Patreon Video 1: Intro - What would you put in warehouses at the end of WWI for WWII if you could?

The exercise begins from the view that the Royal Navy largely chose its real reserves well, then asks what a 1918-23 officer could plausibly add, retain, or conceal within treaty rules.

The exercise selects Reginald Tyrwhitt as a politically durable and sufficiently devious sponsor after rejecting Beatty's short-term style and Jellicoe's honesty.

Four-inch guns, smaller weapons, mountings, and shells are treated as complete systems that could arm large numbers of future escorts and auxiliaries.

Precision gun and mounting production could lag hull construction, making preserved weapons a direct way to accelerate emergency escort output.

Gibraltar and bases across the Empire offer a dispersed network for storing old weapons beyond the close attention of treaty inspectors and the Treasury.

Removing torpedo fittings and assigning defensive coast-guard identities could preserve useful destroyer hulls outside the main battle fleet.

Locally operated destroyer formations could build escort experience, spread defence costs, and reduce imperial bases' dependence on distant Royal Navy reinforcements.

Retaining mine stocks alongside minelayers would turn stored hulls into a practical means of disrupting an enemy's movement.

Small craft retained for routine harbour work could also give the Royal Navy a practical starting point for developing landing craft and amphibious methods.

The most damaging consequence of transferring naval flying to the RAF is presented as the Navy's loss of direct engineering and industrial knowledge, not merely ownership of aircraft.

Admiralty communication seaplanes at distant stations could preserve naval aircrew and technical practice while quietly developing a maritime patrol organization.

A surviving naval seaplane arm might have drawn Coastal Command and the Fleet Air Arm into a unified naval air service when RAF bomber priorities diverged.

A modern aside favors joint RAF-Royal Navy ownership of the P-8 so that two services have incentives to argue for maritime-patrol capacity.

The late-1930s priority order left Coastal Command behind bombers, fighters, and carrier aviation, without an Admiralty constituency pressing its case.

Surplus warships converted into seaplane tenders could support remote flying boats while preserving a bridge to a stronger Fleet Air Arm.

The closing synthesis prioritizes escort armament, mine warfare, reconnaissance, and the Navy's aviation-industry link rather than hiding an extra battle fleet.