Video
Equitable London Naval Treaty: Capital Ships with UAD infusion (Long Patrol)
Study Equitable London Naval Treaty: Capital Ships with UAD infusion (Long Patrol), a Dr. Alex Clarke video from 5 Jun 2022, with 22 time notes. Topics include Alternate History, Battleships, Capital Ships.
Time notes
- 3:26Why the 1936 London treaty lacked deterrent valueChapter
With Japan and other likely opponents outside the agreement, the principal signatories largely restricted navies they were unlikely to fight.
- 5:49What North Carolina delivered within 35,000 tonsNotable Point
North Carolina combines nine 16-inch guns, 28-knot speed, and improved machinery to show how much continuous design development mattered inside a treaty ceiling.
- 7:50Shipbuilding as Depression-era industrial policyNotable Point
An alternate political path treats naval construction as skilled industrial stimulus while preserving the Wall Street Crash and most historical constraints.
- 14:22The 1930 capital-ship building holidayChapter
The treaty text postponed replacement keels, required further disposals, and extended a construction pause just before governments abandoned the Ten Year Rule.
- 18:45What the 1936 treaty counted as a capital shipChapter
The definition captured ships above 10,000 tons, heavily armed smaller vessels, and monitors that might otherwise sit outside conventional battleship categories.
- 21:08The 35,000-ton ceiling and puzzling gun clausesChapter
The treaty paired a 35,000-ton ceiling with a conditional 14-inch gun limit and unusual restrictions on very small or lightly armed capital ships.
- 24:53King George V armament and the 15-inch alternativeNotable Point
The British preference for more 14-inch shells is weighed against an all-forward or triple-turret design using improved 15-inch guns.
- 28:37A 10:10:7:4:4 treaty ratioChapter
A revised ratio gives Japan its desired seven-to-ten security threshold while renewed democratic construction supports confidence and deterrence.
- 33:24Why separate Dominion quotas were rejectedNotable Point
Recognizing Dominion navies separately might divide British maritime power, but restrictions on buying British ships would make the change too disruptive.
- 35:29The Royal Navy fell far below its treaty tonnageChapter
Tonnage tables leave Britain nearly 100,000 tons below one agreed allowance, enough unused capacity for at least two additional 35,000-ton ships.
- 41:44More British dreadnoughts lost to treaty than combatNotable Point
Treaty disposal removed more Royal Navy dreadnoughts than combat had, without a matching jobs program, reconstruction effort, or replacement stream.
- 43:33American retention and British disposal produced different legaciesNotable Point
Modernization, target conversion, training service, and wartime gunfire gave several American ships continuing value while Britain retained only Iron Duke as a target ship.
- 46:03Treaty limits for a twenty-capital-ship fleetChapter
A 700,000-ton ceiling preserves Britain's six-ship margin over Japan while limiting how much replacement tonnage can be under construction at once.
- 49:20A cadence for eight to ten new battleships by 1939Chapter
Alternating two-ship and one-ship batches could preserve yard activity and place roughly eight to ten modern British capital ships in service by 1939.
- 50:53Why smaller battleships do not automatically buy an extra hullNotable Point
Reducing each ship to roughly 33,300 tons would permit a twenty-first hull on paper but leave only 7,000 tons unused, making the arithmetic less useful than the headline ship count suggests.
- 54:40New Allied battleships as an industrial deterrentNotable Point
Continuous Allied construction raises the technical benchmark Germany must meet with a much smaller maritime industrial base.
- 56:39Using treaty membership to support Weimar and JapanChapter
Limited German rebuilding and a Japanese seven-to-ten ratio aim to give both states a stake in the international order without granting dominance.
- 1:03:12UAD British and German treaty battleship designsChapter
A game demonstration pits an all-forward British 15-inch design against German ships whose nine 11-inch guns reflect early-1930s industrial constraints.
- 1:08:02Gun range, first hit, and the golden BBNotable Point
A small range advantage lets 15-inch guns fire first, creating an early-hit opportunity illustrated by the Hood-Bismarck 'golden BB' problem.
- 1:09:28All-forward armament concentrates damage riskNotable Point
An all-forward battery saves design weight and supports seakeeping, but it concentrates magazines near the bow and makes forward damage especially dangerous.
- 1:12:23Maneuvering toward the previous fall of shotNotable Point
A real battleship would zigzag toward earlier shell splashes to disturb the enemy firing solution, a tactic the computer-controlled ships underrepresent.
- 1:15:38German heavy-gun development under the treatyNotable Point
Germany could build promptly with experienced 11-inch technology or delay construction for a national 15- or 16-inch gun program that would spur a French response.