Bruships 162: I can feel the Kalax in the Air Tonight... Oh Books! Naval History Questions & Chat

The main limit is how much money the Royal Navy is willing to spend; Eagle has usable space for more light weapons, but a full modernization may be less sensible than a new carrier.

Probably a lack of better carrier jets; navalized Meteors were tested, but the Royal Navy had more suitable types arriving when it was ready to adopt jet aircraft.

Warspite might reach about 28 knots before hull efficiency and structural loads become severe, while King George V and Lion designs could become roughly 33-knot battleships.

No. He was not as powerful before the war as later narratives suggest, and the wars arose from wider political choices and German strategic gambles rather than one British politician.

It would depend on the participants and aircraft, while limited carrier size and local doctrine could produce misleading lessons for the major navies.

Germany would come closer to success because U-boats could remain submerged more often and become less vulnerable to patrols and air attack; design changes would still take time.

It could support a powerful air-defense fit, but the carrier would more likely carry cruiser-type weapons and anti-aircraft guns than a proportionally enlarged battleship battery.

Yes. The GUPPY program refitted usable wartime fleet boats extensively and helped shape later American anti-submarine doctrine and force structure.

Explorer, Excalibur, and the A-class show Britain testing radical underwater performance while building a more conventional postwar submarine force.

Yes, Britain had the industrial capacity, although the larger challenge was maintaining and upgrading the worldwide infrastructure such ships required.

Yes. Roman and other forces used log rafts, although trained carpenters often made them far more engineered than the phrase rough-hewn suggests.

A 16-gun Belfast would have exceptional cruiser firepower, trading some rate of fire for a broadside that could overwhelm many 8-inch-gun opponents.

Possibly, but the delay changes too many connected events for a narrow answer; Norway's readiness and response to threats are central to the scenario.

For hulls with plenty of service life left, yes: the refits created useful anti-submarine ships and fed practical experience into later frigate design.

The likely point is before Denmark Strait, so Bismarck would never sink Hood and the subsequent Royal Navy pursuit would unfold very differently.

The Germans likely avoid the fight or face a dangerous long-range engagement against a faster, tougher British pre-dreadnought with heavier guns.

The US Navy did not then use frigate as the Royal Navy did; the term returned later as American anti-submarine escort designs converged with foreign frigates.

It could work and offer formidable firepower, but the design is only valuable in relation to the opponents and strategic problems the Royal Navy actually faces.

Possibly, but not necessarily before other ships; faster Queen Elizabeths, Nelsons, and King George Vs could leave Hood useful in secondary roles without making her the first modernization priority.

Yes, but they also existed to generate the scale of carrier strike force the US Navy believed it needed against modern air defenses.

Britain could field new 15-inch-gun battleships much earlier, then move from modernizing old ships toward replacing them as the new force reached critical mass.

It cannot be answered from hull numbers alone; future governments' funding, manning, infrastructure, and replacement choices determine the result.

Potentially, because enough such ships would create a serious commerce-defense problem, though treaty limits and the exact construction schedule matter greatly.

It was a specially kept, clean and pressed ensign reserved for battle, while another ensign absorbed the wear of ordinary service.

Naval professionals in both countries watched them carefully, while the wider public mostly saw an aviation spectacle rather than a doctrinal demonstration.

Probably faster, perhaps around 31 knots, but not proportionately faster because the hull and diesel machinery were designed for long-range cruising rather than high-speed operation.

A longer, narrower hull generally favors efficient high speed, while a shorter, broader hull tends to favor maneuverability.

Not necessarily. Tropical tests occurred, but they did not recreate the sustained firing, rapid loading, and production pressures of war.

Mostly no; cruisers and destroyers are especially flexible, while specialized ships can still perform other tasks badly without that making their original design invalid.

Probably not widely, because ammunition is relatively inexpensive and the space-saving advantage is smaller on warships than in many land or air platforms.

Yes. Technical histories by Eberhard Rössler and broader works on a century of German U-boats are useful starting points, with Gröner valuable for source detail.

Design and test dates can disprove a neat causal story when the weapon already existed before the event said to have shaped it.

It is unlikely to work politically or legally because a state would remain responsible for private warships whose conduct it could not reliably control.

The Balaney-class sea-going torpedo boats, because they symbolize the French Navy's wider loss of infrastructure, design continuity, and great-power status.

