The Most Pointless Mission: Operation Tan No 2 (Long Patrol) - Working Sound

The opening separates unavoidable wartime sacrifice from an operation too small and poorly planned to achieve its stated aims.

Operation Y-Go is used to show that even a successful surprise attack on American carriers could only delay, not reverse, the Pacific war.

Kantai Kessen's failure warns against strategies that work only if the enemy keeps making mistakes.

An earlier 54-aircraft plan against Majuro reveals how little margin Japan had for a surprise raid on a major anchorage.

The C6N Saiun promised long-range reconnaissance, but the move to Truk left only one aircraft reliably available.

Ulithi's immense anchorage exposes the mismatch between the American fleet base and Japan's small proposed raid.

The C6N deployment shows why observed serviceability must determine force size and logistics.

The planned 24 Ginga kamikaze strike depended on a long weather-avoidance route that made fuel itself part of the weapon's shortfall.

The submarine plan added logistics, navigation, and rescue tasks while mechanical failures and rigid orders eroded its usefulness.

A C6N reconnaissance flight identified carriers at Ulithi, but bad weather and engine failures began dismantling the strike force on departure.

Engine trouble and a navigation error left only two aircraft at Ulithi, where one struck USS Randolph with little fuel remaining.

A counterfactual comparison with the Doolittle Raid asks whether larger bombers could have delivered enough fuel and explosives to threaten Ulithi's carriers.

Okinawa's Big Blue Blanket and carrier damage images show how air defence, fuel, repeated impacts, and construction shaped kamikaze consequences.

The aftermath contrasts carrier resilience with a true forlorn hope: extreme risk is defensible only when it can unlock a concrete gain.