Why criticize the 1936 naval treaty but not earlier arms limits?

Why be harsh on politicians seeking peace conferences and arms limits after the First World War arms buildup had failed to prevent war?

The earlier treaties were understandable, but the 1936 agreement imposed unusually tight limits despite clear danger and easy withdrawal provisions, reducing useful naval preparedness without ensuring restraint.

The post-First World War logic behind the Washington and first London treaties is understandable, but the Second London Naval Treaty's combination of strict limits and escape clauses is harder to justify. By 1936, governments were receiving warnings of another war yet still constrained cruiser construction below the full treaty ceiling. The agreement could be abandoned when states felt threatened, making its tight peacetime limits a weak guarantee of mutual restraint. An arms race is also rejected as a sufficient explanation for the First World War, whose causes were more complex. Leaders need not predict the future, but they should preserve infrastructure and procurement options for plausible dangers. The comparison with roads, railways, and telecommunications makes the wider point that governments should maintain enabling capacity even when they cannot know exactly which future industry or military requirement will use it.