Bruships 23 - New Book Review

A mixed selection of recently received naval-history books makes this Bruships session unusually broad.

A recommendation for Ian Friel's Britain and the Ocean Road, especially for readers interested in shipwrecks, piracy, and the early maritime world.

A guide to Andrew Boyd's earlier Eastern Waters study, with a discussion of carrier design, aircraft maintenance, and long-range operations.

Atlantic weather, Mediterranean alert fighters and spare aircraft complicate comparisons of carrier deck parks.

Losing Abadan would have forced Britain to seek more distant oil supplies without enough tankers to carry them.

They could, but combat losses and unserviceability often left too few aircraft to fill an additional deck park.

Andrew Boyd's century-spanning naval-intelligence history is praised for depth, while readers new to naval history are advised to build context first.

American wooden flight decks and British armoured designs are linked to expected operating areas and available repair facilities.

Work on simpler German communications and investment in codebreaking machinery supported the attack on naval Enigma.

A common intelligence-assessment process improved operational use, while secrecy restrictions obstructed longer-term research.

A photograph-rich Essex-class history becomes a route into postwar carrier conversion and the Korean War's carrier operations.

Catapults, deck alterations, fuel storage and stability changes supported the Essex class's transition to jet operations.

The scale of Essex-class construction is placed against American expectations of severe carrier losses during an invasion of Japan.

It was an excellent design for the US Navy, while British designs offered different advantages and Malta was substantially larger.

Not often, according to the reply; the encounters are characterised as a dangerous draw rather than an easy victory for the jet.

A viewer identifies Skyraiders shooting down two MiG-17s; the initial negative answer is withdrawn as potentially wrong, with the example left for checking.

Both are recommended; Marriott's book is particularly accessible, with abundant photographs and enough detail to interest experienced readers too.

Malta is preferred if both carry the same American air group, chiefly because of its fighter-direction control and defensive strength.

An illustrated proposal turns an Essex-class carrier into a mobile Atlas-rocket launch platform and prompts a speculative American-Soviet sea-launch race.

An account of low-level naval helicopter flying leads to a guest's story of hover-taxiing through Stanley to find a ceasefire meeting.

Remove X turret for a helicopter hangar, retain Y turret, and place missiles between the after funnel and the new structure.

The suggested sources are National Archives material, the Belfast book sold aboard the ship and Neil McCart's book on Town-class cruisers.

A First World War U-boat history is recommended for its account of Germany's American-coast campaign and the diplomatic limits of submarine warfare.

Merchant interception and rescue work brought U-53 and neutral American destroyers dangerously close to an accidental clash.

The book contrasts Wilson's restrained public response with a private warning against further submarine attacks near the American coast.

Germany's declaration of war is interpreted as removing Roosevelt's difficulty in extending the American war from Japan to Germany.

Wilson's diplomatic break is distinguished from declaring war, while Colonel House doubts that the separation can hold.

An unbuilt Soviet hybrid design involved American assistance and prompts a tentative explanation of how its topweight might have been balanced.

Hitler's Attack U-Boats is recommended for readers and modelers who want plans, engineering detail, and the practical limits of U-boat weapons.

Limited capacity and fragile rubber floors complicated moving men and stores between submarines and the shore.

Rescue equipment intended to identify a disabled submarine could reveal its position during a depth-charge attack.

Maintenance, low observation height and the submarine's motion limited the practical use of a deck gun.

Weapon reliability, crew coordination and unstable firing platforms constrained U-boat anti-aircraft defence.

Ise and Hyuga's flight-deck conversions lacked the aircraft needed for their intended role and were used largely for transport.

John Jordan's Warships after Washington connects the 1922 treaty with the speed, protection and machinery choices of interwar warships.

High speed and longer-range guns came with thin protection, cramped spaces and a vulnerability when combat closed the range.

Yes, although the treatment is described as brief.

Only roughly: side armour near the shell calibre and deck armour near half that figure offer an initial estimate, with considerable variation from steel quality and metallurgy.

Gunnery changes and machinery choices improved performance, with trial speeds distinguished from practical fighting conditions.

Yes; Warships after Washington is identified as the relevant book.

The trend can look stronger from a Western viewpoint, while states remain powerful elsewhere and beneath Western supranational institutions.

John Jordan's London-treaty volume follows the reasoning behind cruiser designs and the compromises between speed and protection.

Compact machinery supported thicker armour and ten main guns, while constraining the aircraft installation.

Their main value was comparative context: setting navies alongside one another clarified design choices and the limits of procurement driven by a rival's latest ship.

