Complete directory
Explore every watch point in reverse video-date order, then in timestamp order within each video.
Daily steaming, squadron maneuvers, gunnery practice, heating, tenders, and shore services made the anchored Grand Fleet a huge logistics consumer.
From Inglorious 6th of July: Battle of Grenada(1779) & Battle of Algeciras(1801) ·
A single full-length flight deck and deck-edge weapons could improve the conversions, but only through an expensive period out of service.
From Inglorious 6th of July: Battle of Grenada(1779) & Battle of Algeciras(1801) ·
A third Lexington carrier could work with tanker support, while surviving battlecruiser sisters would make Japanese cruiser interception far more dangerous.
From Inglorious 6th of July: Battle of Grenada(1779) & Battle of Algeciras(1801) ·
The Royal Navy would probably accept a land-based patrol aircraft and favor the Orion over developing a Nimrod equivalent.
From Inglorious 6th of July: Battle of Grenada(1779) & Battle of Algeciras(1801) ·
A counterfactual answer argues that large early carriers would create senior officers with practical aviation-command experience.
From Inglorious 6th of July: Battle of Grenada(1779) & Battle of Algeciras(1801) ·
Whether Glorious hurried home or carried out a secret mission, sailing with only two destroyers contradicted Royal Navy carrier doctrine.
From Inglorious 6th of July: Battle of Grenada(1779) & Battle of Algeciras(1801) ·
A change in Gibraltar's status would complicate Britain's exclusive economic zone, though the effect would fall well short of losing half of it.
From Inglorious 6th of July: Battle of Grenada(1779) & Battle of Algeciras(1801) ·
Conduct punished formally in the Second World War could pass without court martial while the service moved away from Victorian command culture.
From Inglorious 6th of July: Battle of Grenada(1779) & Battle of Algeciras(1801) ·
Glorious could suit a fleet advancing from Australia and Singapore, a different endurance problem from the American route west from Pearl Harbor.
From Inglorious 6th of July: Battle of Grenada(1779) & Battle of Algeciras(1801) ·
Without an independent RAF, the Royal Navy would control carrier and maritime patrol aircraft from the beginning, changing both designs and doctrine.
From Inglorious 6th of July: Battle of Grenada(1779) & Battle of Algeciras(1801) ·
A 1936 ton-for-ton conversion rule would replace British, French, Italian, American, and Japanese capital ships with carrier designs.
From Inglorious 6th of July: Battle of Grenada(1779) & Battle of Algeciras(1801) ·
Additional galleys might help the Spanish Armada handle fireships, but moving enough oared vessels around the Atlantic coast would create its own logistical burden.
From Inglorious 6th of July: Battle of Grenada(1779) & Battle of Algeciras(1801) ·
A naval patrol-aircraft requirement would emphasize range, payload, and reliability before choosing jet or propeller propulsion.
From Inglorious 6th of July: Battle of Grenada(1779) & Battle of Algeciras(1801) ·
States may have considered compatible warheads, but thermobaric effects depend heavily on where and how a missile detonates inside a ship.
From Inglorious 6th of July: Battle of Grenada(1779) & Battle of Algeciras(1801) ·
The rapid pre-treaty doubling from roughly 20,000 to 40,000 tons suggests another design cycle could reach 80,000 to 100,000 tons.
From Inglorious 6th of July: Battle of Grenada(1779) & Battle of Algeciras(1801) ·
The Forrestal class did not depend solely on the Korean War because growing jet aircraft already pushed carrier size upward.
From Inglorious 6th of July: Battle of Grenada(1779) & Battle of Algeciras(1801) ·
If the Francesco Caracciolo battleships entered service, Italy would also build some form of fast scout and escort force for them.
From Inglorious 6th of July: Battle of Grenada(1779) & Battle of Algeciras(1801) ·
Britain could build large 14-inch-gunned ships for Chile, but would have to disclose their details to the treaty powers.
From Inglorious 6th of July: Battle of Grenada(1779) & Battle of Algeciras(1801) ·
The episode shifts from Lexington and Saratoga's battlecruiser origins to what their carrier conversions made possible.
From Lexington & Saratoga Carrier Conception: Key Ship Series 3, Ships 10 &11 ·
Lexington and Saratoga were intended for reconnaissance, presence, and denying an enemy a clear picture rather than amphibious assault.
From Lexington & Saratoga Carrier Conception: Key Ship Series 3, Ships 10 &11 ·
Length, beam, and internal volume made the unfinished battlecruisers unusually promising carrier hulls.
