Bruships 131: Battleships...

Stopping salvors requires money, surveillance, and a workable jurisdiction, all of which are complicated by disputed ownership and states that no longer exist.

The Royal Air Force repeatedly mined the canal, making it an unreliable route.

Possibly in a later generation, but high initial cost and political resistance make widespread adoption unlikely soon.

Yes. Canada would need icebreakers of that scale to make the passage a dependable economic route.

The claims need an international legal settlement because specialist salvors will not risk costly equipment without clear authority and protection from seizure.

Probably during the 1920s, after wartime disruption delayed a prewar upgrade cycle, leaving existing dock capacity to constrain new designs in the meantime.

Not soon: Russia retains excellent designers but lacks the broad skilled workforce needed to manufacture and support large warships without gutting other programs.

Germany might receive Atlantic-adapted Littorio-type ships and earlier 15-inch guns, but Italian capacity would first need major expansion.

Britain would use its superior industrial capacity to outbuild France, producing an early ironclad arms race and possibly a serious war scare.

It would probably exceed 15,000 tons and, even with a program beginning soon, would more likely appear in the 2040s.

Probably the Tribals at close range, provided they dodge the Fletchers' torpedoes and exploit their heavier volume of gunfire.

Britain would build equivalents, but Germany could impose an outsized cost because the Royal Navy had to modernize and cover a much larger fleet.

A formal reintroduction is unnecessary because cats have continued to go to sea informally in the Royal Navy.

Yes, especially in its intended Mediterranean setting, although its specialization reduced its suitability for Atlantic operations.

Not necessarily, because the same technology would make 16.5-inch ammunition faster and easier to handle as well.

A River-class hull, probably enhanced for the emergency role, would be the most practical starting point.

Britain loses fewer destroyers, arms carriers and destroyers with five-inch guns, and may keep the weapon in service for many years.

A book discussion uses HMS Vanguard's role in the 1953 Coronation Review to show the battleship's final diplomatic value.

Yes; it can divide six-round ranging salvos into two three-shell groups and find the range on two ships more quickly.

A design-history book reveals Soviet missile battlecruisers, expanding patrol ships, and the flawed Pravda-class submarine program.

It depends on access: free movement around the coast permits central command, while blocked routes force each region to maintain a more independent fleet.

Possibly, if the ship remained viable, though limited personnel could still prevent its retention.

Yes; several designs existed, and an F3-style all-forward arrangement may have handled quadruple turrets better.

Potentially in the late 1920s, but only if metallurgy advanced far enough to implement the already proposed field-effect concept.

Not by itself; the Soviet design was trying to implement ideas that its available supporting technology could not yet sustain.

About twelve to thirteen years using two yards that each build two boats concurrently.

Probably not yet; a return becomes more plausible when power-hungry systems such as railguns make nuclear propulsion and a large hull necessary.

Fit Sea Ceptor, a 57- or 76-mm gun, a 40-mm gun, ASW torpedoes, and aviation space for UAVs or a small helicopter.

It would need several new production lines - roughly three yards able to build four boats each - so that twelve submarines could be under construction at once.

Neither exactly; its capital-ship escort role made it essentially a very large ocean-going destroyer.

Yes. Faster jet landing speeds would drive the change sooner.

Canada was the plausible exception. India, New Zealand, and especially Ireland were unlikely customers.

Britain would not accept the delay because benchmark-navy status required it to set or immediately exceed the emerging standard.

Andrew Lambert's study shows how Baltic operations forced reluctant investment in gunboats alongside steam battleships.

The replacement is already under way, and moving faster would require substantially more submarine-building infrastructure.

There is not enough information; fleet totals are meaningless without the missions, threats, infrastructure, and costs involved.

A 24-knot ship with 14-inch guns was plausible and would pressure Germany while forcing later battlecruisers to become faster.

It was viable by the 1920s or earlier; electric drive let designers connect the propellers to power generated by steam turbines, diesels, or other machinery.

About 18 carriers, with nine based on each coast, if the infrastructure investment actually occurred.

Internal conversions would be impractical, but deck tubes could fit in former boat or tender embarkation spaces.

Submarines and torpedoes would dominate, but submarines would also struggle to navigate and attack while remaining submerged.

No. Battlecruisers would move toward 28 knots, and battleships could not routinely match that speed until small-tube boilers matured.

It would be a slightly larger, roomier improved Oberon.

The Soviet Union would have to build first; Western navies already had modern ships and would most likely construct new battleships only in response.

Prioritize radar and rangefinding, then add 6-inch and 3-inch secondary weapons to keep smaller attackers away.

Ships would drift and listen more often, and the need for better passive detection would bring towed arrays forward.