A short exchange connects early American exposure to Barbary piracy with the loss of Royal Navy protection after independence.

Yes. The explanation given is that the ships were designed before radar, so they needed many visual rangefinders.

A brief observation explains why a navy can later claim it anticipated an unexpected kind of war.

They are worthwhile but demanding and should be read with awareness of an official historian's emphases; broad treaty-era surveys are a better starting point.

Expectations surrounding sonar illustrate the recurring temptation to treat a new technology as a complete military solution.

No specific system is named. Swarming technology is offered as an area where expectations may outrun wartime practicality.

Britain had some engineering capability to strike at range, but political consequences and the limited military payoff made that very different from a practical option.

A sale is considered probable if Poland wanted the vessels and Britain had ships available or could build them for export.

The later portion of the Warships after London review follows cruiser machinery, aircraft requirements, protection, and the transfer of modified Leanders to Australia.

A caution that a cruiser publicly described as a response to a foreign class may actually follow an independent doctrine and procurement logic.

The presence of British submarines near Argentine ports illustrates the political limits on technically possible attacks.

The proposed defence combines 57 mm and 40 mm guns with a Martlet-armed helicopter, plus possible additional light weapons. The helicopter could cover boats trying to move beyond the frigate's guns.

A pale grey resembling a thick layer of dust is suggested, with photographs of HMS Caroline offered as a visual reference.

Central control is questioned as a solution to swarm coordination, and the Yamato attack is distinguished from a simultaneous arrival.

Timed disruption could pressure Saudi Arabia and amplify a regional rivalry whose effects extend into the eastern Mediterranean, Africa, and Asia.

They are intended to avoid close gunfights, though the personal preference given is for twin guns and ideally two twin mounts.

Either a Type 23 frigate or a River-class patrol vessel could respond, depending on which suitable ship was closest.

Martlet is the lightweight multirole missile; the helicopter example carries ten.

A brief note on Project 71: Soviet interest in a 10,000-ton aircraft carrier for the Black Sea and Baltic.

It is a very good reference, but its figures should be checked because a few mathematical errors have been found and repeated.

The proposal uses diving shells, but it needs ammunition selection and feed arrangements that preserve the gun's ability to engage other targets.

No depth is given; substantial depth and accuracy are suggested as possibilities.

Rocket propulsion is favoured for the range it could offer.

A larger, modern cold-weather ocean-patrol vessel is preferred to a direct like-for-like replacement.

The anti-torpedo gun proposal has an earlier precedent in wartime attempts to fire on incoming torpedoes.

It is another option, but the preference is a design better suited to cold weather in the High North, with a hangar.

It was primarily a super-scout rather than an aerial strike unit, though its effectiveness remains doubtful.

The preference is for two or three landing helicopter dock ships.

It used a mechanical steering arrangement that could be set for a port or starboard circle, rather than a sophisticated directional seeker.

Disaster response is accepted as another role for the proposed Canadian landing helicopter dock ships.

An audience clarification distinguishes a widening, depth-changing spiral from a simple circular torpedo search.

An audience example of U-boat netting raises the drag problem for torpedo nets on ships under way.

Other countries were working on them, and the Italian system attracted interest because its performance had proved difficult to reproduce.

British torpedoes used a tension wire and fins to control the drop and produce a shallow water entry.

The interpretation is a British win or draw at Washington, with the cruiser question still unresolved, and a clearer success at London.

Concentration of aircraft is accepted as a reason to prefer several amphibious ships over a single Canadian carrier.

Not many more is the estimate, with an incomplete qualification about the earliest Standards.

France's large army is offered as one reason other powers resisted additional French naval demands.

The response broadly agrees with that interpretation.

The difficulty is attributed to the amount of information packed into the book, while the recommendation remains strongly favourable.

Britain is offered as an example, with the qualified view that its fleet seldom fell far below the limits.

Crew demands and the space for replacement machinery shape the hypothetical return of a Town-class cruiser.

Britain needed numerous light cruisers for worldwide trade protection and blockade, while the United States prioritized heavy cruisers for a decisive Pacific fleet battle before turning to blockade.

The initial judgment is yes, with a later audience contribution qualifying Italy's position by regional differences.

Not necessarily: automation reduces routine manning needs, and the remaining crew can be skilled and available for damage control when systems fail.

Only as a simplification: Mahan also expects economic warfare after victory, while Corbett writes from a British position that already possesses worldwide bases and command of the sea.

Some could have remained battlecruisers while others might have become large carriers, potentially replacing the Courageous-class conversions.