What happens if Pearl Harbor is empty on the 7th of December?

The scenario opens by assembling the battleships, cruisers, and destroyers available for a deterrent sortie - and identifying reconnaissance as the fleet's central weakness.

Fuel limits, maintenance needs, force rotation, and better shore communications explain why the battleships were in port on 7 December.

A strike on Pearl Harbor's oil storage and transfer systems might have constrained the U.S. Pacific war effort longer than attacks confined to battleships.

An eastward sortie escapes danger, a southern course opens distance, and a westward demonstration risks putting Kido Butai directly behind the U.S. fleet.

Kimmel's Scouting Force background made him unusually ready to answer an attack with carriers, even though Washington withheld intelligence that had been available to his predecessor.

A northbound U.S. battle line could collide with Kido Butai before either side expected hostilities, creating a lethal identification and command problem.

The 26 November Hull Note supplies a plausible deadline after which Washington might order a full Pacific Fleet demonstration.

A west-southwest show of force toward the Philippines and Indochina is plausible only if fast tankers are gathered and reassigned in advance.

The Japanese submarines were moving into position and focused on launching midget submarines, leaving a 6 December American departure a chance to pass unnoticed.

Mass suspicion of Japanese Americans rested largely on fear; the Malayan case involved an identified British Indian Army intelligence threat.

Takeo Yoshikawa's diplomatic reporting could reveal the sortie, but a delayed American public announcement might reach Tokyo more effectively.

Meeting Lexington and Enterprise adds carrier aircraft, heavy cruisers, and enough destroyers to turn the battle line into a more balanced fleet formation.

Pearl Harbor is easier to locate, but ships sunk in deep water stay lost and Japanese torpedoes work better away from the shallow anchorage.

The Royal Navy, U.S. Navy, and Imperial Japanese Navy entered the next war with forces designed around different frustrations inherited from 1914-18.

A raid on an empty Pearl Harbor likely produces a northward American hunt and a later carrier battle shaped by scouting, weather, and unequal air strength.

If the battle line escapes destruction, the United States may risk more battleships around Guadalcanal - provided fuel and basing can support them.

Hunting the fleet gives Japan a chance to approach from the unsearched rear and concentrate the historical Pearl Harbor air groups entirely on ships at sea.

Against a located fleet, Kates, Vals, and Zeros assigned historically across ships, airfields, and Ford Island could be focused on battleships and carriers.

Aircraft arriving from astern would first acquire the trailing battleships and then tend to mass on the second ship from the rear as successive attackers moved forward.

Even after a devastating Japanese first wave, Lexington and Enterprise may follow the returning attackers back to carriers busy preparing another strike.

Finding a moving Pacific Fleet could take long enough for Japan's delayed declaration message to reach Washington before the first strike, though not necessarily Kimmel at sea.

The alternative battle may leave fewer battleships disabled, preserve carrier leadership in the war, and make Kimmel's removal depend on his combat results.