Fearless as a naming preference and a Type 45 correction
A preference for Fearless is followed by a correction to the earlier Type 45 name recollection.
From Bruships 223: Naval History & Science Fiction Questions Answered Live... ·
Complete directory
Browse all time notes.
Explore every watch point in reverse video-date order, then in timestamp order within each video.
Six fast Soviet battleships in 1935
Six game-derived Soviet battleships in 1935 create a hypothetical challenge to treaty limits and rival capital-ship plans.
From Bruships 223: Naval History & Science Fiction Questions Answered Live... ·
Would Britain revive a 9.2-inch cruiser?
The scenario opens a conditional route to 9.2-inch Edinburgh and Belfast designs while leaving earlier cruiser groups constrained by timing.
From Bruships 223: Naval History & Science Fiction Questions Answered Live... ·
Soviet battleships, the Black Sea, and the Turkish Straits
Black Sea basing shifts the scenario toward Turkey, access through the Straits, and a possible Mediterranean deployment.
From Bruships 223: Naval History & Science Fiction Questions Answered Live... ·
Radar and fleet carriers as naval discontinuities
Radar and the fleet carrier are suggested as possible interwar discontinuities, without agreement on a single equivalent to Dreadnought.
From Bruships 223: Naval History & Science Fiction Questions Answered Live... ·
Seawolf, Astute, and Virginia represent different bargains
A personal submarine ranking compares hunting capability, price, fleet size, and the use of British production capacity.
From Bruships 223: Naval History & Science Fiction Questions Answered Live... ·
Virginia blocks and an uncertain successor comparison
A Block VI question leads to corrections over Virginia orders and an uncertain account of which future design would succeed Seawolf.
From Bruships 223: Naval History & Science Fiction Questions Answered Live... ·
How to use Wikipedia as a research starting point
Bibliographies and characteristics tables offer initial source leads that need checking in the underlying works.
From Bruships 223: Naval History & Science Fiction Questions Answered Live... ·
The fastest and most efficient fictional FTL
Fictional travel systems complicate the comparison by moving the universe, altering arrival time, or using a wormhole.
From Bruships 223: Naval History & Science Fiction Questions Answered Live... ·
Mechanical coal stokers at sea
Shipboard mechanical stoking is confirmed before the follow-up turns to planned battlecruiser applications.
From Bruships 223: Naval History & Science Fiction Questions Answered Live... ·
Mechanical stokers in German battlecruiser plans
Planned German battlecruiser applications remained unimplemented as oil firing displaced the requirement.
From Bruships 223: Naval History & Science Fiction Questions Answered Live... ·
Procurement leadership across ships, tanks, and aircraft
A comparative argument about recurring leadership failures in British and American defence procurement.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
A conventional weapons fit for the Zumwalt hull
A proposed Zumwalt follow-on would retain the newer hull and power plant while using established weapons and developing advanced systems later.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Type 45 numbers, politics, and sunk program costs
The Type 45 case separates development and infrastructure costs from the declining construction cost of later hulls, showing why cutting a class can make each delivered ship look exceptionally expensive.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
How Type 45 lost its general-purpose option
Reported Treasury funding fears and political concerns help explain Type 45's missing Mark 41 launcher and the proposed general-purpose second batch.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Proposed Type 45 names and the timing of cancellation
A recollection about Diana and Decoy raises the question of whether announcing ship names would have made later Type 45 cancellations politically harder.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Daring and LCS: learning on the first ship
Daring and the first LCS hulls illustrate construction learning, while a larger Type 45 order changes the average cost per ship.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
LCS speed and the frigate-conversion problem
LCS pursued the rapid response and fast-carrier-escort functions once associated with nuclear-powered cruisers, but designing around roughly forty knots imposed compromises that made later frigate conversion unattractive.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
LCS ambition required integration discipline
The LCS integration critique connects swappable mission systems with supplier cooperation, enforced standards, and action when milestones are missed.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
LCS corrosion protection and sacrificial anodes
The reported omission of sacrificial anodes illustrates a tradeoff between design ambitions and inexpensive hull protection.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Type 26 price includes rebuilding shipbuilding capacity
Canadian and Australian Type 26 costs include rebuilding domestic yards, workforces, suppliers, and specialist industrial capacity alongside the frigates themselves.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Type 26 ASW capability and possible uncrewed support
A favourable assessment of Type 26's ASW design leads to predictions about uncrewed surface and aerial support for its helicopter.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Type 26 hull volume, maintenance, and growth
The case for a larger Type 26 hull weighs building and support costs against maintenance access, upgrade space, and damage tolerance.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Why did Australian Type 26s appear more expensive?
