Complete directory
Explore every watch point in reverse video-date order, then in timestamp order within each video.
The scheme aimed to give executive and engineering officers enough shared knowledge to keep a warship functioning when casualties erased normal branch boundaries.
From Selborne Fisher Scheme: It's Conception, Creation, Implementation, Operation and Discontinuation ·
Contrasting Arthur Marder's battleship-complex argument with James Goldrick's account shows why broad claims must be tested against contemporary aircraft limitations.
From Selborne Fisher Scheme: It's Conception, Creation, Implementation, Operation and Discontinuation ·
Carrier conversions, Ark Royal, the Illustrious class, Unicorn, and parallel carrier-battleship orders show a fleet investing within treaty and technology constraints rather than simply rejecting air power.
From Selborne Fisher Scheme: It's Conception, Creation, Implementation, Operation and Discontinuation ·
The scheme's 1905-1919 generation became the lieutenant-commanders and staff officers who interpreted the First World War for the interwar Navy.
From Selborne Fisher Scheme: It's Conception, Creation, Implementation, Operation and Discontinuation ·
Selborne's 1926 intervention distinguishes pre-1902 engineers, common-entry engineers, and officers trained under the 1922 modification before explaining why a new Admiralty order aggrieved all three.
From Selborne Fisher Scheme: It's Conception, Creation, Implementation, Operation and Discontinuation ·
Selborne's 1926 account restores First Sea Lord Walter Kerr to a reform often attributed too narrowly to Jacky Fisher.
From Selborne Fisher Scheme: It's Conception, Creation, Implementation, Operation and Discontinuation ·
Shared training was intended to let officers support another branch during casualties without pretending every specialist could permanently replace every other specialist.
From Selborne Fisher Scheme: It's Conception, Creation, Implementation, Operation and Discontinuation ·
Fisher's problem was how to ensure commanding officers understood enough engineering to recognize machinery trouble and support their specialists.
From Selborne Fisher Scheme: It's Conception, Creation, Implementation, Operation and Discontinuation ·
Cadets would share early education at Osborne, Dartmouth, and sea before specializing in executive, engineering, or Marine duties.
From Selborne Fisher Scheme: It's Conception, Creation, Implementation, Operation and Discontinuation ·
Officer reform extended beyond career rules to Dartmouth, Greenwich, engineering education, and the Royal Naval War College.
From Selborne Fisher Scheme: It's Conception, Creation, Implementation, Operation and Discontinuation ·
Common entry promised engineering specialists a route toward command, but families feared their sons would be trapped in a lower-status career.
From Selborne Fisher Scheme: It's Conception, Creation, Implementation, Operation and Discontinuation ·
Misunderstanding and status prejudice flourished because the Admiralty failed to explain what common entry would do and why a steam navy needed it.
From Selborne Fisher Scheme: It's Conception, Creation, Implementation, Operation and Discontinuation ·
Opponents described common entry as disruptive while the reform forced candidates for specialist roles to compete more directly on merit.
From Selborne Fisher Scheme: It's Conception, Creation, Implementation, Operation and Discontinuation ·
Harold T. C. Walker reached captain in 1931, while the first common-entry engineering specialists did not reach captain in their branch until 1936.
From Selborne Fisher Scheme: It's Conception, Creation, Implementation, Operation and Discontinuation ·
Limited promotion and an unappealing shipboard role left the Marine branch with almost no common-entry volunteers despite the potential value of cross-service officers.
From Selborne Fisher Scheme: It's Conception, Creation, Implementation, Operation and Discontinuation ·
Postwar schools broadened officers' study of war, drafted fighting instructions, and tested ship designs and plans for a future global conflict.
From Selborne Fisher Scheme: It's Conception, Creation, Implementation, Operation and Discontinuation ·
Twenty years after the scheme ended, many captains, commodores, and rear admirals fighting the Second World War were products of its common education.