The concept is incomplete and probably overloaded; without torpedo, anti-submarine, and light anti-aircraft specifications it resembles a fast colonial gunboat more than a balanced destroyer.

It depends on what counts as a shower; bucket-fed arrangements are very old, while a true plumbed installation requires a more precise definition and remains disputed.

France could have retained a more credible capital-ship program by avoiding the compromised Terrible approach and sustaining larger, balanced ironclad construction.

The basic idea is realistic because triple-expansion paddle vessels and paddle gunboats existed, although the proposed orientation would require detailed engineering.

No. The ships might have similar purchase costs, but Canada would need much more supporting infrastructure to operate and sustain them.

She was the oldest candidate without a major rebuild, while Hood remained potentially valuable and Renown had already received investment that was worth preserving.

Probably not. Higher limits would expand every major navy and preserve the underlying political and parity disputes rather than remove them.

Broadly similar arrangements are much older; Elizabethan Anglo-Dutch agreements and earlier foreign examples shared assets in ways that resemble the concept, though not the later US program exactly.

No. By then the need and viable gun supply would be exhausted, and the 15-inch weapon would no longer be a strong long-term answer to the newest capital ships.

The class would likely receive 15-inch triple turrets, with major manpower savings if the machinery could reduce each gun crew to a few supervisors.

They would be more powerful cruisers, but their all-forward silhouette could make long-range identification and threat assessment much harder for an opponent.

Argus was already an auxiliary after a long reserve period, while Hermes and Eagle were worn and scheduled for replacement but not simply unusable wrecks.

Germany might eventually occupy Sweden, but the cost in troops, logistics, politics, and iron supply would make it a damaging strategic choice and could delay France.

No. She had spent years out of commission and served as an auxiliary target-drone tender; her utility came from her hangar and flight deck, not modern combat readiness.

In theory, but it risks top weight and duplicated structural work; for a carrier, making the armored flight deck the strength deck is usually more efficient.

The Alaskas would be heavily favored; four ships erase most of the Scharnhorsts' armor advantage and make the matchup lopsided under clear conditions.

It could produce 15-inch-gun Scharnhorst-type capital ships by the late 1930s, greatly increasing pressure on British construction and carrier operations.

Probably not as operational carriers; larger converted battlecruisers might remain for reserve, trials, or training roles, but the oldest carriers would be superseded.

They have an excellent armor scheme and useful dual-purpose battery, but their 14-inch main guns and quadruple turrets remain important compromises against rival designs.

Only a purpose-designed hull could answer that safely; adding the power without sufficient structural and hydrodynamic design could make the ship fail at speed.

A Queen Elizabeth might gain modestly to roughly 26 or 27 knots, while a larger Revenge would more likely spend the displacement on armor or guns than speed.

Because Copenhagen required the heaviest effective ships available for a direct attack; Baltic geography did not outweigh the mission's need for concentrated gun power.

It might not rewrite Dogger Bank or Jutland directly, but it could free or redirect battlecruisers and alter how British commanders handled the German cruiser threat.

They were lost early, before replacement work reached those guns; the old weapons still functioned and were better than leaving the positions empty in the meantime.

The later pair, Anson and Howe, might be changed to three triple 16.5-inch turrets, though the earlier ships would be too advanced to alter easily.

Yes, Royal Navy ships used such pennants; Enterprise was unusual because the honor was presented to a foreign navy's celebrated ship.

Little or no change - the proposed weight and attachment arrangement are effectively those of the historical Sea Harrier.

Possibly in theory, but the discussion does not establish a concrete compromise-free design.

It would be better described as a coastal submarine and might approach roughly 200 tons submerged, because the required range demands far more fuel and volume.

France had good ideas, but metallurgy and production limited its choices; smaller guns on Dunkerque do not by themselves make the class battlecruisers.

Because Eagle was repeatedly modified and used for experiments, so her fuel capacity, aircraft load, stores, and resulting full-load displacement changed over time.

Turbines were better for high speed by 1920, while diesels increasingly became the preferred efficient cruising machinery and had largely overtaken expansion engines by 1950.

The scheme is real enough to discuss, but detailed English-language coverage is limited; it belongs among the many unbuilt battleship designs that need further archival study.

No. Later designers could spend the changed displacement in several ways, and new turret, speed, protection, and doctrine choices prevent a reliable linear extrapolation.

Royal Navy squadron numbers evolved as generations of battleships replaced or retained earlier formations, so the numbers are not a simple quality ranking.