Complete directory
Explore every watch point in reverse video-date order, then in timestamp order within each video.
The Royal Navy received only two Audacious-class carriers because the government cut the programme's funding.
From Bruships 61 - Ship Design; Sci-fi, Wooden & Steel, and some Naval History Questions ·
The problem was not simply opposition to dual-purpose guns: the suitable mount was delayed and earlier mounts could not provide high-angle fire.
From Bruships 61 - Ship Design; Sci-fi, Wooden & Steel, and some Naval History Questions ·
A personal two-chamber model combines decisive constituency elections with a national proportional voice.
From Bruships 61 - Ship Design; Sci-fi, Wooden & Steel, and some Naval History Questions ·
Shinano could have been a useful aircraft repair ship, but only if Japan had enough aircraft and operational fleet strength to make that role matter.
From Bruships 61 - Ship Design; Sci-fi, Wooden & Steel, and some Naval History Questions ·
Six-inch guns overload an interwar destroyer concept, though they can fit the scale of today's large cruiser-like destroyers.
From Bruships 61 - Ship Design; Sci-fi, Wooden & Steel, and some Naval History Questions ·
A playful counterfactual keeps Britain within the Gulf Stream while moving it southwest and widening the Channel as an additional defence against Germany.
From Bruships 61 - Ship Design; Sci-fi, Wooden & Steel, and some Naval History Questions ·
Personal experience as a borough councillor illustrates casework, planning limits, volunteer party structures, local accountability, and public access.
From Bruships 61 - Ship Design; Sci-fi, Wooden & Steel, and some Naval History Questions ·
In the 2021 discussion, Ticonderoga and Kirov retain the cruiser name, while Type 055 and Sejong the Great perform at cruiser scale under destroyer labels.
From Bruships 61 - Ship Design; Sci-fi, Wooden & Steel, and some Naval History Questions ·
The likely successor to the Lion class depends chiefly on whether Britain commits to the 16-inch gun.
From Bruships 61 - Ship Design; Sci-fi, Wooden & Steel, and some Naval History Questions ·
A 57 mm gun and a close-in weapon system would improve a River-class OPV without pretending it is a front-line frigate.
From Bruships 61 - Ship Design; Sci-fi, Wooden & Steel, and some Naval History Questions ·
In this 2021 discussion, railguns and lasers demand generation and storage systems that conventional warships do not yet provide.
From Bruships 61 - Ship Design; Sci-fi, Wooden & Steel, and some Naval History Questions ·
A discussion of government size uses defence support and Channel patrols to argue for evidence-led choices between public agencies and contractors.
From Bruships 61 - Ship Design; Sci-fi, Wooden & Steel, and some Naval History Questions ·
A short answer highlights the central long-war problem: guided-missile inventories are likely to be exhausted before fleets lose all their hulls.
From Bruships 61 - Ship Design; Sci-fi, Wooden & Steel, and some Naval History Questions ·
The opening frames the American Civil War as a conflict shaped by riverine and amphibious movement alongside land battles.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
The march's naval payoff was access to the heavy guns Sherman could not bring across Georgia.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
The Union blockade left the Confederacy dependent on domestic supplies for its armies, giving logistics strategic weight.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Grant's quartermaster experience and Thomas's methodical style show how professional background influenced Civil War command.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
A modern army needs compatible weapons, ammunition, orders, and command arrangements to sustain operations.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Union industry and access to imports supported newer equipment and the sustained expenditure of ammunition.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Scott's strategy combined rivers, the coast, and borders to isolate a Confederacy short of industrial infrastructure.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Reliance on slavery is linked to moral catastrophe and to weak investment in transport and labour-saving infrastructure.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Vicksburg showed how a river fleet could make a land manoeuvre campaign logistically possible.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
The repeated fighting around Bull Run illustrates that armies often meet where routes and political objectives bring them together, not where the terrain is ideal.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
The Western Theater offered more room for movement, but demanded more elaborate logistics than a fixed-depot campaign.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Confederate material unpreparedness is linked to groupthink, while secession and the first resort to force are treated as decisive responsibility for starting the war.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Daring cavalry could disrupt an enemy, but it could not by itself offset a large numerical and logistical imbalance.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Confederate formations often looked stronger on paper than they were in the field because weak administration and transport reduced attendance and concentration.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Civil War officers could hold different regular, volunteer, substantive, and acting ranks, making titles an unreliable guide to authority or experience.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
The campaign grew from a Grant-Sherman preference for exploiting weakness and arranging conditions before fighting.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
A light-hearted naval-ordnance aside imagines the gun designer asking why Iowa's weapons were not even larger.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Heavy naval-supported weapons made Savannah a realistic objective and gave Sherman a secure base for the next stage.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Sherman's career shows how a deliberately small peacetime army constrained officer employment, promotion, and the senior command structure used in the Civil War.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Their wartime letters illuminate the trust and shared strategic outlook behind the western campaigns.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
The Army of the Tennessee formed the southern side of Sherman's advance, built from experienced corps commanders and divisions.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Peter J. Osterhaus's Vicksburg record explains why he was trusted with the four-division Fifteenth Corps on the march's more exposed southern side.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Blair's changing party affiliations and the Seventeenth Corps's campaign experience put a political general in charge of veteran troops.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Slocum's Army of Georgia combined veteran corps into a left wing whose positions shifted as the columns closed on Savannah.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Slocum brought experience from every level between regimental and corps command to the newly assembled Army of Georgia.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
The retention of Jefferson C. Davis after he killed William Nelson exposes the Union Army's shortage of experienced senior officers.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Williams's long path from eastern campaigns to the Twentieth Corps shows how a capable division commander could be repeatedly overlooked before finding the right senior team.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Sherman's small cavalry component screened the march, while the First Alabama brought local knowledge and Unionist experience.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Sherman's orders translated the campaign into a practical system of parallel roads, compact trains, foraging parties, and controlled destruction.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Sherman's orders formally limited household entry and delegated destruction, while allowing escalating devastation in response to local resistance.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
The orders allowed able-bodied Black people to accompany the columns when they could help, while supply and combat priorities still governed that movement.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
The scattered columns converged near Fort McAllister, where connection with the navy restored supplies and opened the way to Savannah.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
With heavy guns and supply routes under control, Sherman could demand Savannah's surrender without a major battle for the city.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Hood's move toward Nashville drew Confederate strength away from Georgia and culminated in a battle his army was poorly equipped to win.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·
Replacing Johnston's preservation strategy with Hood's aggression removed the Confederate army from Georgia when a threat to Atlanta might have forced Union countermovement.
From Sherman's March to the Sea ·