Tsingtao 1939: WWII but in January & against Japan - P6a Introduction to Patreon Video 4

The scenario opens in January 1939, before Japan or Britain reached the positions and levels of preparation they would have in 1941.

British access to imperial repair facilities could keep German surface raiders operating in the Far East while moving them away from waters near Britain.

An early war changes the Malayan campaign because Japan lacks the later invasion's stockpiles, training, mapping, and operational preparation.

British imperial relationships are treated as a security system in which military protection produced political influence and dependence.

A large diesel installation prevented a fishery survey vessel from detecting fish, forcing different solutions for two ships.

The concession dispute concerned Chinese murder suspects. A Japanese attack that sinks a British ship and may kill sailors, followed by naval retaliation, would create far greater pressure to continue fighting.

January differs from the later 1939 crisis because Germany is weaker, Italy is applying pressure in the Mediterranean, and Soviet-Japanese border fighting is still developing.

Once British casualties and gunfire enter the crisis, an outside power has little ability to compel two leading naval states to stand down.

The proposed eastern war favors British blockade and imperial resources, while Japan's dependence on trade becomes a strategic vulnerability.

Australian, Dutch, French, and Chinese involvement is assessed through exposure in Asia and the practical need to defend regional interests.

A brief deployment argument places capital ships in the Indian Ocean as a reserve while cruisers operate forward from the China Station against trade.

The Gallipoli aside treats the campaign as a costly demonstration that older landing-party methods could not simply overcome modern defended shores.

An American government joining Japan is the scenario's most unlikely premise and the only alignment that gives Japan a serious chance.

Fuel access and resource use shape the coalition balance, with Britain and the United States better placed than states seeking war to obtain supplies.

Even with a radically altered U.S. government, the American Navy would not be immediately ready for war against Britain in 1939.

The Royal Navy's experience and numbers favor attacks on maritime trade, while American and Japanese thinking is portrayed as more drawn to a Jutland-style fleet battle.

The proposed war remains viable for Britain only if Germany and Italy stay neutral or become partners rather than opening a simultaneous European front.

Roosevelt's 1938 midterm losses and a large New York fascist rally provide real context, but a pro-Japanese seizure of power is explicitly treated as fantasy.

British interception of American trade with Japan could turn an already contrived political alignment into open war.