Patreon 104: What could have been learned if Billy Mitchell had followed the rules in 1921?

The 1921 bombing trials were meant to measure successive stages of ship damage, giving naval engineers evidence for better protection and damage control.

Not for the purpose of these tests. They measured weapon damage, while a moving radio-controlled target would test the crews' ability to hit a ship.

Mitchell expected an air threat to Pearl Harbor while dismissing carrier aircraft as insufficiently powerful for the task.

Replacing Japanese or German battleships with carriers would still leave constraints on aircraft capability, trained crews, infrastructure, and enemy construction.

Mitchell's warnings included ideas that later looked prescient and claims about Hawaii and Air Service funding that contemporary evidence did not support.

Mitchell's 1906 prediction of entirely aerial warfare overlooked how armies and navies could adapt and integrate aircraft into combined forces.

No. His later air-power ideas included balloon bombers and battleships of the sky, complicating claims that he drove carrier development.

Officers can dispute doctrine, but misrepresenting evidence and claiming authority over elected leaders raise different questions of professional responsibility.

Mitchell's service in the Spanish-American War, Signal Corps commission, and Alaska cable work preceded his advocacy of aviation.

Mitchell's early aviation experience includes civilian flying lessons, battlefield study, and his 1913 testimony against separating Army aviation from the Signal Corps.

Britain was not expected to intervene militarily. Its neutrality could still deny merchant shipping and coal support to both belligerents, sharply limiting an American fleet's ability to cross the Pacific.

No. Aerial torpedoes and aircraft capable of carrying them already existed, while Mitchell's own campaign concentrated on bombs.

Mitchell's General Staff position placed him at the center of the small Army aviation organization before he finally qualified as a pilot in 1916.

Yes. The term is accepted as describing deliberate wrongdoing, distinct from simple incompetence.

Mitchell's flight over German lines illustrates the risk of losing a senior organizer for the sake of personal operational experience.

St. Mihiel's multinational air force complicates claims that Mitchell alone planned and led the operation; even his personal participation in the flying is disputed.

Mitchell's wartime achievements and popularity with the press coexisted with severe friction among American, British, and French officers.

There was no exact counterpart. Hugh Trenchard was comparable as an air-power theorist, but Mitchell's personal flying and activism made the comparison less direct.

Demobilization and congressional reorganization left Mitchell as an influential subordinate, with permanent colonel's rank and a temporary brigadier-general appointment.

Mitchell expected another major war and sought an independent air force, while his demand to replace naval power went much further than recognizing aviation's importance.

The viewer's correction is accepted: tanks are placed within artillery as a subsection, despite having been mentioned separately.

William Benson, Franklin Roosevelt, William Moffett, and William Sims disagreed about much of naval aviation, yet Mitchell's attacks on the surface fleet and carriers gave them common cause.

Mitchell's proposed shift from naval defense to air defense depended on where hostile heavy bombers could reach the United States.

Mitchell's publicity campaign led the War and Navy Departments toward the joint exercises known as Project B.

An enemy fleet could avoid shore-based aircraft while attacking the trade those aircraft could not reach.

Aircraft procurement prices omit operating and training costs, while figures from different decades distort Mitchell's comparison with a battleship.

Before Project B, the Navy had already attacked Indiana from the air and used controlled charges and practice bombs to study accuracy and damage.

The agreed rules expose the central conflict: the Navy wanted progressive damage evidence, while the Air Service wanted an unrestricted sinking demonstration.

Multiple airfields and supporting infrastructure complicate the cost and coverage of a bomber-based coastal defense.

It was an interesting suggestion, but the rules prohibited creating navigation hazards. The targets were placed in roughly 100 fathoms of water.

The test force combined American, British, and Italian bomber designs against old, stationary ships with no crews, maneuver, fighters, antiaircraft fire, or damage control.

They appear to have been allowed, but the heaviest bombs could be dropped only twice against the battleship.

Probably a single 2,000-pound bomb for two of the displayed aircraft, with doubt about the third. The captions do not establish which aircraft each visual reference indicates.

No. The attacks required good daylight weather so inspectors could safely board the targets and contemporary aircraft could operate effectively.

Mitchell initially observed the rules while fighters simulated antiaircraft suppression and bombers attacked smaller targets before Ostfriesland's staged strikes began.

Yes. The doors were closed, but nobody was aboard to shore up or fix small leaks.

Six heavy bombs fell in quick succession against a limit of two, interrupting the inspection sequence intended to measure Ostfriesland's accumulating damage.

Near misses tore hull plating and produced progressive flooding, but the rushed sinking prevented engineers from determining which leaks a crew could have contained.

Yes. These and later tests conducted according to the rules informed damage-control practice and subdivision in later US battleships.

Moffett, Roosevelt, and Sims were already advancing naval aviation when Mitchell's bombing demonstration became a claim to credit for its development.

Leaked bombing reports complicated Washington naval conference diplomacy by casting doubt on the value of the ships governments intended to limit.

Mason Patrick asserted command authority over Mitchell and brought engineering and wartime Air Service experience to the task.

Mitchell's damaged Army-Navy relationships weakened joint exercises and operational learning before the Second World War.

A bomb-by-bomb record of damage could guide improved subdivision and resistance to bombing.

Mitchell's success with junior supporters coexisted with difficulty engaging peers who challenged his assumptions.

The practical threat depended on delivery method, aircraft range, and a ship's defenses, as Royal Navy planning for armored carriers illustrates.

Yes. The difficulty was securing suitable training and aircraft policy through the Air Ministry, not a failure to recognize the threat.

It might have helped at Pearl Harbor and would have helped at Midway by better preparing and equipping Army air units for anti-ship attack.