Bruships 140 - Patreon Suggestions, Some Interesting Books (Hopefully) & Lots of Naval History Qs!

The navy might call it a 3,000-ton frigate, but the completed ship would probably approach 4,000 tons after additions.

Treaties constrained the choice, while rate-of-fire considerations made 16- to 16.5-inch guns a more attractive practical limit.

Not effectively with ordinary depth charges; attacking a tunnel entrance with a large or guided bomb would be far easier.

Depending on the definition of fighting, examples survive into the First or even Second World War.

It could carry four twin high-angle 4.7-inch mounts, producing a substantially more capable dual-purpose destroyer leader.

The problems were already largely solved; later turret designs addressed blast vulnerability, while Fisher's personal resistance was the central obstacle.

It would look much like the Capitani Romani class, a useful design that Italy could not build in sufficient numbers.

Only if the mission genuinely requires it; otherwise endurance, aviation, boats, and payload are likely better uses of displacement.

It could be useful, but a distributed modular force needs enough hulls and missile depth to sustain its promised capabilities.

Only alongside new construction; his priority would remain new cruisers and the shipyard employment they generated.

Yes. The Sverdlov class was a good 1950s cruiser, and building the proposed numbers would have produced a real race.

No. Renown is a battlecruiser, while the Deutschlands are heavy cruisers whose dramatic label came from the press.

No. Its decisive problem was weight and handling, not simply the oxidizer system.

Yes, they can form a command pathway, although specialist expertise may keep an officer within a particular ship role.

Standardize British 4.5-inch weapons, build true Italian destroyers and German light cruisers, accelerate French Dunkerque derivatives, redirect Yamato resources, and properly develop or avoid Pearl Harbor as a forward base.

About 1,000 horsepower by 1930 was plausible, with much higher outputs possible by 1939 under sustained investment.

Probably not by much on that change alone; Japan could build another large torpedo, and the result would depend on its performance.

Much like the Scharnhorst class: a light battleship with the protection and speed to be a serious raider.

Its reputation exceeded its practical value because treaty rules made it prominent, while 6-inch and 9.2-inch weapons offered stronger tradeoffs on either side.

It would probably add another battleship at Jutland and later provide Britain with extra tonnage to exchange in treaty negotiations.

Extensive VLS, lasers, and potentially workable railguns or coilguns, with metallurgy and projectile guidance remaining important constraints.

It would make German surface ships less competitive and could drive an earlier shift toward a predominantly submarine navy.

The present burden is unusually severe: the Navy is being asked for late-Cold-War-scale commitments with a fraction of the hulls, making numbers the central problem.

From the beginning: the first seaplane carriers were explicitly mobile bases that set up aircraft operations in suitable bays.

Its clearest uses are reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting, although the specific design needs closer study.

It was strongly armed and benefited from wartime experience plus Swedish weapons expertise unavailable when the earlier classes were designed.

The propulsion idea was theoretically possible, but limited control electronics would demand heavy pilot intervention and make the aircraft unlike a normal Harrier.

They would likely be capped near 13,500 to 14,000 tons, giving navies more small carriers and allowing their fleet carriers to approach the full treaty limit.

Bombay ships rate higher because their construction quality was consistently exceptional, whereas Havana output varied more widely.

The weight saving was modest, while torpedoes let the battleship itself finish a disabled but still-floating enemy.

They provide more ships to allocate and more chances to alter a battle, though no specific result is guaranteed.

Probably with a similar result, but the British approach would be faster and boiler explosions could make the battle more destructive.

It would require some gun work and investment, but a wider 16-inch program could make the conversion practical.

The war starts with far more powerful capital ships and naval aviation, then accelerates development from that advanced baseline.

It would replace them as heavy cruisers but probably retain and convert the overage hulls for anti-aircraft work.

It had substantial defenses, but they were not organized or supported to the standard of a forward base genuinely expecting war.

Much of its carrier and major-ship program from 1916-17 onward already assumed that the ships would shape the postwar fleet.

British ships would generally be faster, require fewer stokers, and gain more controllable propulsion, though the nation would need larger oil stockpiles.

Three twin 5.9-inch turrets, combined diesel and steam machinery, mine capability, and as many broadside torpedo tubes as displacement permits.

Probably not in their wartime form; a prewar program would more likely continue Hunt-type escort destroyers built to full naval standards.

A light cruiser is more likely around 10,000-12,000 tons, with scouts lower and heavy cruisers distinctly larger.

Start with Robert Seppings; his name and work lead into the relevant construction method and sources.

No. Drawings survived, but lost infrastructure and institutional memory made the practical capability much harder to recover.

Only with earlier access to Dutch technology and a reason to answer the Allied ASW threat that historically drove the design.

Probably the United States through a maximum qualitative-race design, although the limit would change as technology advanced.

The French ship has the better chance in a fresh maneuvering fight, but the British ship is favored after a long voyage or in an uninspired broadside duel.

They would accompany fast carrier raids as surface cover able to delay a Kongo-class interception.

Never in quite this form; current commitments resemble the late Cold War but are carried by only a fraction of that fleet.

The largest change would be to strategic submarines and missile payloads, not to the basic composition of surface fleets.

