Bruships 123: Naval History Questions and Books on Strategy & Tactics

No. It was heading north but was delayed, then recalled by the Admiralty before it could fight at Jutland.

CODOG is combined diesel or gas. Diesel-and-steam systems exist, but they are a different, older form of machinery arrangement.

The session is framed as an open naval-history Q&A with strategy-and-tactics book discussions.

Carefully. Iceland's strategic position would let it seek support from Britain, the United States, or the Soviet Union, making simple economic coercion risky.

Finland may have sent one of its larger coastal-defence ships, but the vessel cannot be verified and remains an open research question.

Land conquest can destroy or immobilize naval forces, but it is not a clear repeatable method for defeating a genuinely superior navy.

Probably, but under another name and with different national design priorities. The intended role of the predecessor ship would shape the result.

To hide blade geometry and the acoustic signature that it could reveal to an opponent.

Yes. A global empire would retain sloop-like presence ships, even if later terminology called them patrol vessels or OPVs.

PT boats and comparable German small craft are leading candidates, but individual claims need checking because some dramatic weapons are only rumored.

Begin with technical reprints such as Modern American Marine Engines, Boilers and Screw Propellers, then add modern marine-engine and warship-structure references.

No. The practical difference includes damage tolerance, endurance in ice, and how long the vessel can operate before maintenance.

Commanders usually believe they can win, and nominal fleet strength can be misleading. Lissa is offered as a classic example.

A fragmentary capital-ship question yields a clear design trade-off: 1,500 extra standard tons could fund a third shaft and push the unnamed design toward 28-30 knots.

Disperse aircraft, keep radar and defences ready, put every possible ship to sea, and use the attack to spring a coordinated ambush.

An all-four-inch main battery was a strong indicator that the destroyer had been configured for anti-aircraft work.

Jutland fits: Germany escaped after inflicting losses, but Britain kept sea control and the blockade.

Probably on a timetable comparable to the later Island and Castle classes, because an OPV would not require a prolonged development program.

It depends on the balance sought. Separate magazines improve survivability; shared or honeycombed arrangements use internal volume more efficiently.

The term 'offshore patrol vessel' reflects NATO standardisation and post-imperial reluctance to revive labels such as sloop and gunboat, even when the mission remained similar.

Hood would probably receive the command, while Lee could contribute most credibly through a detailed inspection of the battlecruiser squadron's gunnery.

The prerequisite technology would still take work, but successful early investment might put British jet aircraft into service from about 1936-37 onward.

Officials saw many unproven inventions and lacked hindsight; Whittle also approached government before private backing had demonstrated the concept's promise.

Scandinavian builders have the strongest general claim, though Russia's nuclear icebreakers possess major endurance advantages.

That scale is plausible only across the whole empire, and the ships would probably follow a different imperial design rather than the historical Island and Castle classes.

Yes. Attack plus victory would energize the United States, and Hitler might still make the strategically needless decision to declare war.

They would strengthen the British battlecruiser force substantially and make the German scouting force's task much harder.

Germany and the United States could respond with time and effort, but Japan's industrial limits would make its catch-up especially slow.

Not in a clean example. States such as Rome built naval power, and the American case depended on allied fleets.

Radar, radios, and communications could improve rapidly; computers would still lag because their development required more than improved components.

Perhaps two. They could steam toward Pearl Harbor at full speed while tankers, tugs, or slower battleships moved out to support them.

A four-shaft, 16-inch-gun ship capable of roughly 32-33 knots while retaining Nelson-level armour is plausible in the estimate.

The naval treaty system, because it sharply restricted British and American flexibility, deterrence, and industrial preparedness.

Japan's offensive timetable would collapse, Kimmel would probably remain in command, and Nimitz would likely receive a different operational assignment.

Japan would need vastly larger and more demanding ships to regain a margin, or might shift resources toward large carriers and a different battle-fleet concept.

Britain would build more minelayers and minesweepers, but the expanded mine threat would still be difficult to organize against and clear.

The landings might still be attempted, but Japan would likely retain torpedo bombers for home defence and struggle to support the campaign after losing so much of its fleet.

Three triples would mean fewer guns, while four triples would require a substantially larger and more powerful hull.

A modernized Tiger would be costly for Australia to sustain, but a Tiger-Furious grouping could create a substantial Australian task force.

There is no evidence for the claim. Britain could retain sovereign capabilities or work with France rather than depend on Russia.

They would likely be British-derived ships, perhaps Town-class cruisers, that Canada would replace rather than extensively rebuild between the wars.

Interested, yes; likely to buy it, no. Limited money would be better spent on the main-tank fleet than on another small logistics chain.

