Bruships 106: Song Dynasty & Three New Books from Pen & Sword

Possibly, especially Panzerschiffe, but the enlarged Royal Navy would make the operation doubtful and the result depends on what Germany could actually finish in the extra years.

The Illustrious class should be in service, while four Lions, two Vanguards, and two Implacables could be pushed toward completion; older carriers might also survive for a time.

He might try, but effective 15-inch hits could slow the ships so badly that they would be sunk rather than merely escorted away.

Most would remain in home waters, with smaller groups in the Mediterranean and imperial stations; a South Atlantic battlecruiser could overturn the balance at Coronel.

Crews could use masks and seal the ship, but rapid dispersion over open water made gas attacks much more practical against ships in port than ships at sea.

Probably not; three was a more plausible maximum because five would be exceptionally expensive and difficult to procure.

The concept was explored before the Second World War but came into its own after nuclear weapons and nerve agents encouraged sealed bridges and protected command centres.

German yards could make more progress with time, but infrastructure capped how quickly and how far Germany could expand; Britain had greater latent building capacity.

Not necessarily: the outcome would depend on the agent, the hit location, and penetration, while washing and damage control could still permit recovery.

Probably not; Britain could accept a short-term reduction while reusing their turrets in new Vanguard-type hulls, then repeat the process across more older ships.

A large cruiser is more likely to return first; a ship called a battleship remains possible only over a longer horizon.

Standardization would help, but 15-inch turrets would delay construction; a mixed programme is more plausible than immediate uniform rearmament.

It would likely produce a roughly 35,000-ton carrier with better radar, airborne early warning, and a combat air patrol capable of sharply reducing British losses.

Yes. The washdown and fire-suppression functions are linked into the same general water-main system.

Retire the oldest classes in the early 1920s, retain the newer ships longer, and use G3s and later construction to maintain about eight battlecruisers in two squadrons.

The barrel pool survived, but complete turret production had shut down; Britain could maintain guns more easily than manufacture new mountings.

Through strong Admiralty recommendations, which most Dominions respected, although local governments could still refuse to spend the money.

Understand why expanding yards, armor, turbines, and gun production is easier before war consumes labour and transport.

Yes in principle; the light gun battery was practical, though the aviation arrangement would be the tighter design problem.

It evolved naturally from torpedo boats to defensive torpedo-boat destroyers and then to torpedo-armed ships simply called destroyers.

It depended on the navy, but the Royal Navy often ordered a lifetime supply of barrels.

Development would continue anyway because guided anti-ship work already stretched from 1930s glide bombs through German wartime weapons into British and American programmes.

The longer barrel would require stronger metallurgy and machinery to control its weight and prevent droop, so substantial development would be necessary.

Begin with Australian future-of-sea-power studies and then look to authors such as Norman Friedman, Andrew Lambert, and B. J. Armstrong.

Potentially very useful for convoy ASW and air patrol, provided the navy solved the dangerous problem of recovering floatplanes at sea.

No. Their engagement geometry makes them local self-defence systems for the threatened ship.

No. Sailors slept around the guns, and temporary cabins were dismantled when the ship cleared for action.

Extend the delayed-war counterfactual from capital ships to Britain's modern cruiser classes and its programme for converting older hulls into anti-aircraft escorts.

Compare Britain's continuing destroyer and Hunt-class programmes with the limits on a peacetime German submarine buildup.

The larger weapon imposed weight and stowage penalties, while 21-inch torpedoes were easier to carry and sustain on the far side of the world.

Largely yes: target choice depended on tactical circumstances, the ship's roll, and command decisions rather than a rigid national practice.

The exact type is uncertain, but the Royal Navy should have obtained a modern British or American fighter by 1942.

The stagger reduces muzzle-blast interference, although recoil position can also make the guns look uneven in photographs.

It would advance American buildup, British dual-purpose armament, and several European carrier programmes, changing the starting balance across multiple navies.

No known example reached service; several ignition methods were tested, including electrical firing, but reliability and safety problems kept the idea experimental.

Yes; the reports were shared and contributed to American thinking, including the Midway-class carrier design.

Yes. The Royal Navy began with working Duplex torpedoes in part because it had tested them across the differing magnetic conditions of a global operating area.

Probably not, but it could make Japan concentrate escorts and treat the Philippine and Malayan operations more cautiously.

In theory, but making a magnetic fuze survive mortar launch, water impact, and descent reliably was the central obstacle.

Extensive testing helped, but institutions also had to trust operational reports instead of defending a flawed weapon against the evidence.

Yes. The aerial 18-inch weapons had working magnetic detonators as well as the larger ship and submarine torpedoes.

Close inspection of hull form and waterline, especially in a foreign dry dock, could reveal that the declared displacement was implausible.

Compare an accessible introduction, the Cambridge History of China, and an older biographical dictionary while learning why transliteration and source density complicate the field.

Learn how the Song court centralized professional forces to prevent military coups, and why that system imposed a heavy financial burden.

Compare the Song professional army with cheaper community militias whose local ties improved cohesion but worried the court.

Examine a third Song model that fixed troops and commanders in regions to build cohesion at the cost of direct imperial control.

See why Song China developed sea power primarily to protect maritime trade rather than to pursue expansive overseas conquest.

Follow the shift from provincial river forces to shipbuilding programmes and a permanent sea-going imperial navy.

Watch the Southern Song navy grow into a mobile defensive force, then see how it used gunpowder weapons against maritime threats.

About one shot per second is the ideal estimate, while intervals under roughly two seconds might still work if the period fire-control system can coordinate them.

Examine how the cost of fleets pushed the Song government toward revenue measures and non-cash payments for naval construction.

Question impressive annual ship totals by asking whether the state could supply enough seasoned timber for durable hulls.

Use a comparison with Song military burdens to see why armies held together only by pay could become instruments of their commanders rather than the state.

Meet the commanders at the Song dynasty's last battle and see how chaining ships together created both strength and fatal dependence on supplies.

To search beneath thermal layers where submarines could evade or confuse sonar fixed near the surface.

Work from reported troop strengths and ship capacities to test spectacular claims of thousands of vessels at Yamen.

No. Early aircraft lacked the payload, range, and survivability to move an army across the Channel, and simple landing-field defences could defeat the concept.

No. The turret no longer serves the AEW mission and should be removed.

Use The Secret War Against Red Russia to follow a controversial agent through arms dealing, shipyard espionage, and anti-Bolshevik operations.

No. They lacked sufficient capacity and would become extremely vulnerable when descending to deliver troops.

Follow a source-rich submarine history through John Linton's training, Mediterranean commands, decorations, and final patrol.

A severe one: their guns could destroy the lightly armoured landing vehicles before the marines established a secure foothold.

Use Les Brown's illustrated design history to examine spar torpedoes, ramming boats, modular armament, and TB81's later ASW service.

Follow the argument that Britain needs both European reinforcement forces and deployable carrier groups to retain influence over global trade routes.

Start with Norman Friedman, John Lambert, and Ian Ballantyne, but expect no single definitive book on British naval armour.

Yes; it was intended for shipboard use and should fit aviation spaces comparable to those on large cruisers and battleships.

Broadly yes: qualitative competition can remain technical and patriotic, while a numbers race linked to national status and a place in the sun tends toward nationalism.

Italy had useful ASW advantages in shallow waters, while Britain used T-class boats partly because smaller U-, S-, and V-class submarines were scarce or needed elsewhere.

Start with work on the Mediterranean campaign, but expect gaps because no strong single-volume history of the wider Royal Navy submarine war is identified.