Fisher's Furious Flying off Ships: Courageous Class built as Aircraft Carriers

The opening frames a counterfactual where Fisher's Courageous-class ships become full fleet carriers rather than large light cruisers.

The Tsingtao air attack and Royal Naval Air Service torpedo work give Fisher a plausible reason to back carrier strike ships.

The design sketch combines Hermes and Eagle ideas with a battlecruiser-sized hull to create a fast carrier built around reconnaissance and torpedo strike.

A larger Renown-derived hull could trade heavy guns and armor for roughly 90 aircraft, high speed, and reconnaissance support for North Sea or Baltic operations.

The construction discussion weighs how many carriers Fisher might order, how fast they could complete, and whether suitable aircraft could be ready.

The first carriers would combine a useful island and efficient funnel arrangement with immature lifts, deck shaping, launch gear, and aircraft-handling practice.

A post-Jutland carrier force could launch mass torpedo strikes at ships in Wilhelmshaven, forcing Germany to rethink harbor safety.

The Baltic plan looks different when aircraft can attack over islands, strike Kiel Canal concentrations, and help neutralize mine and submarine barriers.

The revised Baltic operation uses expendable mine-clearing ships, Danish geography, carrier strikes, and anti-submarine work after the German fleet has already been weakened.

The strategic aim of severing Germany's Baltic imports could be powerful, but Fisher's personal working style was poorly suited to the information and coordination demands of modern war.

Successful wartime strikes could turn Hood's sisters into carriers and leave the Royal Navy with several distinct carrier types in service or under construction.

If carrier squadrons have already shaped operations, Royal Navy leaders have a much stronger case for retaining them when the Royal Air Force is created.

British carrier tonnage already approaching 300,000 tons would force negotiators to reconsider limits, exemptions, and parity before Washington-style talks even begin.

Loss of Baltic food and material imports could collapse Germany before April 1917, reducing both British debt and American leverage over the peace settlement.

Negotiators might distinguish fleet, light-fleet, and cruiser carriers to preserve British wartime ships while setting usable limits for future construction.

Separate fleet-carrier categories could prompt negotiators to create distinct battlecruiser and battleship allowances around ships such as Hood and the Lexington class.

Converting Hood's sisters avoids the difficult fast-battleship redesign and redirects their volume toward aircraft support, speed, and deck handling.

Allowing ten carriers of up to 35,000 tons could push capital-ship limits upward, preserve Hood, and leave Britain room for more or faster battleships.

The closing causal link compares a successful Tsingtao air attack with Fisher's earlier habit of using Japanese naval success at Tsushima to validate ideas he already favored.