The Ships that Fisher scrapped… suggested by Geoff Grognard

Fisher's long service as a gunnery and torpedo specialist helps explain both his appetite for technical change and his political skill at the Admiralty.

Fisher adopted dancing as suitable exercise for a senior officer and turned it into a way to cultivate prime ministers and the royal family.

No. Fisher was highly capable and faced incompatible demands for economy, modernization, and global naval coverage.

The Fisher-Beresford rivalry also reflected two useful leadership traditions: disruptive technical reform and steady fleet command.

The same technical evidence can support scrapping the Orlandos for rough northern waters or retaining them for the overseas stations they had served.

Fisher's cuts released money for modern ships and reduced political pressure, while concentrating the Royal Navy on a possible European war.

The Imperieuse class retained sail because overseas coal supply could be unreliable, not simply because its engines could not be trusted.

The Admiralty sometimes accepted ships that did not match its wishes because rejecting them could provoke politically costly disputes with builders.

Yes. Fisher urged restraint partly because he expected the Russian fleet to be on the other side of the world shortly.

Partly, but not consistently; some wooden ships still survived Fisher's cuts.

He understood the technology well, but was also very sure that newer meant better.

They faced rapid change in armament and armour. Age alone did not explain why some ships were discarded while others remained useful.

A fleet concentrated in European waters may be militarily mobile, but it cannot instantly replace day-to-day imperial presence across the world.

Better warships can win a battle, but fewer hulls cannot visit the same ports, patrol the same routes, or reassure the same allies in peacetime.

Russia was weakened, but remained a naval factor and rebuilt after the Russo-Japanese War.

Often not. Many third- or fourth-generation ironclads would still have been discarded.

The recurring aim was to gain more speed, larger guns, and longer range than the opposing battlecruiser.

Type 31 and River-class ships address presence, though substantially more are needed.

The race was already under way, and Tirpitz was more important in starting it than Fisher.

Only to a limited extent. Reginald Henderson's two-tier battle-and-presence fleet was more influential.

Political leaders can read a numerical fleet reduction as weakness even when each replacement ship is more capable, making port visits and visible hulls part of deterrence.

Germany pursued a risk fleet: enough ships that Britain could not destroy it without becoming vulnerable elsewhere.

No. Old cruisers could serve as secondary force multipliers while newer British cruisers countered the newest German ships.

Large cruisers alone cannot cover an empire; a practical presence system needs flagships, smaller cruisers, and inexpensive patrol vessels.

Yes. A long-serving Third Sea Lord could acquire greater authority over building decisions.

It can be lost, though the wider ability to respond matters more than demanding that every overseas ship match the newest enemy unit.

Only approximately. They fall into the third or fourth rate depending on the cruiser's size and form.

Scrapping labour-intensive old battleships saved manpower, but comparable reserve cruisers could still supply useful wartime hulls without tying up active crews.

Yes; Type 45 destroyers can use their hangars, while the Type 31 has even more adaptable connected space.

Parliament presented the Orlandos as belted cruisers for commerce protection within a mixed programme of capital ships, scouts, torpedo rams, and torpedo boats.

The Orlando class was designed for overseas commerce protection, not for heavy-weather service with the battle fleet in the North Sea.

A modernized Orlando need not defeat a raider outright to protect a convoy: the prospect of damage and ammunition use could make the attack unattractive.

Probably between about 1916 and 1920.

The Royal Navy understood convoy methods, but lacked enough cruisers and destroyers to protect trade while also sustaining the Grand Fleet and worldwide commitments.

They could threaten trade, alongside mines and cheap explosive swarm craft launched from a mother ship.

An older and less capable predecessor to the Orlando class survived into 1920, supporting the argument that reserve status shaped Fisher's cuts.

First World War submarines were slow submersible ambush craft with limited torpedoes, so armed convoys and surface escorts could still constrain them.

More available cruisers could have strengthened Cradock's squadron enough to make Spee's range advantage and confidence in battle less decisive.

It was less advanced than reliable later Allied systems, though the troubled Mark 14 is an unusually low benchmark.

Yes. Every cruiser loss worsened a broader shortage of ships for patrol, escort, and overseas duties.

War quickly consumes cruiser and destroyer availability, making reserve hulls valuable even when they are no longer first-line combatants.

No. They were in the wrong place at the wrong time rather than primarily deployed as a sea-training exercise.

No. An illustrative alternative combines 24 Tribals with 72 J-type destroyers.

A balanced navy needs a powerful battle core behind numerous presence ships, with reserves helping preserve both readiness and hull numbers.

Ski-jump landing helicopter docks could share aircraft with the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers and preserve both strike and amphibious options.

Apollo-class cruisers served as minelayers, patrol vessels, presence ships, and blockships, showing how old hulls could be repurposed instead of discarded.

Not really. They are too small for the category, though close enough to invite comparison.

Not consistently. Some scrapped ships had received newer boilers, while reserve status appears more important to the disposal pattern.

At 2,575 tons, the Pearl class paired quick-firing 4.7-inch guns with the size and duties of a sloop, making it useful for distant stations rather than fleet battle.

It was probably large enough for some modern radar, on a scale comparable with a River-class patrol ship.

It was used to push more power and speed, while the resulting deeper running condition worsened the Orlandos' belt and seakeeping problem.

The survival of technically old Pearl-class and wooden or composite ships supports the view that reserve status mattered more than any consistently applied disposal threshold.

The closing argument accepts Fisher's North Sea logic but finds the reductions damaging to global escort, reserve, and presence requirements.

Britain had reservists but too few retained hulls for early convoys, allowing German submarine success to attract further investment.

The drawing may show a sloped protective deck, about two inches on the slopes and one inch on top, although the material could be ordinary steel rather than armour.

Probably, though even Fisher could not combine successful technology, enough replacement ships, and lower fleet costs all at once.

The decisions came in 1904-05, when torpedoes and submarines were already influential, but neither displaced every other naval capability.

Once an aircraft is no longer a top fighter, its existing performance and payload capacity can still make it useful for ground attack.

Open water provided much more room for takeoff, landing, and experimentation than the limited land airfields of the period.