Eight Ryujos could break the 1930 carrier settlement

How would other treaty powers respond if Japan built eight original-design Ryūjō carriers in the late 1920s?

They would have to rewrite carrier limits or accept Japan's withdrawal, most likely weakening cumulative restrictions and restarting construction.

The scenario exploits the period before the 1930 conference closed the small-carrier gap. Japan could present the treaty with roughly 80,000 tons of existing light carriers that it would refuse to scrap. Negotiators would need to legalize them through exceptions or alter aggregate carrier rules for everyone. Either solution restarts larger carrier construction elsewhere and risks leaving Japan with many small carriers while Britain and America build more capable 27,000-ton ships. The effects could extend beyond carriers: Germany might favor coastal-defence ships over 10,000-ton commerce raiders, while earlier Soviet construction could mature yards before Stalin's later fleet expansion. A treaty exception would create an industrial and strategic shock across several navies rather than a Japanese windfall in isolation.