Treaties, deterrence, and visible industrial strength

The Washington and London naval treaties were intended to prevent another naval race, but the incentives they created could work against that aim. A visible and continuing construction base would tell potential challengers that an established navy could expand from strength. A long pause in building can instead make competitors appear to be starting from the same point even when their industries are unequal. The counterfactual proposal calls for HMS Dreadnought to be followed immediately by a full eight-ship dreadnought squadron and four Invincible-class battlecruisers, making the technological lead visibly durable. Without that emphatic follow-through, Germany could believe it might catch up, just as political leaders in Germany, Italy, and Japan could later mistake treaty-era paper ratios for real industrial parity. Deterrence in this argument depends on showing productive capacity rather than leaving it in reserve and expecting competitors to account for it.