From Selborne Fisher Scheme: It's Conception, Creation, Implementation, Operation and Discontinuation ·
Interviewers tried to classify twelve-year-old candidates with questions that often measured class background and imperial knowledge as much as future naval aptitude.
From Selborne Fisher Scheme: It's Conception, Creation, Implementation, Operation and Discontinuation ·
The scheme sought a broad pool of technically literate specialists and commanders, but replacing an inherited career system made controlled reform look revolutionary.
From Selborne Fisher Scheme: It's Conception, Creation, Implementation, Operation and Discontinuation ·
The loss of Hood, Courageous, and Glorious opens a wider lesson about irreplaceable officers, chiefs, maintainers, and trainers.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
A carrier with Force Z could have disrupted the land-based bomber attack and preserved the core of a later Allied command in Southeast Asia.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
Moving French capital ships to Indochina offered strategic possibilities but depended on Allied fuel and sympathetic French officers.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
The services' competing priorities made a politically credible naval commander more plausible than Lord Gort for Far Eastern coordination.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
Fighters were waiting at Singapore, but ambiguous messages led Admiral Phillips's command to believe useful air support was unavailable.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
The Alaska comparison illustrates how modest speed gains drive disproportionate machinery, hull, and protection weight.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
An Italian carrier would become the Royal Navy's highest-priority submarine target, while a German carrier required a major task-group response.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
Sound warnings were not enough: interwar naval preparation depended on persuading both politicians and the public.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
Two modernized battlecruisers offered more targets and guns, but a carrier-centered three-capital-ship task group was the stronger answer.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
A 1933 Henderson plan might have delivered extra carriers, escorts, modernizations, and a broader sloop program before war.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
Japan's brutality did not remove the practical problem of getting laborers, materials, and support to the islands that needed defenses.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
Japan's decisive-battle concept did not encompass every strand of naval thought, and realists inside the service understood the wider war they faced.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
Graf Zeppelin or Aquila could distort Allied deployments simply by existing, despite serious flaws in their carrier systems.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
Extreme selectivity produced superb aviators but denied average graduates the operational experience needed to become durable wartime replacements.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
Three fast large cruisers armed with reused 12-inch turrets could have given American carriers a credible answer to the Kongo class.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
The Iowa class can be read as both carrier escorts and a fast scouting wing intended to wound an enemy before slower battleships arrived.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
Supporting Stalin was morally ugly but aligned Allied resources with the state already absorbing the main German attack.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
Britain's attempt to return Free Polish personnel after the war was weakly enforced, and many instead emigrated or settled where they had served.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
Britain and Australia were overstretched, America remained neutral, and a resource bargain with Japan offered little dependable security.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
Four capital-ship losses during 1941, including three fast ships, sharpened the Royal Navy's need to accelerate the Implacable-class carriers.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
An Arethusa-derived cruiser offered a more achievable industrial step than the machinery-heavy Dido design.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
Useful alternatives start with proposals and political arguments that existed at the time, not unlimited hindsight.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
Canada's celebrated ranking depends on counting hulls rather than the tonnage measure commonly inherited from treaty-era comparisons.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
Joint commands, procurement, and shipbuilding could strengthen smaller allied navies without automatically surrendering their national autonomy.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
Political hesitation delayed expansion, while early mobilization effort went into the shipyards and infrastructure that enabled later output.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
Possible Japanese anti-aircraft missile work lacked the guidance, training, and robustness needed for dependable wartime use.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
The location, pattern, and frequency of German transmissions could expose submarine operating areas even before a message was decrypted.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
Radar, protected airfields, heavy anti-aircraft guns, and stockpiles could strengthen key bases only if Britain began a coordinated program around 1930.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·
Simple frigate or sloop escorts could reduce merchant losses and impose higher costs on American submarines, buying Japan time rather than victory.
From Five Weaknesses of Allied/Axis/Minor Navies in 1941 & 1942; Response to some Comments ·