Bruships 144: Some Books(Can't Find Lego Cam Sorry) & Naval History Questions

She would have been much more capable and survivable, but the late structural conversion would have been difficult enough that it might not have worked cleanly.

No nuclear capability is claimed, but categorical assumptions about Taiwan's preparations are unsafe; a contested landing would still become a difficult amphibious and urban campaign.

Chile was the most consistently professional, while Brazil and Argentina alternated between strong periods and neglect.

The layout worked and was well regarded, but concentrating the magazines forward complicated subdivision, survivability, and damage control.

It could have combined a large Yorktown-style air group with an armored strength deck and substantially better protection, but cumulative treaty limits still rewarded smaller ships and greater numbers.

The program evolved through Ranger and early design studies into Yorktown, Enterprise, and Wasp, laying important groundwork for later US fleet carriers.

Probably not larger at all; its payload and bomb bay were already adequate if the selected torpedo physically fitted.

The records repeated plausible wartime assumptions rather than direct physical evidence, and later wreck inspection exposed the false premise.

Many tactical failures could have defeated the raid, but the historical British plan exploited Italian complacency and gained extra surprise by attacking before HMS Eagle was available.

More Yorktowns were possible, but Hornet was chiefly a rapid bridge between the unsatisfactory Wasp compromise and the next purpose-built carrier design.

Not necessarily; many were competent products of older requirements, and the mismatch reflected changing doctrine as much as flawed aircraft.

Yes. Infrastructure and sustainment impose hard limits, while cost and the need for multiple ships to provide presence can outweigh the benefits of concentrating capability in one hull.

Yes. Three triple turrets required fewer crews than four twins and helped the design use its limited displacement more efficiently.

From the perspective of technological pace and wartime demands, Stanley Goodall is the strongest choice, although William White also faced exceptional pressures.

Radar would place high-flying fighters for a diving interception when the bomber descended to an altitude from which it could bomb effectively.

It would change British choices more than German ones, likely producing 9.2-inch cruisers that outmatched conventional light cruisers and threatened the Deutschland class.

Navies still retain in-house design capability, but commercial yards perform much more of the detailed completion work than they did when state dockyards were available.

Its cumulative design penalty was about 1,000 tons, potentially enough to support a third shaft or other major machinery changes.

It would likely have been more stable and carried a larger missile load, with Long Beach suggesting the scale of the opportunity.

Probably; a larger Royal Navy would likely continue the Tiger or large Town-class cruiser lineage for a major guided-missile presence ship.

Restrictions against firing over another turret protected expensive equipment during exercises, not proof that the shot was impossible in combat.

Roughly 2,400 to 2,450 tons standard, because the torpedoes would require a longer and differently balanced hull as well as added weapon weight.

Purpose-building would help, but Canada should choose one class and build a standardized run rather than produce one-off ships from many classes.

Some yards could probably build a ship near 100,000 tons, but wartime demand for quantity made such maximum-size construction strategically unattractive.

Prioritize carriers, specific Pearl Harbor preparations, reserve basing units, and the numbers and long-range support needed for submarine operations.

They had little chance of reproducing Calliope's escape because position, Captain Kane's decision, engineering performance, and luck all favored the British ship.

The recalled proposals involved facilities around Cape Town, Durban, and Port Elizabeth or modern Gqeberha, although the individual yard names were not available.

It first faces a neutrality and warning dilemma, but if it intervenes its modern aircraft, antisubmarine helicopters, sensors, and missiles would dominate 1941 naval forces.

The Royal Navy would begin with overwhelming European superiority in carriers and capital ships while its main rivals remained much less prepared.

The battleships would shift to Channel and other secondary duties, while the faster battlecruisers continued global-presence and surface-raider missions.

Fleets would be larger and more modern, but an earlier Far Eastern conflict could leave Britain and the United States experienced and cooperating before Germany entered the war.

They were expected to delay a German breakthrough at the Channel barrier until the Grand Fleet arrived, accepting that the mission could require them to fight until sunk.

Yes. Their secondary missions made them force enablers, and reserve status kept usable ships available without wearing out the active fleet in peacetime.