A recalled question about Australian Type 26 prices distinguishes local construction costs from a British export charge.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Type 23 hull wear and delayed replacement
Keeping Type 23s beyond their intended service lives shifts the cost of delayed replacement into hull maintenance and operations.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
More Type 45 space without an automatic crew increase
The larger Type 45 option offered room for power generation, launch cells, and support spaces without automatically requiring more crew.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Program cost, unit cost, and a larger Zumwalt fleet
Zumwalt's apparent unit price absorbed facilities and development intended for thirty ships, while a larger mixed fleet could have hidden the few hypersonic-strike variants among ordinary destroyers.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Seawolf, F-22, and the cost of small specialist fleets
The F-22 comparison weighs costly air-to-ground adaptation against the possibility of justifying more aircraft.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Constellation grew from presence frigate to fleet picket
The Constellation case traces growing mission demands through a comparison between Type 31 affordability and Canadian Type 26 capability.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Flower corvettes: define the equipment, then find the hull
Britain used sloop experience to define escort and minesweeping requirements, then selected a commercial hull that small yards could build in quantity.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Oliver Hazard Perry: the hull around the escort systems
The Perry class illustrates defining essential escort systems before designing the hull around them.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Congressional affordability and the mission-creep argument
An interpretation of Constellation's design changes links its politically affordable starting requirement with operational demands that later exceeded it.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
The general-purpose frigate can become a mini-Burke
The proposed escort fit approaches an Arleigh Burke as ASW, aviation, and air-defence requirements accumulate, raising the question of where a frigate's role should end.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
The third-rate principle: enough capability at scale
Age-of-sail ratings provide a vocabulary for accepting a numerous, deliberately less capable ship whose job is fleet mass rather than matching the best combatant.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Sherman supportability and the tradeoff with numbers
Sherman supportability and the Panzer IV alternative illustrate the tradeoff between individual performance and numbers, then return to modern all-mission requirements.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Hypersonic weapons and changing countermeasures
Claims that hypersonic weapons will always penetrate repeat older predictions that one technology has permanently defeated its countermeasures.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Missile availability in the amphibious-warfare debate
The Albion debate tests claims of widespread missile threats against actual inventories and the time needed to expand production.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Amphibious missions persist as defenses change
Earlier threats to amphibious landings and the Gallipoli example distinguish getting forces ashore from succeeding in the campaign that follows.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
A forecast of crewed ships coordinating uncrewed groups
The forecast places a crewed warship at the centre of cooperating uncrewed assets, including possible ASW and convoy groups.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Convoys, guided bombs, and gaps between escorts
The convoy argument compares repeated technological objections with the need to concentrate protection around moving merchant traffic.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Enduring military roles and a balanced fleet
The comparison of cavalry, armour, and cruising roles leads to an argument for frigate numbers alongside larger ships with greater magazine depth.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
One advanced destroyer cannot occupy five stations
A ship claimed to be five times more capable still occupies only one place and must rotate through refit, training, deployment, and recovery.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
The unipolar moment as a transitional condition
The geopolitical interpretation distinguishes American predominance from the growing regional strength or global reach of other powers.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Wars of choice as an assumption behind slow procurement
The critique links assumptions about optional future wars with slow orders, limited reserves, and an overworked force.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Regular naval presence in the deterrence argument
Regular visits by small ships backed by a larger fleet illustrate the proposed link between naval presence and credible deterrence.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
AUKUS reactor orders and the uncertain capacity estimate
Shared reactor orders could lower British submarine costs, while the suggested spare capacity at Barrow is explicitly an informal estimate.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
Australia's submarine distances and time on station
The range comparison separates reaching a patrol area from remaining there and returning, with different assessments for Australia and Canada.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·
SSGNs as specialist conventional deterrents
The specialist SSGN argument distinguishes conventional strike from the SSBN's nuclear deterrent and weighs concentrated payload against several smaller boats.
From What the Frigate is wrong with how we buy ships, tanks & aircraft? ·