Its survival would first require overcoming Swedish resistance to Danish rule. A lasting Scandinavian bloc would become another northern power for Britain to consider, while extensive land borders limited its freedom to concentrate at sea.
Type 23 frigates entered service at about the same time. Continuing their construction is suggested as a way Britain could have sustained its shipyards.
It is judged useful, with a preference for the alternative twin 18-inch arrangement. Building 18-inch British capital ships before Washington would also change the treaty assumptions and the fleets entering the next war.
The real project still consisted of design studies, so a refit calculation needs an agreed starting design. Its machinery, protection and secondary armament also differ from Scharnhorst despite the gun comparison.
The 1950s are suggested because suitable cranes and ships existed. Their large carrying capacity is qualified by their dependence on port cranes, while Liberty ships could unload themselves.
Build a parliamentary coalition before the funding dispute reaches the Treasury, explaining ship programmes to MPs and securing support from the prime minister and chancellor.
Iranian reserves were already known and exploited for British naval fuel, so the proposed discovery does not establish a new timeline. Earlier discovery of North Sea or Libyan oil is suggested as a more substantial alternative.
A land-command role, possibly replacing MacArthur or Patton, is favoured because the character is a principled fixer who finds capable people to carry out the work.
Japan is the proposed target to end the Pacific war and release resources for Europe. Political credit and Soviet exploitation of attacks in Europe complicate the counterfactual choice.
Strike length is preferred for flexibility, with short launchers justified by ship and cost constraints. Tactical length has a less clear purpose in this assessment, which favours the larger Mark 57 arrangement.
Assembly from buoyant modules would imply extensive compartmentalisation, requiring widespread flooding or uncontrollable fire to sink the structure. The game's structural collapse and reactor destruction follow a different route.
The preferred description is a patrol frigate developed from a heavily armed offshore patrol vessel. Its intended value is persistent presence on lower-threat missions that would otherwise draw destroyers away from other duties.
Yes, but limited cutter numbers and home-region duties restrict overseas capacity. The case for Navy patrol ships also assigns naval diplomacy and freedom-of-navigation exercises to the Navy.
The River Plate would become a much less attractive refuge or operating area. Graf Spee would probably stay farther east in the South Atlantic and could face an Argentine battleship if it approached the estuary.
The proposed changes would remove so much of the hull that building a new ship would be quicker and easier. An age-of-sail great refit provides the comparison: effectively a new vessel under an existing identity.
The Royal Sovereigns provide a 23-year comparison, from 1892 to 1915, substantially shorter than the American destroyer example. Those shorter service lives are linked here to Britain's rapid replacement and construction cycle.
The expectation is broadly historical performance, perhaps about a knot either way. The comparison must include boilers and steam systems as well as the turbines, with merchant diesel development offered as evidence of available German capability.
The engine problem is considered manageable if Germany used its diesel-development capability. The greater risk is a successor ship whose design accumulates competing politically supported preferences.
Getting crews and ships to Germany would create treaty and diplomatic problems. Strong French opposition and renewed capital-ship construction are predicted if the ships somehow arrived.
It is judged a useful destroyer for Mediterranean operations and task-group screening, with replenishment important for distant deployments. More missiles and a larger order are preferred.
China's effort, Japan's progress and India's rapid ordering and growth receive favourable assessments. Poland also receives praise for wider military expansion.
Its effect would depend on which side the union supported. Territory, limited population and European defence commitments would constrain its influence, while continued union itself would require overcoming Swedish resistance.
They could improve efficiency, but compatible ports, cranes, ships and inland production systems would all need to change. The many small ports of the period make that harder than the later transition to container shipping.
Revenue cannot be estimated without knowing how the dues changed with inflation, but collecting them would force vessels to leave financial records that could be tracked.
It depends on the installed engines and the period assumed. A modern design is suggested as capable of more than 40 knots, while QE2's 1987 diesel-electric conversion is cited with a speed of 34 knots.
The South Korean deal is judged a good choice because it provided close to the desired specifications and numbers while building a regional relationship. A more proven Japanese design would still have political and practical complications.
Ammunition and fleet numbers are expected to run short, despite the advantages of nuclear submarines and F-35s. Arrival in 1939 against Germany alone is treated more favourably, while nuclear use is raised as a separate and uncertain possibility.