Some Minor Navies of WWII: Five Problems and How to Fix them January 1939

The opening sets a no-hindsight planning exercise: identify practical remedies that smaller European navies could begin before war closes their options.

With only months likely remaining, Poland's most plausible immediate purchase is a rush torpedo-boat order from a British yard that already has a production line.

Disguised merchant or factory ships in neutral harbors could give Polish submarines supply points beyond the vulnerable Baltic coast.

Poland's narrow coast, exposed bases, and restricted routes out of the Baltic leave almost no strategic depth for conventional naval operations.

A programme begun in 1935 would emphasise destroyers, submarines, and torpedo boats, though even that force cannot overcome Poland's exposed position by 1939.

Exercises, rapid call-up procedures, and authority for local commanders would turn Norway's declared neutrality into a posture its navy could enforce.

A longer-term Norwegian program combines monitor-like gunships with destroyers and torpedo boats suited to confined coastal waters.

Marked daylight channels and defensive minefields could make unauthorized movement through Norway's fjords dangerous in darkness or fog.

Six late-1920s submarines give Greece its most useful modern leverage despite an elderly and difficult-to-replace surface fleet.

Crete offers Greece a defensible base for submarines, torpedo boats, stores, coastal guns, and fighter protection against Italian movement.

A prepared Crete could preserve Greek forces and government on national territory even after defeat on the mainland.

Dutch industry should concentrate funds on completing submarines and destroyers before invasion overtakes the yards.

Dutch 4,000-ton flotilla leaders show how displacement, armament, and institutional practice can place the same warship near two classification categories.

Foreign construction gives the Dutch large-cruiser program industrial and geographic depth that vulnerable home yards cannot provide.

British construction opens a design choice between the planned nine 11-inch guns and a heavier six-gun 14-inch battery.

The Netherlands has money and advanced designs but lacks time and capacity, making an overseas-built flagship useful in either Europe or the Far East.

The closing exercise asks where the fast Dutch capital ships should be built and whether their armament or protection should change.