Their response could become collective: Poland, Finland, and Sweden might form a Baltic defense alignment supported by Swedish shipbuilding.

The division would have produced intense bargaining: Britain would seek modern ships, France would demand useful squadrons, Italy would seek parity, and the United States would compete for valuable technology and hulls.

Two battleships were enough for the heavy naval role; the land campaign needed smaller ships capable of operating in canals and rivers more than additional capital ships.

Refit them for convoy escort, where their guns could deter or delay surface raiders and release modern battleships for other theaters.

Before treaty limits hardened replacement cycles, the Royal Navy kept old ships for lesser duties and added new construction to meet expanding requirements.

No. The government made the political decision and issued the orders; the Royal Navy did not independently start wars for entertainment.

Japan loses the weapon its tactics were built around, while the United States gains a superb torpedo that initially exceeds the needs and assumptions of its doctrine.

Britain would gain enormous wealth and domestic energy security, reducing tanker and import burdens while accelerating rearmament, mechanization, industrial output, and operational flexibility.

The battle likely reverses: the faster Hawkins-class ships could control the range and use longer-ranged, faster-firing 7.5-inch guns to defeat the German squadron before it could bring most of its armament to bear.

The Hawkins class extended the large light-cruiser line; a true postwar armored-cruiser successor would have been a much larger 20,000- to 25,000-ton ship.

Most personnel could move safely by rail beneath the Channel, reducing submarine leverage, while ships would retain part of the freight burden and engineers adapted the tunnel's electrical systems.

It would open with a British counter-invasion and probably cost Germany the surface ships sent to support an isolated, unsustainable garrison.

Probably not while they were still needed for monitors, trials, and proof work; two were gone by 1933 and the last survived until 1947.

Armored flight decks complemented rather than replaced combat air patrol, radar warning, and observer-assisted fighter interception.

They would form the core of the fast fleet and could probably run down the German ships within hours, with major consequences for later Bismarck operations.

They would help, but they would not by themselves fix the command failures, weak defensive preparation, and loss of the reservoir.

Possibly, if treaties allowed it; South African or Australian sites were less contentious than Singapore, where Japan and the United States might object.

He would probably coordinate the defense more firmly, pull back earlier when necessary, and secure the reservoir, making the Japanese position far more precarious.

British carriers traded air-group size for survivability in confined, distant theaters, while American carriers emphasized massed air power across the Pacific.

Their major characteristics would converge, with competition moving into turret layouts, detailed systems, and each navy's willingness to stretch the rules.

About six inches at the flight deck plus another heavy deck below, a protection scheme too weight-intensive for a practical contemporary carrier.

As a mixed but respectable record: later needs make his shortcomings visible, yet he also made important decisions and is sometimes blamed to spare his successors.

Only at extreme risk; the expedition would need a major fleet and amphibious train, then face a fortified siege while British fleets cut its supply and withdrawal routes.

Not exactly; designing for 18-inch combat would require a heavier protection baseline, so later post-Jutland changes would start from a different ship.

The proposal is unsound because it treats a long-lived amphibious capability as a short-term budget problem instead of planning for the fleet future governments will need.

The Sea Otter was a proven Walrus development that fit British scouting, communications, and rescue needs, where biplane utility mattered more than headline performance.

Atlanta's loss arose from a chaotic close-range battle, while the transferable British advantage was collective prewar experience in night coordination rather than an invulnerable technique.

Yes. Britain retained design continuity, while the others restarted from scratch, though their clean slate could also help them escape inherited design habits.

Order more ships, recruit more sailors, and improve pay, accommodation, career progression, and rotations so the larger fleet can actually be crewed.

Twenty-two inches is about the outer practical limit, but 21 inches is the effective one; shortening a 24.5-inch torpedo would not cure its wider installation problems.

Only at a steep cost: loading limits, slower cycles, tracking error, mechanical vulnerability, and changing engagement range can erase the theoretical advantage.

Battleships carried political prestige, so Congress underfunded most other types until war exposed the shortage and forced mass emergency orders.

The name fit Royal Navy tradition, but Britain would probably avoid sharing it with the contemporary American nuclear carrier.