The Tide-class tankers, built by Daewoo in South Korea and fitted out in Britain because domestic yards lacked available capacity.

Railways could be faster and better for heavy freight, but they would require gentler curves and substantially more supporting infrastructure.

Fewer C-class ships and more D- and E-class cruisers, perhaps on the order of two dozen in each later grouping.

Probably. A base with substantial air, naval, and ground defences would make a full invasion far more costly and less attractive.

Yes. The 1950s generation, including the Daring class, remained gun-armed; shipboard missiles became prominent in the 1960s.

A series of carrier-and-amphibious groups, each supporting Royal Marine units, that could combine into brigade or light-division formations.

No. The Tide contract was a temporary yard-capacity solution, not a precedent for outsourcing combatant construction.

Generally no. Their fuel, speed, and modernization problems would cost too much for ships still vulnerable to newer battleships.

Britain would likely enter World War II with established Icelandic bases and patrol aircraft, improving early Atlantic surveillance and pressure on German raiders.

Build large capable ships with space and structural margin for later conversion, especially substantial six-inch cruisers.

It would still be dangerous, but a Commonwealth forum and perhaps the League could provide limited structure while the great powers relied mainly on proxy conflicts and balance-of-power practice.

No. The named examples place slow crossings around two to three weeks; four knots may describe net progress in conditions, not the convoy's intended speed.

Probably in Hermes's conventional carrier configuration, though the relevant aircraft weights still need verification.

They could hit coastal convoys and surfaced U-boats effectively, but their submarine role was opportunistic rather than dedicated ASW.

Yes. Six global stations and a carrier group require roughly 36 escorts, without asking individual ships to cover incompatible roles.

Yes. Liners were designed to sustain that speed, while cruisers could wreck their machinery trying to keep pace for the whole crossing.

Probably not as long; continued annual construction would send them to reserve and disposal sooner, though some might move to Dominion fleets.

Both. The force had effective spotters and was close enough to sight its targets clearly.

Use them as sacrificial, minimally crewed minefield breakers at the Dardanelles, modified for buoyancy and rapid abandonment.

Because governments often promise a small fixed number of hulls, pushing the Navy to maximize each ship rather than trade size for a larger fleet.

This strategy collection is imperfect but useful for provoking questions about the relation between strategy, planning, and real crises.

Sparta shows how a famous military image can outlast relative power, especially when publicity and psychological warfare obscure Macedonian dominance.

It would first require more industrial capacity or abandoning competing projects, then likely provoke a larger British response and alter treaty-era decisions.

Not automatically. A different fleet program changes the requirements, and might eliminate a class such as Type 21 instead of merely accelerating it.

By cutting open planned access routes to the engineering spaces, changing boilers and bunkers, and closing the armored structure again during a major modernization.

Roger Knight's Convoys shows how escorting trade and blockading enemy coasts were intertwined strategic functions in the difficult North Sea.

Yes. The King George V class used replaceable armor panels and planned side access to machinery spaces.

Wayne Hughes uses the Falklands War to argue that scouting, comparative force quality, and mission context matter more than claims that missiles made surface warships obsolete.

A large 15,000-18,000-ton cruiser, probably with guns larger than eight inches, alongside a 7,000-10,000-ton light cruiser.

Begin with Timothy Walton on the Spanish treasure fleets, then use Strategy Before Clausewitz and comparative Portuguese history for wider context.

Probably by 1918, or around 1920 at the latest.

An official account of Operation Iceberg explains how naval gunfire, air attack, and layered small-craft screens reduced the threat from Japanese suicide boats.

Yes. They are well suited where the main needs are deck space and room to maintain drones rather than high-threat combat survivability.

Probably somewhat better, especially while maneuvering as part of a task force rather than fighting alone.

British and Australian ships were hit, but the examples checked here survived; armoured carriers could continue operating after attacks.

Richard Humphreys's Under Pressure uses personal experience to contrast brief freedom in Scotland's Inner Sound with the confinement and routine of a ballistic-missile patrol.

L3: an 18-inch-gun, strongly protected 25-knot battleship design that complements the K3 concept.

A need for dispersed maritime aviation that could survive attacks on fixed bases, followed by a workable British or joint replacement design.

The British and RAAF both have strong cases, but no definitive ranking is offered because national figures are not compiled on the same basis.

To avoid overstraining individual shafts and to preserve propulsion after battle damage; losing several still leaves the ship mobile.

Treat it as a highly motivated and professionally serious force, while avoiding a firm wider ranking from ship counts alone.

J3 generated more reports and recorded design work, and more of those documents survived.

Not for the period in question. Aircraft were developing rapidly but were not yet reliable enough to replace battleships as the main naval fighting arm.