Bruships: A Special - Questions/What ifs till the Bru runs out? (8)

The missed conversion is attributed chiefly to short-sighted decisions by the Australian government.

Britain could have leaned toward Germany against France and Russia, because German naval construction made Germany itself the maritime threat.

He expects them to have been capable fleet carriers and thinks they could have accelerated the British approach to naval strike aviation.

It would need its fast battlecruisers, Renown and Repulse, with an available carrier such as Furious, because they were the ships able to catch her.

Britain would likely maintain a stronger North American station, while the United States would struggle to fund a complete response.

Yes. They are described as effective small sloops whose convoy work was concentrated on the Arctic routes.

The incentives would shift toward efficient hulls and larger, likely twin-engined aircraft within a limited number of flight groups.

They could have been very useful, because the proposals belonged to the continuing South American naval competition and must be judged against Chile's opponents.

The outcome is treated chiefly as a political choice rather than an absolute financial impossibility.

Their adaptable designs and generous hull size made later conversions, including Sea Harrier operation, comparatively straightforward.

They would require a very large production run, eventually pushing force planning toward Daring-class destroyers and their 4.5-inch armament.

The battleships are manageable, but the carriers require Britain to get its own carrier force into service.

Hermes might have been retained, with Sydney, Canberra, or Adelaide as plausible Australian alternatives.

He says no such restriction controlled those orders; a South American customer could have obtained a 16-inch battleship if it wanted one.

Some were, especially pre-dreadnoughts, but torpedoes often delivered the coup de grâce after shellfire had made recovery impossible.

It should track the limited ports and fuel supplies capable of supporting a ship as large as Hood.

The F3, which he describes as an almost Nelson-and-Rodney arrangement developed as a fast battleship.

Minotaur is preferred because Britain already knew how to build the design.

Not as a substitute for guns: torpedoes are mainly for finishing an enemy, while guns offer more dependable long-range damage.

He thinks so, and would prefer a Tomahawk-capable fit that can cover both anti-ship and land-attack missions.

Such rules would be very hard to police because builders could hide protection and displacement in supposedly structural material.

Not readily, because their hulls were not designed around that form of concentrated protection.

It should have done so more consistently, but the necessary regional differences were not always implemented.

Probably long enough to be claimed for treaty tonnage, because paper strength could matter even when a ship's operational future was doubtful.

Yes. It is presented as feasible, potentially exportable back to the US Navy, and a useful justification for Mark 41 VLS.

It could have produced a hard-to-detect loitering global strike system while prompting Soviet and wider efforts to build equivalents.

A very large fleet, including completed Malta-class carriers and possibly another Vanguard-type battleship.

They can serve museum functions, but a full conversion must replace their current income and secure dependable long-term financial support.

It could use aircraft, satellites, or helicopters for targeting, and route the missile indirectly to conceal the launch position.

The fight would be costly, but their combined gun advantage could matter in a chase where Hood cannot easily use her full broadside.

Not greatly at sea, because Sweden could not seriously challenge the Royal Navy, but the postwar Scandinavian settlement could change substantially.

No additional surviving ships that fought in the war are identified, though a few contemporary civilian vessels remain.

Not with its own lift; Soviet forces would need British or American shipping, offered only if their participation became necessary.

Yes technically, but West Germany preferred the American connection and the relationship that came with choosing Fletchers.

Yes, mainly because it was a turboprop operating in an era whose attention had shifted to jet aircraft.

It would probably follow the G3 design, including forward main armament and a midships hangar.

Finland's unexpectedly strong Winter War performance is separated from its eventual defeat after entering the wider war against the Soviet Union alongside Germany.

No. The powers controlling postwar German rearmament would not have allowed West Germany to keep the cruiser.

Only somewhat: they would need better engines and air defence, but their powerful main guns would not require replacement.

Probably, because any substantial Japanese force in the islands would have put the Soviet assault in trouble.

It would use a Big Blue Blanket-style defence, with British carriers becoming crucial as more resilient platforms after US carriers were depleted.

He prefers enough dedicated carriers: battlecruisers should remain battlecruisers, while carriers supply the recon and strike reach.

Technically yes, but it would be uneconomic because the hull would already be worn out.

It might reach Darwin, but logistics would likely prevent a sustained advance much farther into Australia.

Probably not, because drones already supply much of the expendable strike role without requiring a human-guided weapon.

He considered it far too early to judge, because an opening diplomatic move does not determine the later strategic contest.

Define what counts as a pre-dreadnought first, then use broad reference pages to locate and follow the underlying sources.

It is compared more closely with the Leander class, while Australia's version is becoming a different design.

He expects an F3-like fast capital ship rather than a third Nelson, probably named St Vincent.

They might win the immediate confrontation, but Egypt could face prolonged conflict and possible regime change, with no simple predictable settlement.

Perhaps not that exact ship, but the rules could reward very large carriers built around larger twin-engined aircraft.

Navies held spare plates, cut out damaged sections, and fitted one or more replacement plates depending on the size of the hole.

It was considering them by the end of the war, after treaty-era incentives for compact single-engine aircraft became less decisive.

They removed rivets where possible and otherwise used cutting torches and heavy mechanical tools to take out the damaged section.

No. Turrets could be broken into components, and shipyards built larger cranes as turret designs grew.

They would likely sustain a larger, longer-lived, and more economical Royal Navy carrier aviation capability.