockpile savings promised for precision weapons.
From Bruships 232: Naval History Questions Answered Live... ·
Elegant theories can fail when they treat states as perfectly rational actors and leave emotion, habit, and inefficient compromise out of the model.
From Bruships 232: Naval History Questions Answered Live... ·
Concentrated grants can shape later publication trends, while audience funding can give a historian room to pursue different subjects.
From Bruships 232: Naval History Questions Answered Live... ·
Naval advocates choose and arrange their arguments to reach readers who may never finish the book.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Roosevelt uses American frigate victories and national memory of the War of 1812 to argue that a great power cannot afford naval weakness.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Reported impressment totals need to be read alongside merchant-captain wage evasion, voluntary recruitment, and competing claims to sailors' nationality.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Roosevelt connects different British and French treatment of American shipping to imported goods, competition for sailors, and profits under a neutral flag.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
British and French crew totals cannot be compared directly because different rigging practices and levels of sea experience changed how many sailors a ship needed.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Isaac Hull and James Richard Dacres show that private friendship and professional respect could survive service on opposing sides in the War of 1812.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Roosevelt's impressment claims raise separate questions about nationality, the reliability of papers, the composition of numerical totals, and named evidence of crew losses.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
A Cooper sea novel and a merchant's account of losing ships illustrate different grievances, requiring a distinction between property seizure and impressment.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
The practical damage attributed to whole-crew impressment may instead reflect the removal of a small number of scarce, highly skilled topmen.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Slow ships-of-the-line construction and faith in movable one-gun boats expose the danger of substituting an inexpensive coastal scheme for a fleet able to meet wartime missions.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Roosevelt treats early mines and the steam warship Fulton as anticipations of later naval technology; their immediate effects and the fleet's subsequent decline complicate that claim.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Roosevelt uses American naval victories to argue for readiness and offensive capability; the historical comparison raises questions about British priorities and the limits of those victories.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Britain's lighter frigates operated within a fleet that could bring in ships of the line, while American heavy frigates reflected a different funding constraint.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Roosevelt uses battles in successive wars to argue for improving American naval performance; ship size and European priorities complicate that comparison.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
An individual American first rate with an inexperienced crew would face concentrated British blockade squadrons containing several ships of the line.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Mahan attacks a politics dominated by internal economics and argues that post-Civil War leaders must recover an outward-looking national policy.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Mahan connects organized force to his expectation of conflict between civilizations and to a Christian justification for Western expansion.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Mahan's religious vocabulary illustrates how a naval advocate connected sea power to the concerns of his intended readers.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
YouTube and podcasts provide routes to historical audiences who may later seek out a historian's books.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Sims explains why the anti-submarine campaign remained hidden during World War I and writes for civilians who had not seen the Navy's dispersed contest with the U-boats.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Hendrick helped make Sims's account readable for civilians, while Sims acknowledged disagreement about the causes of success in the submarine campaign.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Sims's hostility to Irish republican activists is connected to political disputes and reported attacks on American sailors around Cork.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
German submarines could not cover every approach to Europe, while Allied routing flexibility and scarce destroyers forced different risk calculations for loaded and returning transports.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Rapid postwar contraction repeatedly reduced American military capability and prompted renewed arguments for retaining sea power.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
The safe arrival of American soldiers embarrassed German naval leaders, and a late diversion of U-boats toward transports reduced merchant sinkings without stopping the troop flow.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Sims turns the transatlantic movement of an army into a case for retaining the ships, people, and organization that let the United States project power globally.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
German reference classifications and the limits of available gun technology support reading the Scharnhorst class as fast battleships rather than battlecruisers.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Mahan shows why protecting Germany's commerce requires more than control of its home waters: Atlantic access imposes additional distance and force requirements.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Mahan uses geographic analogies to explain Britain's central position, then connects its imperial naval commitments and smaller army to dependence on command of the sea.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Benjamin Armstrong's selection of Mahan shows that battle-fleet command and protected maritime commerce are mutually supporting parts of sea power.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Congressional quotations encountered during one research project clustered near the beginning of Mahan's book, with little remembered use of the naval-policy chapter.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
Mahan traces how German commercial growth and naval expansion pushed Britain toward France and Russia while making British, American, and Japanese choices part of one strategic calculation.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·
An arbitration exception shows why the exact terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance matter when assessing Britain's position in a possible American-Japanese conflict.
From The Arguments that made American Seapower: Roosevelt, Mahan, Sims & More ·