Notable Point · 11:08 Successive Odin, Parthian, and Rainbow-class batches refined the long range and striking power required for Far East patrols.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Chapter · 12:11 The interwar force combined medium boats, fleet submarines, mine-layers, and the T class rather than relying on one standard type.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Notable Point · 12:11 The S class balanced useful range and combat power against the cost and complexity of the larger boats designed for Pacific endurance.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Notable Point · 15:32 The success of German minelaying boats in the First World War persuaded Britain to preserve submarine mine warfare in its interwar force.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Notable Point · 16:10 T- and U-class development was already replacing older boats before 1939 and helped Britain build roughly 150 submarines during the war.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Notable Point · 17:49 The Royal Navy did not need Germany's submarine numbers because its likely targets and access to enemy supply routes were different.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Chapter · 18:40 A long-range convoy escort, a fleet screen, and a ship intended to fight surface vessels needed different combinations of speed, weapons, and endurance.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Chapter · 20:12 A directional sound pulse, echo timing, and bearing indication gave an escort a submarine contact.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Notable Point · 21:47 ASDIC contacts became difficult above about 18 knots or in bad weather, making the search pattern and operating environment critical.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Notable Point · 22:19 Successive ASDIC types and skipped model numbers reveal sustained development rather than one finished invention suddenly appearing before the war.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Chapter · 23:39 The sloop was a specialist long-range escort: modestly sized, treaty-compatible, and designed to search at speeds where ASDIC was useful.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Notable Point · 26:16 Smaller coastal escorts traded ocean endurance for the ability to defend local convoys against submarines and mines.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Notable Point · 28:37 The development of Hedgehog shows that an anti-submarine weapon had to survive launch and impact as well as work in theory.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Chapter · 29:53 The Hunt-class escort destroyers combined anti-submarine speed with a planned role in convoy protection and carrier screens.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Notable Point · 31:29 The Mediterranean offered controlled training conditions and deterrent value, but calm water and clear visibility could flatter ASW performance.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Chapter · 34:22 The Royal Navy cultivated anti-submarine specialists, but effective undersea warfare also required intelligence that could anticipate an opponent's choices.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Notable Point · 36:20 Sinclair linked naval intelligence, submarine expertise, and the Secret Intelligence Service, making his death in 1939 a difficult institutional loss.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Notable Point · 40:36 Accurate intelligence was insufficient unless briefers adapted facts, context, and nuance to the decision-maker receiving it.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Notable Point · 41:48 Rapid interwar ASW development produced an adaptation contest in which submarine officers immediately looked for ways to confuse improved detection.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Notable Point · 42:37 By 1939 the Royal Navy expected two or three escorts to be needed: one to keep ASDIC contact and another to make the attack.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Notable Point · 43:10 Many Hunt destroyers, Flower corvettes, and trawlers were in the pipeline in 1939, but planners had expected more time before a major conflict began.
From ASW and Submarine Warfare in the Inter-War Royal Navy: 1920s & 1930s (Long Patrol) · 24 Dec 2021
Chapter · 5:46 The Royal Navy treated submarine and anti-submarine capability as mutually dependent, using each to make the other more realistic.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Chapter · 12:19 Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Far Eastern patrols demanded very different ranges, bases, and submarine designs.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Notable Point · 19:48 A quiet diesel submarine can wait like a mobile minefield, while a nuclear boat can sprint ahead, attack, and escape.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Q&A · 22:11 A question about snorkels leads to the operational reasons Britain valued other equipment more highly in its expected theatres.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Q&A · 24:51 Submarines are potent warfighting tools, but their invisibility limits conventional presence missions.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Notable Point · 25:54 The T-class hull carried features from earlier British boats into a period when underwater performance was becoming more important than surface speed.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Notable Point · 27:47 British submarine radar installations emphasized warning of aircraft while also offering limited surface-search capability.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Chapter · 29:13 The O, P, and R boats emerged through successive experiments to give Britain long-range submarines for the Far East.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Chapter · 40:49 The S class replaced ageing H boats with a medium design that could serve in the Atlantic while still fitting Mediterranean requirements.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Q&A · 43:34 Britain did practise escorting merchant-style convoys, using Royal Fleet Auxiliary tankers rather than hiring commercial shipping.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Q&A · 47:42 Exercise submarines sought prestigious capital-ship attacks, whereas wartime commanders had strong reasons to sink an available destroyer.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Chapter · 50:24 River-class fleet boats and purpose-built minelayers explored how submarines might accompany a fleet or attack through mines.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Q&A · 51:52 The US Navy concentrated its submarines against Japan while British and American boats used separate patrol areas to reduce operating risks.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Q&A · 52:31 The transition from passive hydrophones to active ASDIC depended on reliable equipment and trained crews, not merely the first appearance of the technology.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Chapter · 56:04 The U class was designed for short-range underwater ambush work from Mediterranean and North Sea bases.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Q&A · 1:01:02 A question about theatre and diving safety leads into the T class's true Far Eastern role, long range, and heavy forward torpedo salvo.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Chapter · 1:08:34 A convoy escort needed endurance and reliable ASW gear, while a fleet escort also needed speed, guns, and air defence.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Q&A · 1:13:51 Surface ships carried more cargo and could be escorted, while submarine supply runs were reserved for exceptional high-value deliveries such as Malta.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Q&A · 1:14:21 British submarine design varied more with operating range and boat size than with insulation for warm or cold water.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Q&A · 1:15:07 A large paper submarine force would have changed the war only if its boats were available early enough and deployed in the theatres suited to them.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Q&A · 1:15:40 Navies have not abandoned convoy protection, but contemporary fleet size limits how widely they can provide it.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Chapter · 1:17:30 ASDIC gave escorts a directional echo and range, but speed, weather, thermal layers, and false contacts limited its use.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Chapter · 1:24:11 The drive toward Hedgehog-like weapons came from the problem of losing ASDIC contact during a stern depth-charge attack.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Chapter · 1:29:31 Treaty limits below 2,000 tons and 20 knots still allowed Britain to build long-range escorts optimized for ASDIC and convoy defence.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Q&A · 1:35:45 The Grimsby class combined long-range Far Eastern ASW work with a plan to spread warship construction beyond British yards.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Q&A · 1:39:19 A badly ranged forward-thrown attack could physically damage the thin ASDIC dome and replace useful echoes with rushing-water noise.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021
Q&A · 1:39:53 Diesel vibration and harmonic noise could interfere with listening equipment before effective machinery isolation became common.
From Patreon 41: RN Strategic & Tactical thinking on submarines & anti-submarine forces between the Wars · 23 Dec 2021