The boiler section marks the strongest missed opportunity: small-tube oil-fired boilers could have improved speed without provoking the same gun-caliber race.
Keep it in Jellicoe's Grand Fleet as a battleship fast wing; Beatty received the historical squadron only because his own battlecruisers temporarily left for training.
The Queen Elizabeth Maximus counterfactual shows why the technically possible 15-gun, 16.5-inch fast battleship would have been strategically destabilizing.
Possibly, but not predictably. An American 18-inch answer and a British construction pause might create a temporary balance, yet changing the scale of the competition could also change its political rules.
Not necessarily. The Revenges were more efficient new designs, while Queen Elizabeth's original inefficiencies happened to provide room for later major reconstruction.
Not easily in the 1910s. Manufacturing a much longer barrel was a harder metallurgical problem than increasing caliber with the methods then available.
The Maximus counterfactual exposes a prewar capability gap: Britain could build escorts, but effective submarine detection and attack systems were not yet mature.
The proposed sixth Queen Elizabeth becomes a source-critical investigation into whether Britain intended a one-off, small-tube-boiler battleship with six 18-inch guns.
Yes. Their enormous heat and power demands encouraged vertically integrated works that generated their own power and handled much of their own supporting infrastructure.
A close blockade sits outside the enemy port, but the ships required depend on whether the target is a battle fleet, merchant traffic, or a privateer base.
An inshore squadron can imitate a fleet over the horizon, or conceal a real one, by controlling when it signals and encouraging the enemy to confirm the wrong assumption.
Distant blockade becomes more disruptive when production depends on components, additives, and raw materials moving through global maritime chokepoints.
German submarine campaigns in both world wars attempted to blockade Britain through minefields or ocean-wide interdiction guided by intelligence and command control.
Napoleon could forbid European trade with Britain on paper, but merchant crews, weak tracking, and French loss of sea control made the prohibition hard to enforce.
The opposing orders of battle show why Britain kept first- and second-rate ships concentrated against Toulon while the War of 1812 continued across the Atlantic.
French commanders used favorable winds to exercise outside Toulon, while Edward Pellew held the main fleet back in hopes of cutting them off for battle.
Both fleets fired high to damage masts and rigging until the French reached shore-battery protection, leaving light casualties but important tactical lessons.
Even after Pellew withdrew much of the fleet to Majorca, the French remained cautious because the sudden British reinforcement had made the blockade seem tighter than it was.
Because warships spend more wartime on blockade, commerce protection, and convoy work than in fleet battles, those routine missions must shape force design.
Allowing merchant traffic into a blockaded naval port can preserve the enemy fleet by feeding its sailors and replacing water, rope, clothing, and other stores.