Henning Von Holtzendorff & Unrestricted Submarine Warfare

The introduction presents Henning von Holtzendorff as the reluctant architect of a submarine campaign meant to besiege Britain when Germany had few other routes to victory.

Holtzendorff's career explains why he was an unusual advocate of submarine warfare: he had opposed Tirpitz's naval competition with Britain.

Holtzendorff returned in 1915 to lead an Imperial Navy divided among competing offices, after earlier submarine advocates had failed to settle the strategic debate.

Holtzendorff's alternative to the Risk Fleet was a strong German navy and army built to complement Britain while avoiding direct naval competition.

Possibly, if Germany had acted as a reliable partner and avoided naval competition: Britain had strategic reasons to welcome help against Russia and little interest in matching the German Army.

The strategic object of unrestricted submarine warfare was to reverse Britain's pressure on Germany by cutting an island economy off from seaborne trade.

Holtzendorff's December 1916 case rested on merchant tonnage, grain routes, and the claim that only an unrestricted campaign could force a decision.

The memorandum contrasted unrestricted attacks with cruiser rules, arguing that a limited campaign could reduce trade but could not break British resistance.

Holtzendorff expected American intervention to have little immediate effect and assumed economic pressure would overcome Anglo-American resolve before the United States could deploy decisive force.

German calculations omitted an anti-submarine response that was already taking physical form in Royal Navy orders for sloops and other small escorts.

The January 1917 decision met opposition from Kaiser Wilhelm II and Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg because it risked American war and abandoned established limits on commerce warfare.

The campaign sank vast tonnage in 1917 but failed because convoying and escorts reduced losses before submarines could produce a decisive result.

Holtzendorff was replaced as the strategic crisis deepened, leaving a legacy shaped by his failed effort to find a workable alternative to defeat.

The closing question asks how the alliance system might have changed if Holtzendorff had replaced Tirpitz in 1913 and tried to align Germany with Britain before war began.