More Questions of the Equitable Washington Treaty Answered: A UAD Infused Discussion (Long Patrol)

An Ultimate Admiral: Dreadnoughts build explores how speed, protection, machinery, and twelve 16-inch guns compete for space and displacement.

A 6,000-ton excess forces visible compromises in range, bulkheads, barbettes, armour distribution, and secondary weapons.

The opposing design becomes a large, 25-knot Spanish battleship whose generous armament is separated clearly from historical Spanish capability.

No rule set eliminates evasion, but broad limits are less likely to manufacture loopholes than highly detailed restrictions.

The crews were harder to replace than the hulls, especially senior officers whose professional experience had taken decades to build.

Hood would ultimately be replaced, while recurring construction would produce successive improved designs rather than one final treaty generation.

No. A battlecruiser can avoid a battleship, but it does not have the protection to make battleships obsolete in a direct fight.

No treaty guarantees peace, but one is more durable when participants feel secure rather than permanently weakened.

Yes. A treaty should not be written in a way that automatically forces its signatories to lie.

A viewer links recurring fast-battleship construction and battlecruiser reconstruction to threat response and Depression-era shipyard employment.

It could be interesting, but modernization cannot fully overcome an old hull's original internal and technological limits.

Damage could take away Hood's ability to disengage, while fast battleships could keep up and survive return fire behind battleship armour.

A 10:7 ratio could make Japan feel secure while still constraining the United States and Britain, unlike a ratio that made Japan feel permanently weak.

The video leaves both starting points open and defers the choice to the later London treaty discussion.

Britain would likely favour fast ships and steady construction, the United States might trade speed for cost and protection, and Japan would wait to tailor its response.

Potentially. A very fast Tiger would have specialised utility, while old slow battleships would be dangerous to retain in a modern battle line.

A viewer proposes lower heavy-cruiser limits as a peace compromise while asking whether unfinished South Dakota hulls could survive cancellation.

It is an interesting idea, but it rapidly reaches the practical ceiling around 18-inch guns and very large displacements.

This installment defers the detailed answer to part two of the series.

No. Henderson's career is given as evidence that he anticipated it as well.

Yes, especially for trade protection and cruiser hunting, but most old battle-line ships would soon be outclassed.

A viewer links naval budget cuts to public spending, industrial demand, and the collapse of Britain's postwar warship export market.

Only with a clear speed margin, potentially around 35 knots, because successive treaty battleships would become faster.

The viewer proposes nine guns as the baseline, while twelve guns or a 35-knot reconstruction would demand difficult compromises. The reply considers the speed increase possible but a tough ask.

The fictional battle turns earlier weight-saving choices into visible damage, ammunition, and force-control consequences.

The closing preview offers two starting points for the London treaties: the historical Washington settlement or the equitable alternative developed in this series.