Bruships 129: Travels, Rememberance & Questions from Chat

A bookshelf introduction contrasts stated interwar Far East plans with the capabilities the Royal Navy actually built.

It would be a modified, probably heavier Scharnhorst-derived design whose chief advantage was producing more ships rather than one exceptional Bismarck.

Royal Navy logistics plans for a coastal advance in East Asia differed from the US Navy's trans-Pacific fleet train.

Logistics and engines.

Britain would reinforce the Mediterranean urgently, possibly accelerate capital ships, and might retain Repulse and Prince of Wales rather than deploy them east.

It is an old tradition visible by Henry VIII's reign and probably earlier, although its ceremonial form has changed.

They might escape to Allied service or interfere with the Norway operation, adding useful six-inch cruisers against a German weakness.

The scandal could collapse the conference, restart British capital-ship construction, and politically weaken the US building program.

Popular historical films can attract new audiences even when specialists find factual errors too distracting for immersion.

Japan faced severe financial limits, but an American political scandal could stop US funding first; the outcome depends on why negotiations failed.

Very little, because Britain intended to learn from the ships in service before designing their successors rather than plan several generations ahead.

Britain was more likely to choose nine uniform guns, which would broadly match US firepower and spur qualitative competition.

Clarke places less confidence in achieved accuracy, so the six-inch gun's higher volume of fire gains more weight.

Yes; a Soviet descent through Iran toward India is the main plausible development that would have made it worse.

The relevant later limit was 23,000 tons, and raising it without increasing aggregate tonnage would worsen Britain's shortage of carrier hulls.

Most were broadly comparable; Japan's system, especially for aircrew, was notably slow at producing replacements.

It would be far more lethal because 1960s capabilities would be deployed in 1940s-scale numbers.

Possibly, if the turret ring is sufficiently wide, but the answer depends on the individual ship class.

Probably, but the larger effect would be new cruiser classes armed with autoloading six- and three-inch weapons for Pacific air defense.

It was too ambitious for the political class, not necessarily for Britain's scientific and technological base.

Britain might prefer purpose-built carriers, the US case is uncertain, and Japan probably would not make the same conversions.

Some were excellent, especially earlier in his career, but his many later proposals were not all good ideas waiting for technology.

Before World War I Britain had the clearest advantage, the United States was close, and circumstances complicate comparisons in later wars.

Only intrusive independent inspection could verify ships reliably, so practical compliance depended on making the treaty valuable enough for states to follow.

It would annihilate the Armada because of its vastly greater firepower, rate of fire, and mature line-of-battle warships.

No; it would replace Japanese insecurity with British and American insecurity rather than stabilize the system.

The nine-gun Drake is closest, though four twin 9.2-inch turrets may be more characteristically British.

None in principle; Britain had enough cruiser-building yards, provided the ships were funded.

HMS Swift is treated as a useful starting point for later destroyers, rather than a complete post-treaty design decades ahead of its time.

American treaty requirements combined a Pacific margin over Japan with a residual force against an unlikely British crisis.

He could form a battle line, but would probably exploit his superior firepower by breaking the Spanish formation aggressively.

Possibly in military terms, but Nelson would more likely pledge loyalty to Elizabeth I, already a heroic figure in his own age.

Because it remained a reliable design that British planners believed could still be developed further.

Probably an allocation comparable to France or Italy, which would in turn encourage Japan to demand more tonnage.

Yes, the US Navy considered it but rejected it; the aim was the same concentration and displacement economy as an all-forward battery.

Yes, some cruiser construction there is plausible, though the likely number is uncertain.

No; it still needed carriers, but it should have prepared far better for its known pilot and industrial limitations.

Yes, and the design may also have helped prepare the way for a later 9.2-inch cruiser battery.

A Stuart-era treasure fleet could reinforce Spain and still be outclassed; on Britain's side, one Tribal-class destroyer could eliminate the Armada at range.

It depended on the period, rising from about 400 to 500 and eventually around 600 by World War II.

A great deal; the next generation of cruiser programs would be especially interesting.