Probably not. Vikramaditya is capable, but that arrangement did not fit the Soviet doctrine behind the Kiev class.

The United States would probably reopen the recurring debate over reactivating the Iowa class.

Probably not to every claim, but it should still be a useful first generation of a new uncrewed capability.

It would probably buy many more British-built escorts, especially Flower-class corvettes, while domestic capacity caught up.

No. Keep each project alive until testing shows that its technology is not viable, then cancel it.

It would make US cruisers more capable and crew-efficient, while encouraging Britain to demand more and larger cruisers until it could field a similar system.

HMS Renown would be the strongest choice, or a very large heavy cruiser if the ship must be classed as a cruiser.

It would probably become a British submarine target and sink after a larger torpedo attack, creating an even greater political controversy.

A common platform would be financially sensible if it met the required operational roles.

The inventory might remain broadly similar, but better command and a larger number of genuinely operational submarines would make the force more dangerous.

No. Conventional ways to disrupt a chokepoint are easier, so needing the nuclear weapon would indicate a deeper strategic failure.

It would require the better part of 22,000 tons.

Yes; Argentina had real chances if it had cared for its troops and used its forces to disrupt Britain's long logistics line.

The joke name belonged to a serious radar-guided anti-ship missile intended for the Fairey Gannet.

No; anti-drone systems must be fitted across the fleet rather than concentrated on one specialist ship.

Yamato would need a major victory over carriers that convinced navies battleships were necessary to protect carrier groups.

Build amphibious lift, carriers, submarines, and long-range aviation, then fortify the islands and attack Britain's supply line at sea.

The government would probably blame earlier carrier cuts and launch a major program to rebuild large-carrier capability.

A comparative design passage explains liquid-layer, dry, crush-tube, and Pugliese underwater-protection systems.

Yes, but it needs a false keel or comparable structure below the main keel with enough protection depth to absorb the blast.

A Corbett passage demonstrates the difficulty of reconstructing Tsushima amid smoke, broken formations, and missing Russian testimony.

Only by breaking French neutrality, which could bring Britain into Japan's war against France.

Chronic underinvestment and erratic design choices left France poorly placed to risk a naval war in 1905.

Sea Harrier II alone would radically improve radar and beyond-visual-range combat, probably devastating Argentine air power in the Falklands War.

It mattered, but less than some American officers claimed and more than Japanese propaganda acknowledged.

Maintain an Iver Huitfeldt-class ship, several Knud Rasmussen patrol vessels, a conventional submarine, and supporting aircraft for persistent coverage.

It would greatly improve accuracy and radar, potentially giving the Royal Navy electronics resembling 1960s or 1970s capability.

Yes, despite the technical difficulty, because a domestic version and strong export sales could repay the investment.

Both deliver energy from above, but US, Japanese, and British doctrine approached long-range battle differently.

Yes, provided wartime metallurgy and production could manufacture enough reliable miniature components.

No; three hulls are needed to guarantee one station, and at least five are needed to guarantee two flight decks are available.

Not much simpler, but more tightly integrated with commands, which allowed intelligence to be distributed faster.

Probably not as an aircraft choice, although buying it would have supported British industry.

No; Taranto faced no comparable night-fighter threat, while Japanese aircraft actually encountered defenders at Pearl Harbor.

Medium helicopters in the Sea King and later Merlin size range would become important earlier.

It would have gained a capable early system and experience on the road to Aegis, but Typhon would still fall short of later Aegis performance.

King George V and Victorious would reshape the formation and add air power, probably overwhelming Bismarck and Prinz Eugen.

Because US policymakers alternated between wanting controllable dependence and wanting capable allies that could defend themselves and share the burden.

Britain would probably choose TSR-2 because it matched the national specification, although the F-111K-like alternative is preferred here.

Ark Royal, Warspite, Dreadnought, and Eskimo.

A design-game battlecruiser gained hull length and space but entered a battleship fight with only 10 inches of armor.

Because the Royal Marines belong to the Royal Navy, which adapted Lynx airframes to provide the attack-helicopter support its amphibious troops required.

Enterprise, Constellation, Washington, and Saratoga.

Each service built on an aircraft family it already supported: Huey commonality favored Sea Cobra, while Britain standardized around Lynx.

Look for Flower- and Tribal-class records, especially anti-submarine warfare material and personal accounts.

The cruisers' vulnerability reflected command failure to vary course, not an unavoidable torpedo solution.

They would probably launch an aggressive flank attack, bring the British cruisers in behind them, and turn the battle into a much more complex fight for Bismarck and Prinz Eugen.

Yes, if public debate convinces politicians that sustained defence and infrastructure funding are essential.