Chapter · 39:01-48:44

Why a Washington-style treaty cannot work in 1909

Uncertain technology, national prestige, too many relevant powers, and weak mutual trust defeat a comprehensive ratio system.

Notes

Naval strength was bound to national status just as battleship design began a rapid transition, leaving governments unsure what future fleet they needed. The later 35,000-ton Washington limit was understood to fall short of designers' ideal battleship, but it could still produce a workable ship. In 1909 the Orion class displaced only about 22,000 tons under normal conditions, its 13.5-inch guns were not yet in service, and 12-inch weapons remained the contemporary standard. Diplomats therefore lacked a mature capital-ship type around which to write a durable technical ceiling. Unlike the postwar Washington conference, a 1909 settlement would have to accommodate Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and perhaps Spain, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, the Ottoman Empire, Greece, and Australia. Every compromise would depend on rivals making equivalent concessions across very different strategic theatres. With no shared wartime shock and little confidence in compliance, a broad system of ratios or total tonnage limits has almost no political foundation.