Complete directory
Explore every watch point in reverse video-date order, then in timestamp order within each video.
Even additional Yamatos and successor designs would improve resistance, not overcome American industrial capacity or turn a defensive fleet into a Pacific-winning force.
From A150 & BB64; After Yamato - Key Ship Series 4, Ships 7 ·
The A-150's proposed 20.1-inch guns offered intimidation, but its six-gun battery produced fewer splashes for range correction than Yamato's nine guns or the Number 13 design's eight.
From A150 & BB64; After Yamato - Key Ship Series 4, Ships 7 ·
B-64 is interpreted as an Alaska-like large cruiser intended to defeat cruisers and shield carriers.
From A150 & BB64; After Yamato - Key Ship Series 4, Ships 7 ·
A counterfactual alternative favours repeatable hulls, carriers, submarines, and pressure on repair infrastructure over ever-larger battleships.
From A150 & BB64; After Yamato - Key Ship Series 4, Ships 7 ·
Yamato is framed as a capable but comparatively slow battle-line foundation within a renewed Eight-Eight logic, shaped by Kantai Kessen and deterrence thinking.
From A150 & BB64; After Yamato - Key Ship Series 4, Ships 7 ·
The expected decisive battle was meant to follow attrition, seek a negotiated peace, and accept severe Japanese losses rather than promise lasting command of the sea.
From A150 & BB64; After Yamato - Key Ship Series 4, Ships 7 ·
The closing question asks whether Japan could have combined its existing assets, public messaging, and deployment to postpone conflict long enough to matter.
From A150 & BB64; After Yamato - Key Ship Series 4, Ships 7 ·
French parity with Italy illustrates why equal fleet totals do not create equal security when one navy must defend a worldwide empire.
From A150 & BB64; After Yamato - Key Ship Series 4, Ships 7 ·
Mobile Bay shows how estuaries and channels restrict a fleet's manoeuvre even when naval power is strategically mobile.
From Fleets of Mobile Bay(1864) ·
The battle strengthened the Union blockade by making it harder for Confederate blockade runners to use Mobile Bay.
From Fleets of Mobile Bay(1864) ·
A comparison with Sparta explains why slave societies cultivate coercive authority and why slavery corrodes the wider society that sustains it.
From Fleets of Mobile Bay(1864) ·
The opposing admirals illustrate how political judgement, loyalty, and operational temperament shaped the battle.
From Fleets of Mobile Bay(1864) ·
Maryland's votes, attempted neutrality, and disputed Confederate enlistment figures complicate a simple border-state secession story.
From Fleets of Mobile Bay(1864) ·
Farragut selected the conventional USS Hartford for communication and command rather than choosing the most modern-looking vessel.
From Fleets of Mobile Bay(1864) ·
A proposed Washington naval museum would have preserved Hartford, but the plan died and the historic flagship deteriorated beyond salvage.
From Fleets of Mobile Bay(1864) ·
Farragut used ironclads ahead of his wooden ships as the Union column pushed past Fort Morgan and the minefield.
From Fleets of Mobile Bay(1864) ·
After USS Tecumseh sank in the minefield, Farragut brought Hartford forward and carried the remaining force through.
From Fleets of Mobile Bay(1864) ·
Tennessee could neither ram the faster Union ships nor withstand the monitors that closed in from several directions.
From Fleets of Mobile Bay(1864) ·
Most vessels at Mobile Bay were recent construction, showing how quickly the Civil War created new naval capabilities.
From Fleets of Mobile Bay(1864) ·
Chickasaw and Winnebago were imperfect sea-going craft, yet their speed and firepower helped trap Tennessee.
From Fleets of Mobile Bay(1864) ·
The monitor discussion explains why low freeboard and limited speed constrained early armoured warships at sea.
From Fleets of Mobile Bay(1864) ·
Lackawanna's varied battery illustrates the practical trade-off between standardisation and getting a wartime fleet into service quickly.
From Fleets of Mobile Bay(1864) ·
Selma's capture and immediate Union recommissioning show how a local victory could transfer useful combat power between fleets.
From Fleets of Mobile Bay(1864) ·
Tennessee's failure exposes two linked lessons: a ram must be fast enough to strike, and an admiral must be able to see the fight.
From Fleets of Mobile Bay(1864) ·
Buchanan's advance let the Union fleet manoeuvre freely instead of forcing it through mines and confined water under Fort Morgan's guns.
From Fleets of Mobile Bay(1864) ·
A one-day delay was justified because it added a fourth ironclad and useful firepower to a hazardous attack.
From Fleets of Mobile Bay(1864) ·
The proposed Number 13 class emerges as the fast, 18-inch-gunned successor to Japan's Nagato, Amagi, and Kii programmes.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
Claims that Number 13 would have been unrivalled depend on unknown American and British successor designs.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
Japan was planning the yard and maintenance capacity for Number 13, making it more than a paper super-battleship.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
A brief counterfactual asks whether completing more Daring-class destroyers would have preserved a larger Royal Navy escort and presence force.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
If treaty limits arrived after Number 13 and its rivals, high speed and heavier guns could become the new capital-ship norm.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
The shipbuilding counterfactual is bounded by the argument that fascism, militarism, and Japan's internal divisions would still shape the interwar world.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
Japan wanted the battle line to make intervention costly for stronger industrial powers and deter a prolonged war.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
Japan had to reckon with Britain as both a naval power and the head of an imperial system able to mobilize forces from several regions.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
Former Union and Confederate officers employed in Japan gave Japanese planners an unusual perspective on American political solidarity.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
Number 13's proposed guns combined enormous shell energy with a calibre large enough to push rival navies toward still more extreme weapons.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
The ten-inch-gun analogy shows how slower loading, turret movement, and spotting can erase the theoretical advantage of a larger shell.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
The design is traced from the Queen Elizabeth fast-battleship idea through Japan's Nagato, Amagi, and Kii family and Yuzuru Hiraga's work.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
Number 13 shows the pre-treaty capital-ship path Japan was preparing before two decades of construction limits led toward Yamato.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
Number 13 is imagined as a visible fleet cornerstone, contrasting with the limited deterrent value of a hidden prestige ship.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
Japan weighed the fleet's cost honestly while recognizing that a force defensive against great powers could be coercive against weaker states.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
A modernized game model preserves Number 13's intended speed and guns while making its displacement and stability compromises explicit.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
Number 13's 30-knot speed could keep a 23-knot South Dakota at long range, but damage would quickly erode that advantage.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
The simulation illustrates why more smaller guns and a faster firing cycle can overwhelm a smaller battery of very large guns.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
A realistic comparison would require entire battle lines and cruiser forces, not one Number 13 fighting one South Dakota.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
Historical simulations are useful illustrations of choices and constraints, not definitive answers to an unrealized arms race.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
A brief postscript imagines rebuilding Number 13 with Yamato-level protection as a route to a late-1930s Japanese fast battleship.
From Number 13 Class: Dreams of Yamatos - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 6 ·
The Dutch empire depended heavily on the East Indies, making a credible naval defence force a question of national economic security.
From Dutch Dream of 1913: A Dreadnought Battle Fleet of their very own - Key Ship Series 4, Ship 5 ·