Complete directory
Explore every watch point in reverse video-date order, then in timestamp order within each video.
Japan's sub-10,000-ton Ryujo demonstrated how the Washington rules could support fleets of small carriers, prompting London to close the category.
From 1930 London Naval Treaty: An Introduction Part 1 of 5/Articles 1-7 ·
Rapid growth in aircraft size made the apparently economical small carrier a difficult long-term naval aviation platform.
From 1930 London Naval Treaty: An Introduction Part 1 of 5/Articles 1-7 ·
Article 5 aligns carrier armament rules around a 6.1-inch or 155-millimetre limit, showing how measurement standards defined treaty categories.
From 1930 London Naval Treaty: An Introduction Part 1 of 5/Articles 1-7 ·
A discussion of 152- and 155-millimetre weapons connects the treaty's calibre wording to later artillery standards and speculative future naval guns.
From 1930 London Naval Treaty: An Introduction Part 1 of 5/Articles 1-7 ·
Article 6 applies standard displacement rules across surface warships and defines submarine displacement without fuel, oil, fresh water, or ballast water.
From 1930 London Naval Treaty: An Introduction Part 1 of 5/Articles 1-7 ·
Article 7 sets a 2,000-ton and 5.1-inch baseline for submarines while allowing a few larger boats and a special French exception.
From 1930 London Naval Treaty: An Introduction Part 1 of 5/Articles 1-7 ·
Large cruising submarines could use reusable deck guns against merchant traffic, conserving expensive torpedoes for warships.
From 1930 London Naval Treaty: An Introduction Part 1 of 5/Articles 1-7 ·
Interwar boats spent most of a patrol on the surface, so their hulls and endurance should not be judged by the standards of later underwater submarines.
From 1930 London Naval Treaty: An Introduction Part 1 of 5/Articles 1-7 ·
A mixed selection of recently received naval-history books makes this Bruships session unusually broad.
A recommendation for Ian Friel's Britain and the Ocean Road, especially for readers interested in shipwrecks, piracy, and the early maritime world.
A guide to Andrew Boyd's earlier Eastern Waters study, with a discussion of carrier design, aircraft maintenance, and long-range operations.
Atlantic weather, Mediterranean alert fighters and spare aircraft complicate comparisons of carrier deck parks.
Losing Abadan would have forced Britain to seek more distant oil supplies without enough tankers to carry them.
British carriers could carry deck-park aircraft beyond the hangar complement when enough serviceable aircraft were available.
Andrew Boyd's century-spanning naval-intelligence history is praised for depth, while readers new to naval history are advised to build context first.
American wooden flight decks and British armoured designs are linked to expected operating areas and available repair facilities.
Work on simpler German communications and investment in codebreaking machinery supported the attack on naval Enigma.
A common intelligence-assessment process improved operational use, while secrecy restrictions obstructed longer-term research.
A photograph-rich Essex-class history becomes a route into postwar carrier conversion and the Korean War's carrier operations.
Catapults, deck alterations, fuel storage and stability changes supported the Essex class's transition to jet operations.
The scale of Essex-class construction is placed against American expectations of severe carrier losses during an invasion of Japan.
Essex and British carrier designs offered different advantages, with Malta's greater size complicating any direct comparison.
Sea Fury encounters with MiG-15s receive a qualitative assessment, including their reputation among opposing pilots.
An audience Skyraider example prompts an acknowledgement that the initial answer about propeller aircraft and jets may be wrong.
Both authors are recommended, with Marriott's photographs and accessible presentation especially useful to a reader new to the subject.
The Malta preference is conditional on equivalent aircraft and rests chiefly on fighter-direction control and defence.
An illustrated proposal turns an Essex-class carrier into a mobile Atlas-rocket launch platform and prompts a speculative American-Soviet sea-launch race.
An account of low-level naval helicopter flying leads to a guest's story of hover-taxiing through Stanley to find a ceasefire meeting.
A hypothetical Town-class conversion places a helicopter hangar in place of X turret and adds missiles near the after funnel.
Archival and published references are suggested for researching an assessment of Belfast's return to service.
A First World War U-boat history is recommended for its account of Germany's American-coast campaign and the diplomatic limits of submarine warfare.
Merchant interception and rescue work brought U-53 and neutral American destroyers dangerously close to an accidental clash.
The book contrasts Wilson's restrained public response with a private warning against further submarine attacks near the American coast.
Germany's declaration of war is interpreted as removing Roosevelt's difficulty in extending the American war from Japan to Germany.
Wilson's diplomatic break is distinguished from declaring war, while Colonel House doubts that the separation can hold.
An unbuilt Soviet hybrid design involved American assistance and prompts a tentative explanation of how its topweight might have been balanced.
Hitler's Attack U-Boats is recommended for readers and modelers who want plans, engineering detail, and the practical limits of U-boat weapons.
Limited capacity and fragile rubber floors complicated moving men and stores between submarines and the shore.
Rescue equipment intended to identify a disabled submarine could reveal its position during a depth-charge attack.
Maintenance, low observation height and the submarine's motion limited the practical use of a deck gun.
Weapon reliability, crew coordination and unstable firing platforms constrained U-boat anti-aircraft defence.
Ise and Hyuga's flight-deck conversions lacked the aircraft needed for their intended role and were used largely for transport.
John Jordan's Warships after Washington connects the 1922 treaty with the speed, protection and machinery choices of interwar warships.
High speed and longer-range guns came with thin protection, cramped spaces and a vulnerability when combat closed the range.
The Soldati question receives a brief confirmation and a reminder of the book's main chronological scope.
Rough armour-to-calibre ratios need substantial qualification because steel quality and metallurgical practice change the protection obtained.
Gunnery changes and machinery choices improved performance, with trial speeds distinguished from practical fighting conditions.
The Washington volume is identified as the place to find the discussion of Nelson's guns.