Some navies fear that a hangar will encourage politicians to label the OPV a budget frigate and replace real escorts with it.

They would treat it as a serious loophole and eventually demand either comparable rights or treaty restrictions.

A rough estimate is about 10 knots because the denser timber would make a Victory-sized hull heavier and deeper in the water.

They would help, but fighter cover from almost any carrier would address the fundamental problem far more effectively.

He could become First Sea Lord, resist the carrier-construction pause, and push the Malta class as the Royal Navy's largest available carrier design.

Not if the arms race continued; Britain would keep upgrading its yards and docks to support the next several ship generations.

Not cleanly, because 8-inch and 6-inch cruisers each serve both roles in different ways.

Probably after the G3 and N3 generation, with an F3-like design serving as the bridge to a unified fast-battleship type.

Potentially, and it might push as far as 22 inches, but the required ship could break the limits of Japanese infrastructure.

No; they were ambitious but viable, particularly with 16.5-inch guns, and could have entered service if Britain chose them.

It could cripple Germany and Japan within weeks, with most delay coming from moving modern forces into position rather than defeating resistance.

Yes; Britain tested and deployed very heavy anti-aircraft fire, and wartime reports even credit Rodney's 16-inch guns with an aircraft kill.

About 80,000 tons fully loaded, because the turret requires a larger hull, more structure, and additional power as well as the guns themselves.

No. Six-inch weapons offer the rate of fire needed against destroyers and cruisers, while larger targets warrant the main battery.

Britain would prioritize Malta carriers and cruisers, might finish the Lions, and would compete with America without necessarily entering a true Anglo-American Cold War.

Roughly twelve 18-inch guns, more than 30 knots, and heavy protection, with exact armor thickness dependent on material technology.

Worse than historically, because the British cruisers and Duke of York would all gain power while Scharnhorst remained constrained by German industry.

Potentially, because a fixed battery avoids several shipboard penalties, although the larger gun would remain expensive and slow-firing.

No; it would be a capable battlecruiser, but Iowa's battleship status made it the stronger answer to the prestige and deterrence problem posed by Kirov.

An Audacious-sized ship could probably do it if the aircraft were designed for catapult use, while Malta or Midway would certainly be large enough.

With substantially more than 74 cells, including quad-packed local defense, a large Aster battery, Tomahawks, and separate anti-ship missiles.

The claim rested on political myths and propaganda that concealed the Nazi leadership's independent commitment to rearmament and expansion.

For the unreliable American torpedoes then available, probably yes, even though effective torpedoes are normally a valuable cruiser weapon.

They would improve submarines, strengthen emergency power, and make electric drive more efficient by supplying short propulsion surges.

They could produce either insulting pressure for 5:3 or an underestimating concession toward 10:7, while his desire for more construction pushes the settlement upward.

Probably not by much, because their size came from yard capacity, construction standards, and mass convoy-ASW requirements rather than destroyer limits.

The attribution is uncertain, and the claim is inaccurate because Germany was blockaded toward collapse in 1918 and physically conquered in 1945.

The High Seas Fleet would probably turn for home, because advance warning reveals an engagement it cannot win and prevents Jutland from occurring.

San Francisco and Seattle are the likeliest targets, creating damage and alarm while diverting American defenses toward the coast.

About 2,000 tons, enough to carry a stronger destroyer-like armament while remaining below the fleet destroyer tier.

Yes, but the gap was largely imposed by Versailles, with Type 23 and Type 24 torpedo boats providing only a constrained intermediate step.

Not realistically; every important route or target brought Japan into conflict with Britain, the United States, or their allies.

Almost everywhere, because the extra displacement permits a balanced dual-purpose gun, torpedo, and ASW fit without sacrificing the normal destroyer role.

Likely yes in the Pacific, because American isolationism focused heavily on avoiding a European war rather than abandoning Pacific interests.

No; similar needs produced similar shapes, while the internal systems and arrangements determine the ships' real differences.

The long, visible buildup prompts Britain to field 16-inch King George V and Lion-class ships in greater numbers, leaving Germany behind despite its stronger fleet.

Not as much as the gun change suggests, because Japan would answer the higher treaty caliber and Exeter would still be outnumbered with a less experienced crew.

Modern air defense, gunfire, and carrier aviation would probably break the German assault and its logistics before the finite ammunition stock became decisive.

Yes, if a large program really delivers many more hulls, such as twelve reduced ships for the cost of eight full Counties.

The King George V class could receive reliable triple 16-inch turrets, while British coastal defenses gain more heavy guns and useful ammunition.

Only marginally; every useful improvement would cost armor, weapons, range, or another feature the design could scarcely spare.

None is the first priority; most navies need more of their existing ships, followed by useful uncrewed or support variants.

The Mark 5 gun, especially in the Mark 6 turret, offered high elevation, a fast rate of fire, and useful air and surface reach.

No; such ideas existed after World War I, but Britain initially favored more numerous 7.5-inch commerce-protection cruisers for the threat it expected.

The Allies gain many cruisers and carriers, while the supporting Dominion shipbuilding infrastructure multiplies escort and small-ship production.

The Deutschland and Scharnhorst limits followed from destroyed yards, gun-making capacity, lost experience, inspection, and a rearmament timetable dominated by the army and air force.