The Admiralty understood the escort-carrier idea: at Third Sea Lord Reginald Henderson's direction, Stanley Goodall's staff studied conversions of Winchester Castle and Wanpao in 1936. Illustrious-class construction consumed treaty tonnage and shipbuilding attention, while the RAF resisted aircraft demands that would compete with its bomber program. The Board of Trade also wanted merchant hulls kept in commerce. The 1939 Fighting Instructions trusted ASDIC, surface escorts, Coastal Command, France, and Norwegian neutrality to constrain the U-boat threat. The contrast with the 1947 instructions, which treated a convoy carrier as its tactical air force, shows how wartime experience overturned that prewar judgment. Those institutional and strategic assumptions explain why designs existed without producing ships before 1939.
Chapter · 1:41-5:13
Why trade-protection carriers stalled before the war
The Admiralty explored merchant-ship carrier conversions in the 1930s, but treaty tonnage, competing aircraft demands, merchant-shipping needs, and optimistic war plans kept them off the building program.
AsdicBoard Of TradeCivilian-to-Military Ship ConversionsCoastal CommandConvoy EscortEscort CarriersFighting InstructionsFleet Air ArmIllustrious Class Aircraft CarriersMerchant ShippingNaval ProcurementNaval TreatiesReginald HendersonRoyal Air ForceRoyal NavyStanley GoodallTrade ProtectionWanpaoWashington Naval TreatyWinchester Castle