Smaller Yamato studies and additional carriers offered alternatives to building more full-size Yamatos in yards already stretched by the existing programme.
The Greek dreadnought combined a German hull, American 14-inch guns and Yarrow boilers, while the choice of turbines depended on the suppliers the yard could secure.
Rear Admiral Lionel Grant Tufnell assessed competing designs and armour supplies for Salamis, while the comparison with Erin shows why procurement quality alone could not decide a battle.
A roughly nine-inch belt could protect an export dreadnought against much of a regional fleet while leaving it vulnerable to the rival navy's newest heavy guns.
Ten 14-inch guns, credible protection and 21-knot speed made Ersatz Monarch a plausible answer to Italy's existing dreadnoughts in the confined Adriatic.
A treaty permitting regular construction could have produced different Second World War battleships by allowing designs to develop through successive programmes.
Born in 1855, Pohl served in the navy for decades before liver cancer prompted his replacement by Reinhard Scheer in January 1916 and killed him the following month.
Pohl's early career shows a reliable, self-promoting officer advancing through the Imperial German Navy and joining Alfred von Tirpitz's torpedo specialists.
Command of Hansa during the Boxer Rebellion gave Pohl a chance to display competence, cultivate press attention, and secure promotion with Tirpitz's support.
Elevation to chief of the Admiralty Staff put Pohl close to Kaiser Wilhelm II and rewarded his habit of telling senior patrons what they wanted to hear.
German naval leaders expected a short war and kept the High Seas Fleet near home, while Pohl pressed from November 1914 to remove cruiser-rule limits on U-boats.
On taking command of the High Seas Fleet, Pohl promised that twenty U-boats could stop neutral shipping without a diplomatic crisis and force Britain to collapse.
Aboard the damaged Seydlitz, Pohl presented the U-boat blockade directly to the Kaiser while rival naval leaders were constrained by court and patronage politics.
Operational availability meant a nominal force of twenty U-boats could place only a fraction off Britain, far too few to deliver Pohl's promised shutdown of trade.
Pohl planned short, heavily screened fleet advances near German waters, hoping to impose losses on the Grand Fleet without risking a decisive distant battle.
Pohl's policies projected action while distributing responsibility so success enhanced his reputation and failure could be blamed on implementation or conditions.
The light cruiser Danzig struck a mine near Heligoland during one of Pohl's limited advances, showing that even tightly bounded operations still carried real risk.
The mutual effort to lure the opposing fleet toward friendly coasts illustrates why a naval plan cannot depend on the enemy choosing conditions that favor you.
State-owned dockyards gave government a cost benchmark, retained surge capacity, and allowed priority construction without paying a private yard's profit and disruption costs.