From Lexington & Saratoga Carrier Conception: Key Ship Series 3, Ships 10 &11 ·
A fast carrier paired with suitable fast capital ships could form a flexible and unusually powerful combat force.
From Lexington & Saratoga Carrier Conception: Key Ship Series 3, Ships 10 &11 ·
The treaty chronology challenges the claim that Lexington's eight-inch battery was forced by a shortage of allowed cruisers.
From Lexington & Saratoga Carrier Conception: Key Ship Series 3, Ships 10 &11 ·
The heavy battery imposed weight and space costs while making simultaneous flying operations unsafe.
From Lexington & Saratoga Carrier Conception: Key Ship Series 3, Ships 10 &11 ·
The conversion retained immense machinery and speed, with turboelectric transmission shaping what the ships could achieve.
From Lexington & Saratoga Carrier Conception: Key Ship Series 3, Ships 10 &11 ·
The eight-inch battery illustrates how established ordnance and ship-design institutions could impose gun-centered assumptions on a new aviation platform.
From Lexington & Saratoga Carrier Conception: Key Ship Series 3, Ships 10 &11 ·
Aircraft reconnaissance, speed, and escorts offered a more coherent defence than asking a carrier to duel cruisers.
From Lexington & Saratoga Carrier Conception: Key Ship Series 3, Ships 10 &11 ·
A carrier's fuel and aviation spaces made surface combat a poor answer even in the interwar years.
From Lexington & Saratoga Carrier Conception: Key Ship Series 3, Ships 10 &11 ·
British carrier safeguards grew from First World War losses, while American interwar development explored capabilities the US Navy had lacked during that war.
From Lexington & Saratoga Carrier Conception: Key Ship Series 3, Ships 10 &11 ·
The eight-inch battery carried forward a battlecruiser vision of wide-ocean presence and commerce warfare.
From Lexington & Saratoga Carrier Conception: Key Ship Series 3, Ships 10 &11 ·
Carrier aviation made destroyer escorts essential, especially when a hostile capital ship broke through the air screen.
From Lexington & Saratoga Carrier Conception: Key Ship Series 3, Ships 10 &11 ·
Lexington's loss at Coral Sea opens the ships' combat history with the first true carrier battle.
From Lexington & Saratoga Carrier Conception: Key Ship Series 3, Ships 10 &11 ·
Saratoga's torpedoings, carrier strike, overseas deployments, and kamikaze damage reveal the converted hull's resilience.
From Lexington & Saratoga Carrier Conception: Key Ship Series 3, Ships 10 &11 ·
Operation Crossroads ended a career that began with battlecruiser design and passed through the rise of carrier aviation.
From Lexington & Saratoga Carrier Conception: Key Ship Series 3, Ships 10 &11 ·
The closing thought experiment asks how three battlecruisers and three carriers might have changed American deployment before Pearl Harbor.
From Lexington & Saratoga Carrier Conception: Key Ship Series 3, Ships 10 &11 ·
Major navies usually grow by changing purpose and form over time, which makes fleet building an evolutionary institutional process.
From How to Build A Navy ·
A navy begins with its purpose, the capacity to build and sustain it, and the reactions its acquisition will provoke.
From How to Build A Navy ·
Trade, fisheries, anti-piracy patrols, and moving land forces by sea can make naval power a practical defensive necessity.
From How to Build A Navy ·
If coastal communities must fund their own protection as well as the state, failure at sea can weaken the political bargain behind taxation.
From How to Build A Navy ·
Some early fleets existed chiefly to move and supply armies, with war-fighting capacity as a secondary advantage.
From How to Build A Navy ·
Sea control protects trade and enables blockades and amphibious operations; holding water has no independent value.
From How to Build A Navy ·
Yards, expansion options, and access to suppliers determine whether a fleet can be built and repaired without persistent external dependence.
From How to Build A Navy ·
Building and supporting ships domestically can turn naval expenditure into internal economic activity instead of a continuing capital outflow.
From How to Build A Navy ·
Expanding a dockyard is futile without equipment, trained workers, and a plan to keep essential labour out of competing wartime demands.
From How to Build A Navy ·
A fleet requires continuing maintenance, stores, weapons support, and trained people long after the ships have been acquired.
From How to Build A Navy ·
Recruitment is only the beginning: naval service must compete with civilian work and sustain morale during long separations from home.
From How to Build A Navy ·
Commitment to national service does not remove the need for adequate pay, housing, family support, and credible reasons for repeated separation.
From How to Build A Navy ·
Japan's fleet building illustrates how alliances, suppliers, and access to coal can reduce or amplify the threat seen by other powers.
From How to Build A Navy ·