Losing Scharnhorst or Gneisenau close to the loss of Admiral Graf Spee could push Hitler away from surface operations and alter the invasion of Norway and the Atlantic war.
Removing the German battlecruiser threat could release Royal Navy battleships for the Mediterranean and change Mussolini's calculation about entering the war.
The rebuild's value lies less in a single decisive battle than in the cumulative advantage created when extra ships preserve other scarce resources early in a long war.
Adding rebuilt cruisers behind the armed merchant cruiser patrol line improves the Royal Navy's speed, radio reporting, and ability to maintain contact with German raiders.
Henderson's large-destroyer ambitions, released rearmament funding, available yards, and Stanley Goodall's support make the unusual conversion institutionally plausible.
Midway combined US operating assumptions with treaty-era design experience. Its design was distinct from British armoured carriers and the mass-produced Essex program.
Midway's survivability depended on repairability, resistance to the attackers that escaped the air defenses, and the ability to keep flight decks available across long distances.
George Chamberlain Duncan's crash aboard Midway illustrates both the danger of postwar carrier aviation and the later reuse of real accident footage in feature films.
During her 1954-55 world cruise, Midway became a major Seventh Fleet carrier and covered the evacuation of Nationalist troops, civilians, and livestock from offshore islands.
Successive refits gave Midway an angled deck, stronger aviation machinery, and a much larger flight deck, but cost overruns and handling problems exposed the limits of transforming an old hull.
Midway's later career included onboard explosions and an accidental bomb strike on Reeves, reminders that routine carrier aviation exposed the ship and her escorts to serious risks.
The closing question asks viewers to choose an aircraft carrier lost after the Second World War for preservation and decide where its museum home should have been.
The 1921 bombing trials were meant to measure successive stages of ship damage, giving naval engineers evidence for better protection and damage control.
Replacing Japanese or German battleships with carriers would still leave constraints on aircraft capability, trained crews, infrastructure, and enemy construction.
Mitchell's warnings included ideas that later looked prescient and claims about Hawaii and Air Service funding that contemporary evidence did not support.
Officers can dispute doctrine, but misrepresenting evidence and claiming authority over elected leaders raise different questions of professional responsibility.
Mitchell's early aviation experience includes civilian flying lessons, battlefield study, and his 1913 testimony against separating Army aviation from the Signal Corps.
In a hypothetical 1914 US-Japan war, British control of much of the coal-carrying trade could constrain both fleets even while Britain remained neutral.
St. Mihiel's multinational air force complicates claims that Mitchell alone planned and led the operation; even his personal participation in the flying is disputed.
Hugh Trenchard provides a British comparison in air-power theory, while Mitchell's personal flying and public activism made him a different kind of advocate.
Demobilization and congressional reorganization left Mitchell as an influential subordinate, with permanent colonel's rank and a temporary brigadier-general appointment.
Mitchell expected another major war and sought an independent air force, while his demand to replace naval power went much further than recognizing aviation's importance.
William Benson, Franklin Roosevelt, William Moffett, and William Sims disagreed about much of naval aviation, yet Mitchell's attacks on the surface fleet and carriers gave them common cause.