Nelson Class & Patreon 67 Comment Response

A proposed British 15-inch/50 gun opens an alternate path from the F2 and F3 studies to faster capital ships with heavy triple turrets.

Yes, to an extent: the Special Service Squadron visibly demonstrated British strength even when procurement policy fell short of its larger aims.

A comment on water- and oil-backed protection connects underwater blast behavior with Italian, Dutch, and experimental Pykrete concepts.

Removing roughly 1,500 tons of crushing tubes from HMS Hood offered weight savings, but replacing the system before 1941 likely required a major machinery rebuild.

Possibly, but the ship would also need compatible ammunition spaces, machinery, and prebuilt replacement turrets, turning the idea into a substantial planned conversion.

No. It would more likely have created a multi-front war, weakened the Union blockade, and encouraged Britain to support the Confederacy as its enemy's enemy.

Relaxing the treaty displacement assumption produces an F3-like Nelson with heavier protection, rearranged machinery, three shafts, and roughly 29 to 30 knots.

An alternate secondary battery develops Britain's existing 5.5-inch gun into a twin dual-purpose mount for capital ships and perhaps converted cruisers.

The Admiralty's own label is the historical starting point, while the conflicting coefficient values need their dimensions, formula, and assumptions checked together.

Britain's pursuit of a 16-inch weapon is weighed against the ammunition, refit, and fleet-wide advantages of standardizing on a 15-inch/50 gun.

Nelson, fast battleships, Hood, and the Kongos are placed on a spectrum defined by how each design traded speed, armor, and firepower for its intended role.

Admiral Ernest King's hostility to British dependence is set against the fact that neither the U.S. Navy nor Royal Navy could independently cover every major wartime theatre.

It might have delayed conflict by easing Japanese resentment, while a roughly 40,000-ton limit would have been more practical, but it would not guarantee lasting peace.

Yes in principle, but the oversized barbette and its machinery remain, so most savings come only from the omitted gun, crew, and associated handling equipment.

Yes. Secondary explosions were possible, but proving a distinct second major detonation would require much more evidence.

Possibly, especially for the Queen Elizabeth class, but the longer barrels would require rebalancing and stronger turret machinery, and the work would be expensive.

HMS Rodney's performance against Bismarck shows that the Nelson class's 16-inch guns remained dangerous despite disappointing tests and a comparatively light shell.

Only partly, but smaller, better-subdivided spaces could limit flooding and make the internal volume more useful.

Yes. The barrel dimensions were close enough that the conversion was technically manageable, though the turret and internal gun systems would still require redesign.

Yes, but the layout can improve magazine temperature control, subdivision, and separation between boilers and magazines, creating a different survivability tradeoff.

The F2 and F3 studies complicate a simple anti-Beatty story because he supported promising alternatives before accepting the final Nelson arrangement.

Technically yes, but Britain lacked the established system and would have disliked dependence on American equipment and spare parts.

Possibly, but the mounting would need a full redesign, and a capital-ship installation might be ready well before a lighter destroyer version.

It was arguable but uncertain: Britain could say the caliber and shell size were unchanged, while other powers could treat the longer weapon as a major upgrade.

A standardized British heavy gun would affect rivals unevenly: Japan and Germany retain their main paths, while American treaty policy and Italian and French battleship choices face more pressure.

Probably not. Without a treaty limit, Britain had little reason to accept a 35,000-ton compromise instead of building a 40,000- to 45,000-ton capital ship.

Probably not, because France was not the only interested power; Italy and the United States also contested the postwar distribution.

F3's official 29-knot speed frames an unanswered design problem: a faster German capital ship would need more machinery and sacrifices elsewhere.

Japan did not ignore them, but relied on its speed advantage to dictate when and how it would fight them.

Because rapid, reliable construction was the priority while newer battleship programs were delayed; a conventional layout reduced schedule and design risk.

Raising Nelson and Rodney to about 28 knots creates a fast battle line but risks making the five R-class battleships strategically marginal.

The closing counterfactual asks how 28-knot Nelsons armed with 15-inch/50 guns might reshape Italian, French, and German capital-ship programs before the Second World War.